I was inspired to write this story by purchasing twenty cans of “army stew from the state reserve.” I bought it based on the reviews from workers. The stew turned out to be shit. Yes, there is grease on the can, but there is an unpleasant taste and smell, there is a lot of liquid, the meat looks more like minced meat. The people have come to the point where they have forgotten the taste of normal stew. But I don’t just remember it, thanks to Soviet supplies in food warehouses Ukrainian army, but I also have something to compare it with. For long field trips, there is real army beef in thick cans in the pantry: meat in one or two large pieces, fat, bay leaves. In general, I felt sad and immediately the famous (and therefore standard) image of overseas food, which seekers like to remember, arose in my head. historical truth". It is the stew that is usually branded with the damned scoop, because “without America he himself could not have done it.” But hardly anyone can clearly tell what it looks like and how it was made. But I can. We will talk about pork stew, aka “svinaia tushonka "But for our comparative purposes this is unimportant, since the current canned food, whether beef or pork, is equally crappy.

“Reliable information”, according to which the USSR’s victory in the war became possible only thanks to the material assistance of the inhabitants of the Empire of Good, at one time simply piled up. Some researchers stated in all seriousness that the wild inhabitants of the country of the Soviets (workers', peasants' and soldiers' deputies) first became acquainted with meat in a tin only thanks to the Americans. Sometimes you can come across rather bizarre information that this stew was either caramel or chocolate. But these are simply local features of the general flow of inadequate understanding of allied relations and military supplies. Digressing literally a millimeter, I note that at the end of the war, Great Britain owed the United States and Canada $5.53 billion for Lend-Lease goods and paid off the debt only in 2006.

Canned meat (and other types of canned food) experienced its finest hour back in the First World War. In fact, they have been made since about the middle of the 19th century, supplying both polar expeditions and ordinary citizens, since there were plenty of private manufacturers. To be precise, the first cannery in Russian Empire was built in 1870. It has been scientifically measured that the volume of a can of meat for military use should be one pound, i.e. 409 grams. Self-heating canned food with a compartment for water and quicklime was also produced for the army (albeit in small quantities). When the compartment was rotated, the substances were combined, releasing a large amount of heat. According to legend, this find was subsequently adopted by the Germans, who supplied units leading with such canned food. fighting in conditions of disgustingly low temperatures.

So we knew the taste of stew first hand and, let me emphasize, we made it for the Red Army in our own factories. Simply due to the loss of territory (along with stewing warehouses) and industry, little of it was made, as well as equipment and weapons. This is where the need to fill the gap grew. In direct meat ratio, the USSR produced 432.5 million cans of canned food during the war years. The Allies (including the USA) supplied 2 billion 077 million cans, that is, 4.8 times more. Soviet stew was made strictly according to GOST from beef aged 48 hours after slaughter. In this way, the royal stew tradition was continued, since at that time soldiers’ food was also made from beef.

The Americans focused on stewed pork. And they did it with a special patrician enthusiasm. Here's how it happened at the Kroger grocery and baking company, Cincinnati, Ohio, in 1943 (translated from American):

Madine Hood, 19 years old. Separates fat from meat. Former housewife. Her husband is in the US Army.

Madine and her fighting friends (I signed this myself).

Mrs. M. Bury cuts the pork into portions before the meat is given a 20 percent sear. Her husband is involved in some kind of "defense work", three sons are in the US Army. One in North Africa.

The same process from the outside. From left to right: Dorothy Roland and Flora Keaton, former housewives; Susan Brown, meat packing plant worker; Edith Bixton, telephone operator.

Boilers where the pork is seared before it goes into the can.

Dump the meat out of the container after frying and for another eight minutes at 180 degrees. Henderson Fuller (left), 40, former design engineer.

The girls place lard (pork fat), spices and onions into jars before the pork is added. From left to right: Bonnie Williams, 21, worked in a clothing factory. Her husband is in the US Army; Elta Wininger, 29, former housewife, her brother (fighting) in North Africa.


Same process. Right: Bonnie Williams, 21 (see above).

Inspectors (control, in short) check each can after they come out of the pressure cooker, where the meat was cooked for 2.5 hours at a temperature of 160-250 degrees. From left to right: Pearl Isen, 27, former housewife. Her husband and brother are in the US Army; Faye Brynsen, 22, former housewife. Her husband is at the already mentioned mysterious “defense work”.

Mary Duvall, 26, a former housewife, packs cans of pork. Her husband is on "defense work" and her brother is in the army.

All this is called quite briefly: “Preparing canned pork (Russian: “svinaia tushonka”) for lend-lease shipment to the USSR.” Each of these young ladies (and young men who, for various reasons, did not end up in the army), as follows from brief description, is a classic “home front worker” while husbands and brothers fight the Nazis. And what is shameful about this, may I ask? Or is it a shame to be a “home front worker” only in relation to our history? I take this opportunity to insert this pin because it is a very convenient opportunity. Briefly speaking. This is what came out:

And the volumes of stewed meat supplied to the USSR were sufficient to feed the population of the liberated territories. By the way, 331,066 liters of alcohol were supplied under Lend-Lease. So there was something to drink for the Victory. Let us all thank photographer Gollem R. Howard and the Library of Congress, where the originals of these photographs are carefully preserved. All photos are from 1943.

About American supplies to the USSR during the Great Years Patriotic War almost everyone knows. Studebakers and American stew, nicknamed “the second front” by Soviet soldiers, immediately come to mind. But these are rather artistic and emotional symbols, which are actually the tip of the iceberg. The purpose of this article is the creation of general idea about Lend-Lease and its role in the Great Victory.

In the initial period of World War II, the so-called neutrality act was in force in the United States, according to which the only way to provide assistance to any of the warring parties was the sale of weapons and materials exclusively for cash, and transportation was also entrusted to the customer - the “pay and take” system (cash). and carry). Great Britain then became the main consumer of military products in the United States, but very soon it exhausted its foreign exchange funds. At the same time, President Franklin Roosevelt understood perfectly well that in the current situation the best way out for the United States was to provide all possible economic support to countries fighting against Nazi Germany. Therefore, on March 11, 1941, he actually “pushed through” the “Act for the Defense of the United States,” also called the Lend-Lease Act, in Congress. Now any country whose defense was considered vital to the United States and strategic raw materials was provided under the following conditions:

1. Weapons and materials lost during hostilities are not subject to payment.

2. The remaining property suitable for civilian purposes after the end of the war must be paid for in whole or in part on the basis of long-term loans provided by the United States.

3. Any equipment not lost after the war must be returned to the United States.

Joseph Stalin and Harry Hopkins, 1941

After Germany attacked the USSR, Roosevelt sent his closest assistant Harry Hopkins to Moscow, as he wanted to find out “how long Russia could hold out.” This was important, since the prevailing opinion in the United States at that time was that the Soviet resistance would not be able to provide significant resistance to the Germans, and the supplied weapons and materials would simply fall to the enemy. On July 31, Harry Hopkins met with Vyacheslav Molotov and Joseph Stalin. As a result, the American politician left for Washington with the firm conviction that the Germans would not have a quick victory and that the supply of weapons to Moscow could have a significant impact on the course of hostilities.

However, the inclusion of the USSR in the Lend-Lease program occurred only in October-November 1941 (until that moment, our country paid for all American military supplies). It took Roosevelt such a long period of time to overcome the resistance sufficiently large number American politicians.

The first (Moscow) protocol, signed on October 1, 1941, provided for the supply of aircraft (fighters and bombers), tanks, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, trucks, as well as aluminum, toluene, TNT, petroleum products, wheat and sugar. Further, the quantity and range of supplies constantly expanded.

Cargo delivery took place along three main routes: the Pacific, Trans-Iranian and Arctic. The fastest, but at the same time dangerous, was the Arctic route to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. The ships were escorted by the British fleet, and on the approaches to Murmansk, security was reinforced by ships of the Soviet Northern Fleet. At first, the Germans practically did not pay attention to the northern convoys - their confidence in an early victory remained so great, but as the fighting became protracted, the German command pulled more and more forces to bases in Norway. The result was not long in coming.

In July 1942, the German fleet, in close cooperation with aviation, practically destroyed convoy PQ-17: 22 transport ships out of 35 were killed. Heavy losses, as well as the need to attract a large number of ships to escort ships with supplies for besieged Malta, and then prepare the landing in North Africa forced the British to stop escorting northern convoys before the onset of the polar night. Beginning in 1943, the balance of power in Arctic waters gradually began to shift towards the Allies. There were more convoys, and their escort was accompanied by fewer losses. In total, there are 4027 thousand tons of cargo along the Arctic route to the USSR. Losses did not exceed 7% of the total.

The Pacific route was less dangerous, along which 8,376 thousand tons were delivered. Transportation could only be carried out by ships flying the Soviet flag (the USSR, unlike the United States, was not at war with Japan at that time). Then the resulting cargo had to be transported by rail through almost the entire territory of Russia.

The trans-Iranian route served as a definite alternative to the northern convoys. American transport ships delivered cargo to the ports of the Persian Gulf, and then they were delivered to Russia using rail and road transport. In order to ensure complete control over transport routes, the USSR and Great Britain occupied Iran in August 1941.

To increase throughput, a large-scale modernization of the ports of the Persian Gulf and Trans-Iranian railway. General Motors also built two factories in Iran where they assembled cars intended for delivery to the USSR. In total, during the war years, these enterprises produced and sent 184,112 cars to our country. The total cargo flow through the ports of the Persian Gulf for the entire period of existence of the trans-Iranian route amounted to 4227 thousand tons.

Aircraft under the Lend-Lease program

From the beginning of 1945, after the liberation of Greece, the Black Sea route also began to function. The USSR received 459 thousand tons of cargo this way.

In addition to those noted above, there were two more air routes along which aircraft were ferried “under their own power” to the USSR. The most famous was the Alsib air bridge (Alaska - Siberia), over which 7925 aircraft were transferred. Airplanes also flew from the USA to the USSR via the South Atlantic, Africa and the Persian Gulf (993 aircraft).

For many years, the works of domestic historians indicated that deliveries under Lend-Lease accounted for only about 4% of the total volume of production of Soviet industry and Agriculture. And, although there is no reason to doubt the reliability of this figure, nevertheless, “the devil is in the details.”

It is well known that the strength of a chain as a whole is determined by the strength of its weakest link. Therefore, when determining the range of American supplies, the Soviet leadership sought first of all to close “ weak spots"in the army and industry. This can be seen especially clearly when analyzing the volumes of strategic raw materials supplied to the USSR. In particular, our country received 295.6 thousand tons explosives accounted for 53% of all produced at domestic enterprises. Even more impressive is this ratio for copper - 76%, aluminum - 106%, tin - 223%, cobalt - 138%, wool - 102%, sugar - 66% and canned meat - 480%.

General A.M. Korolev and Major General Donald Connelly shake hands in front of a train arriving as part of Lend-Lease deliveries.

The analysis of automotive equipment supplies deserves no less close attention. In total, the USSR received 447,785 cars under Lend-Lease.
It is significant that Soviet industry produced only 265 thousand cars during the war years. Thus, the number of vehicles received from the allies was more than 1.5 times higher than our own production. In addition, these were real army vehicles, adapted for use in front-line conditions, while domestic industry supplied the army with ordinary national economic vehicles.

The role of Lend-Lease vehicles in combat operations is difficult to overestimate. To a large extent, they ensured the success of the victorious operations of 1944, which were included in the “ten Stalinist strikes.”

Considerable credit goes to allied supplies for the successful functioning of Soviet railway transport during the war. The USSR received 1,900 steam locomotives and 66 diesel-electric locomotives (these figures look especially clear against the background of its own production in 1942–1945 of 92 locomotives), as well as 11,075 cars (own production - 1,087 cars).

“Reverse Lend-Lease” also functioned in parallel. During the war years, the Allies received from the USSR 300 thousand tons of chrome and 32 thousand tons of manganese ore, as well as wood, gold and platinum.

During discussions on the topic “Could the USSR do without Lend-Lease?” many copies were broken. The author believes that, most likely, he could. Another thing is that now it is not possible to calculate what the price of this would be. If the volume of weapons supplied by the allies, to one degree or another, could well be compensated by domestic industry, then with regard to transport, as well as the production of a number of types of strategic raw materials, without supplies from the allies, the situation would very quickly become critical.

The lack of rail and road transport could easily paralyze the supply of the army and deprive it of mobility, and this, in turn, would slow down the pace of operations and increase the growth of losses. A shortage of non-ferrous metals, especially aluminum, would lead to a decrease in the production of weapons, and without food supplies it would be much more difficult to fight hunger. Surely our country would be able to survive and win even in such a situation, but it is not possible to determine how much the price of victory would increase.

The Lend-Lease program ended at the initiative of the American government on August 21, 1945, although the USSR asked to continue supplies on credit terms (it was necessary to restore the country destroyed by the war). However, by that time F. Roosevelt was no longer among the living, and the new era of the Cold War was loudly knocking on the door.

During the war, payments for supplies under Lend-Lease were not made. In 1947, the United States estimated the USSR's debt for supplies at $2.6 billion, but a year later the amount was reduced to $1.3 billion. It was planned that repayment would be made over 30 years with an interest rate of 2.3% per annum. I.V. Stalin rejected these accounts, saying that “the USSR paid off the Lend-Lease debts in full with blood.” To substantiate its point of view, the USSR cited the precedent of writing off debts for deliveries under Lend-Lease to other countries. In addition, I.V. Stalin quite reasonably did not want to give the funds of a war-ravaged country to a potential enemy in the Third World War.

An agreement on the procedure for repaying debts was concluded only in 1972. The USSR pledged to pay $722 million by 2001. But after the transfer of $48 million, payments stopped again due to the adoption by the United States of the discriminatory Jackson-Vanik amendment.

This issue was raised again in 1990 at a meeting of the presidents of the USSR and the USA. A new amount was set - $674 million - and the final repayment date was 2030. After the collapse of the USSR, obligations on this debt passed to Russia.

Summing up, we can conclude that for the United States, Lend-Lease was, first of all, in the words of F. Roosevelt, “a profitable investment of capital.” Moreover, it is not the profits directly from supplies that should be assessed, but the numerous indirect benefits that the American economy received after the end of World War II. History would have it that the post-war well-being of the United States was paid for to a large extent with the blood of Soviet soldiers. For the USSR, Lend-Lease became practically the only way reduce the number of casualties on the way to Victory. This is a “marriage of convenience”...

The 75th anniversary of a unique project - the first convoy to deliver aid from allied states to the warring Soviet Union - was celebrated in these last summer days in countries involved in the history of the famous Lend-Lease. On August 21, 1941, the first caravan of five British and one Dutch transport set off for the USSR, arriving in Arkhangelsk ten days later. The Soviet port then received 15 Hurricane fighters, 3.8 thousand depth charges and magnetic mines, 10 thousand tons of rubber, fuel, various equipment, uniform items, wool for sewing. In just four war years, from the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition in the USSR More than one and a half thousand transports and tankers proceeded back and forth, over 22 thousand aircraft, more than 13 thousand tanks, thousands of guns, rifles, tons of explosives, and impressive food supplies were delivered. At the same time, it was the Arctic route (there were also the Pacific and Trans-Iranian routes) that provided the bulk of supplies under Lend-Lease. More than five thousand sailors - participants in front-line convoys - remained forever in these cold waters...
Help on loan Dozens of films have been made about Lend-Lease, and an impressive number of books have been written. In our country the most famous a work of art Valentin Pikul’s novel “Requiem for the PQ-17 Caravan” was written on this topic - a difficult but poignant thing... By the way, why PQ? This designation arose by chance - from the initials of the British officer Peter Quelyn, who was in charge of convoy planning in the USSR in the operational department of the Admiralty. In turn, caravans going in the opposite direction were designated, accordingly, by the code QP. Another Lend-Lease secret - were deliveries to the Soviet Union absolutely disinterested?
The US Congress adopted the Lend-Lease Act back in March 1941, and the name itself clearly consisted of the words lend - to lend and lease - to rent. To some extent, this was precisely a loan, because in response to the supplied weapons and other goods, the allies received from the USSR 300 thousand tons of chrome ore, 32 thousand tons of manganese ore, a significant amount of platinum, gold, timber and other raw materials. Of course, the amount of assistance and the fees for it are incomparable: according to official information, the USSR received cargo worth 10.8 billion dollars. However, for some supplies, Russia completed settlements with the United States only in 2006, paying a total of more than $700 million. Fortunately, the Americans agreed to take into account only “civilian” cargo in the calculations: equipment and equipment that had military significance, were declared irretrievably lost
Of course, the sailors who risked their lives in Arctic waters were not thinking about profit, although, according to the recollections of some participants in the convoys, it was the high pay that lured them into dangerous campaigns (monthly payments amounted to up to five hundred dollars, which was in the States, which experienced Great Depression, huge fortune). And yet it is believed that the northern convoys became primarily symbols of courage and perseverance in battles at sea, where the cold of the polar latitudes, ice and storms multiplied the horrors of war. By and large, it was here that the allied duty of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition was first hardened.
"Airacobra" for Pokryshkin What went into Soviet Union? Tanks, cars, planes, explosives. The famous ace, three times Hero of the Soviet Union Alexander Pokryshkin flew the American P-39N Airacobra delivered under Lend-Lease. It is interesting that these aircraft were operated in our country after the war - until the early 1950s. In general, the supply range included a wide range of products. The Soviet Union received almost two thousand locomotives, 8 thousand tractors, 35 thousand motorcycles. It is known that it was the Lend-Lease Studebakers that became the main chassis for the famous Katyushas in the second half of the Great Patriotic War: the States provided about 20 thousand trucks for the first Soviet MLRS. And the nimble Willys passenger car became almost the main staff vehicle in the Red Army.

Impressive deliveries came through food and clothing supplies. 15.4 million pairs of army boots, more than one hundred thousand tons of cotton for sewing military uniform. Anastas Mikoyan, who was responsible for the work of the key people's commissariats in the system during the war years National economy, who was also involved in receiving supplies under Lend-Lease, recalled that with the arrival of American stew, combined fat, and egg powder, the soldiers immediately began to receive significant additional rations. Some things also fell to the rear. And they also say that it was by sea that the first films with the incredibly popular film “Sun Valley Serenade” came to the USSR. And the film itself, and most importantly the music of the big band Glenn Miller sounding in it, quickly fell in love with Soviet viewers. According to official sources, Lend-Lease supplies provided the USSR with more than half of the production of explosives, doubled the production of aluminum, tripled the production of tin, and six times - canned meat. It was from abroad that supplies of aviation gasoline arrived at Soviet front-line airfields. However, the same Anastas Mikoyan rightly noted: although this help shortened the road to Victory, it did not at all decide the final outcome of the war...
Heroes of the northern convoys

Our country paid a high price for foreign aid convoys. And we are not only talking about the already mentioned “reverse” supplies of raw materials or cash payments under contracts. During the war, the ships of the Northern Fleet alone made over 800 trips to sea to protect caravans. Some ship movements resembled large-scale military operations.
By the way, the first “Dervish”, which arrived in Arkhangelsk in 1941 and consisted of six cargo ships, was guarded by nine warships at once - two minesweepers, four destroyers and three anti-submarine trawlers. Almost all the forces of the fleet took part in the operations to escort the caravans. Joseph Stalin personally set this task to the commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Arseny Golovko. Destroyers and patrol ships they strengthened the direct protection of convoys, minesweepers and boats kept coastal areas and roadsteads safe from mines and submarines. Aviation covered convoys as they approached at a distance of 150-200 miles to the coast and carried out air defense of bases and ship moorings. It was while defending one of the caravans (PQ-16) that the commander of the aviation regiment, the first twice Hero of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War, Lieutenant Colonel Boris Safonov, died.
By an evil twist of fate, the legendary pilot fought his last battle on the American Kittyhawk fighter delivered under Lend-Lease...
The routes of the Lend-Lease caravans ran through the most dangerous places, in areas of active operations of the German fleet. Hitler, who at first did not attach importance to these campaigns, from the beginning of 1942 gave the order to launch a hunt for Allied transports. After the death of the 42nd PQ-17 convoy in the summer, Great Britain refused to participate in convoys. Only persistent reminders of the need to fulfill allied obligations prompted Winston Churchill to resume ship cruises.
It is interesting that the crews had practically no forces to protect against attacks - both air and sea. In case of falling behind a convoy or a solo campaign (such were practiced during 1942), the sailors had little chance of survival. The Americans tried to organize something like combat training for their crews during their rest period after campaigns, but it was almost impossible to convince the tired sailors of the need for such training.
In this regard, the behavior of the sailors of Soviet ships, who were also part of the caravans, can be considered truly heroic. Thus, the timber carrier “Old Bolshevik”, traveling as part of convoy PQ-16, was set on fire by German aircraft. The Soviet sailors rejected the British offer to transfer to their transports, after which the convoy left, leaving a burning timber carrier. For eight hours the crew fought the fire and repelled attacks from enemy aircraft. And he came out victorious! Having repaired the damage, the sailors delivered the cargo to Murmansk. The captain of the ship and one of the crew members were awarded the Stars of Heroes. He refused to go to the rescue ships and the crew of the Azerbaijan tanker, which caught fire after being hit by aerial bombs. The team managed not only to localize the fire and put it out, but also to deliver the fuel to its destination. Moreover, the crew of the ship was predominantly women...
Commonwealth maritime hub
Russian historian, head of the department national history Northern (Arctic) federal university named after M.V. Lomonosov, professor, doctor historical sciences Mikhail Suprun wrote about a hundred scientific works, dedicated to the northern convoys and the Lend-Lease program. In his opinion, those years set an example of unprecedented technical, economic and military cooperation between the countries participating in the anti-Hitler coalition. “Moral support was especially important at the beginning of the war Soviet people, notes the historian. - The moral factor in war, as Napoleon put it, correlates with the material factor as “three to one.” This help not only instilled confidence in victory among Soviet people, but was also a strong demoralizing factor in the enemy camp. The threat of fascism turned out to be so great that it pushed all contradictions into the background, Mikhail Suprun also emphasizes. - History has never known such experience of interstate cooperation. This, of course, does not mean that contradictions disappeared completely in the interaction of the war years. But the very desire to build relations on the basis of dialogue, harmony and tolerance is an example of the most important principles in solving interstate problems. The experience of cooperation between states during the Second World War is especially valuable these days.” The head of the Russian Military Historical Society, Minister of Culture of the Russian Federation Vladimir Medinsky believes that during the Great Patriotic War one of the strongest “sea knots” was tied in Arkhangelsk, cementing the ties military community of countries Anti-Hitler coalition. “The first allied convoy from Great Britain marked the beginning of an operation unparalleled in history, the scale of which was comparable to a gigantic land battle,” notes the head of the RVIO. - During the war, such convoys were of strategic importance both for the Soviet Union and for the Western powers. Lend-Lease brought the overall victory over the aggressors closer, and the sacrificial efforts of Soviet and allied sailors and pilots demonstrated to the citizens of the USSR and allied countries that they were not alone in the ongoing battle against fascism. I am sure that even today in many issues it makes sense to turn to the accumulated historical baggage of interaction. Just like it was 75 years ago."

Lend-Lease is called the Allies' contribution to the common victory over fascism. But this was also the first experience of mass acquaintance of Soviet people with Western goods

America - Russia

On November 6, 1941, ten days before the feat of 28 Panfilov men at the Dubosekovo crossing and a day before the historical parade on Red Square, the United States decided to supply the Soviet Union with weapons, military equipment and food. Based on this decision, the Allies supplied the USSR with a huge amount of a wide variety of products. This was the first experience of mass acquaintance of Soviet people with Western goods. Even today, imports into Russia in monetary terms hardly reach the scale of that “consumer lending” campaign.

The volume of American supplies under Lend-Lease to the USSR amounted to about 11 billion dollars. A huge amount for those times. True, even in the era of great opposition to fascism, the class-alien USSR did not become America’s main partner. The cost of Lend-Lease deliveries to the UK was much more significant - more than $30 billion. Moreover, at first the Americans were in no hurry: by the end of 1941, only half a percent of the promised volume of military equipment and weapons was delivered to the USSR. And only after Pearl Harbor did Lend-Lease cargo begin to arrive in the USSR with enviable regularity.

Deliveries went along several routes: through Iran, by sea - to Arkhangelsk and Murmansk and to Pacific ports, and by air - from Alaska through Siberia. The planes took off in Fairbanks, America, and flew through Chukotka, Yakutia and Krasnoyarsk to front-line airfields. Even today this route is considered difficult, and during the war many pilots never reached their final goal, forever remaining somewhere in the middle of the endless taiga. But in any case, each of them routinely repeated the same feat for which Valery Chkalov’s crew once received hero stars.

The same story applies to the sailors who drove ships across the North Atlantic. After these transitions, the Americans and British recognized that the Russians were a great maritime nation. At least they themselves did not dare to cross the Atlantic along the “great circle arc” on boats.

Weapon of Victory

During the war years, the USSR received thousands of tanks, aircraft, military and cargo ships under Lend-Lease. It is well known that our famous aviation ace Alexander Pokryshkin has fought exclusively in the Airacobra since 1943. Later, his regiment, and then the division he commanded, fought with the Germans in full strength on the same vehicles. Another eminent Soviet pilot, Boris Safonov, preferred the English Kittyhawk. And the pilots of Yevgeny Preobrazhensky’s regiment, who in 1941 bombed Berlin on domestic DBs, moved to American Bostons in 1943.

Data show that deliveries under Lend-Lease amounted to 16 percent of those produced by the Soviet aviation industry for front-line fighters, and 20 percent for front-line bombers. Thus, almost every fourth fighter and bomber that entered the USSR Air Force during the Great Patriotic War was of Anglo-American production. And this cannot be ignored. This was a real help, especially initial stage war.

True, not everything imported was better than domestic. This was especially true for tanks. None of the Western models even came close to comparison with the T-34. "Shermans", "Stuarts", "Valentines", "Matildas" and "Churchills" burned like torches. The MZA1 tank, which in the USSR received the name BM-7, was especially notorious, which jokers deciphered as follows: " mass grave for seven." In the end, the Americans made a new Sherman - M4A3E8, almost as good as the Tigers and T-34, but almost all of these tanks fought on the Western Front.

American supplies of automotive equipment to the USSR were very large, but for the US auto industry it was a drop in the ocean. Jeeps and Studebakers received under Lend-Lease accounted for only about one percent of their total production in the States. The famous German saboteur Otto Skorzeny did not know this and was badly burned. During the Ardennes offensive, he loaded five of his thugs into a jeep, dressed in American uniforms. And almost all of them were instantly exposed and destroyed. The reason is simple: due to the abundance of cars, Americans traveled in jeeps alone or together. The third could only be a beautiful stranger.

An important role was played by the supply of Liberty-class ships, on whose iron shoulders the bulk of the cargo was transported. Moreover, as he believes American professor Hubert van Guille, "Liberty" had a certain influence on the timing of the opening of the Second Front. According to him, back in 1942, Franklin Roosevelt, through Vyacheslav Molotov, offered Joseph Stalin to make a choice: either the Liberty would work under the Lend-Lease program, or they would be entrusted with the transfer of American troops to Europe to open the Second Front. As if Stalin chose Lend-Lease...

"Second front"

And yet, the main thing in Lend-Lease was not tanks and planes, but food. Already at the beginning of the war, the Germans captured the territory that produced 84 percent of the sugar and almost 40 percent of the grain in the USSR. Not only the army, but the entire country was threatened with famine. Without supplies of equipment and weapons, the USSR had a chance to win the war, but without a “second front,” as the American stew was called, it did not.

In addition to canned meat and grain, the Lend-Lease diet included the no less popular “Roosevelt eggs” - powdered eggs from the “just add water” series, dark chocolate (for pilots, scouts and sailors), biscuits, as well as canned food, incomprehensible to the Russian taste a substance called "chocolate-covered meat". Canned turkeys and chickens were supplied with the same “sauce”.

Childhood memory: a can of canned American borscht, which stood on the windowsill for many years as a gastronomic monument to the alliance, until, out of curiosity, it was used for its intended purpose. Then doubts arose: was there borscht? As you know, this dish is not in the American culinary tradition. But it turned out that there was no mistake - especially for the peoples of the USSR, the USA mastered the preparation of borscht, which was supplied both in bags and in jars. And it is possible that somewhere in our deep warehouses these products are still stored, which, by and large, do not have a statute of limitations.

However, many Soviet soldiers, who sat in the trenches on the front line from bell to bell, never had a chance to appreciate the taste of the “second front.” But the appearance of delicacies from Lend-Lease deliveries was noted in special stores and restaurants in the rear, as well as on the black market. Nevertheless, food Lend-Lease played a role. The food supplied to the USSR would have been enough to feed an army of ten million for 1,600 days - that is, for the entire Great Patriotic War and a little more than six months. By the way, on May 12, 1945, when the question of the USSR’s entry into the war with Japan was being decided, supplies were unexpectedly suspended. Later, Harry Truman argued that this scandalous order was “insidiously slipped to him” and he signed it without looking. Be that as it may, exactly on the day of Japan’s surrender, the Lend-Lease supply program was completely and irrevocably curtailed. The time has come for another war - the Cold War.

Marshal's coat

Veterans of Russian diplomacy may still remember this funny story. At the height of the war, a representative delegation from the State Department arrived in the USSR and was greeted at the airfield to the highest standards. However, high-ranking allies diligently avoided hugs and monotonously, through an interpreter, asked the same question: why, they say, are only drivers meeting us?

For everything to fall into place, we need to look at the situation through the eyes of the Americans: not only those who met them Soviet generals, but other officials were almost entirely packed in the leather coats that came with the Studebakers. In America, no one really wore such clothes except for drivers. It was a kind of work uniform, one might say, overalls.

In the USSR, leather coats, confiscated from Studebakers by efficient rear officials, became a tangible sign of belonging to the military and civilian elite. Photo chronicles of the war impartially testify: even front commanders sported chauffeur's coats. Zhukov and Rokossovsky were no exception. But even earlier, American leather coats appeared on the shoulders of various rear-facing rogues. According to the writer Eduard Khrutsky, this type of clothing was very much to the taste of the criminal world of Moscow. After 1947, when the last deposits of Lend-Lease were being sold, an American leather coat could be purchased by anyone who had money. So Lend-Lease determined fashion trends in the USSR for a long time.

Still appreciated leather jackets"pilot" type from the "Aerocobra" kit. Alexander Pokryshkin practically never took off such a jacket - neither on the ground nor in the sky. Really very comfortable clothes. First motorcyclists understood this, and then other fashionistas. And today you can acquire the legendary American Falcons jacket without much difficulty.

Hour of Reckoning

It must be emphasized that Lend-Lease is not a charity program. After the war, the Americans demanded the return of the surviving military equipment and weapons. And they took it meticulously. But they didn’t take us overseas. Powerful presses were installed right in Soviet ports, which turned usable cars and other equipment into neat briquettes. After which they were taken to neutral waters and mercilessly drowned. It would be difficult to imagine a more subtle mockery of the inhabitants of a dilapidated country. Is it possible to withdraw from Soviet distribution the Lend-Lease blockbuster from Hollywood “His Butler’s Sister” with Dina Durbin in the title role...

Professor Hubert van Guile believes that this was done for economic reasons - so that a popular product would not appear on the secondary market. But there is another explanation: former allies They were very afraid that the Red Army, in the same jeeps and Studebakers, would rush to the English Channel in the blink of an eye. And this explanation seems more reasonable.

Then the debit and credit were combined. For example, the British settled accounts with the Americans by introducing the dollar into their colonies. We were presented with a bill of 2.6 billion dollars, although we believed - and quite reasonably - that soviet soldier paid for Lend-Lease in full with his blood. Later, the debt was halved, then reduced further, resulting in $722 million, which we had to pay off first by 2001, and now by 2030. But this is an American assessment. We believe that after the collapse of the USSR and the re-issuance of the Lend-Lease debt, we only have 100 million left to pay. And then the line will finally be drawn under the Second World War.

Or maybe it’s better to pay before the stabilization fund is wasted?

The editors of the magazine "Itogi" express gratitude to the Central Museum of the Great Patriotic War for their assistance in organizing photography.

Oleg Odnokolenko

Insertion 1

STATISTICS

Lend-Lease in numbers

The range and volumes of deliveries under Lend-Lease are amazing. The USSR received everything from overseas, from military equipment and weapons to raw materials and food.

The fleet received a total of 520 ships and vessels - including 128 transport ships, 3 icebreakers and 281 warships, the largest of which were Tacoma-class frigates. The Allies supplied about 20 thousand units of armored vehicles, of which 12 thousand tanks, combat and transport aircraft - 22 thousand pieces, other weapons - 10 thousand artillery pieces, 472 million shells and more than 130 thousand machine guns. The supplies of explosives were especially large - 900 thousand tons, more than half of the Soviet production of explosives.

The number of vehicles was several times greater than the number of military equipment supplied under Lend-Lease: 376 thousand trucks, more than 51 thousand passenger SUVs, almost 36 thousand motorcycles, 8 thousand tractors, 1.9 thousand steam locomotives, about 10 thousand railway platforms. Plus 4 million car tires.

The Wehrmacht occupied the territory where, before the war, 40% of the country's population lived, 84% of sugar, 38% of grain, 60% of pork were produced. A significant part of the food supplies went to the occupiers. In Ukraine, during four months of fighting, the Germans managed to capture a third of the grain reserves and more than half of the tractors that were to be evacuated. Tens of thousands of tons of food were destroyed by the retreating Soviet units according to Stalin’s order “not a gram of bread, not a liter of fuel for the enemy...”.

Soon, a shortage of certain types of food (sugar, bread, traditionally imported goods) arose throughout the country. The threat of famine became more and more real and could spread to the army. In this regard soviet government not only took a number of urgent measures to mobilize internal resources, but was also forced to turn to the allies for help. At the Moscow Tripartite Conference (September 29 - October 1, 1941), which developed the first of four Supply Protocols, the Soviet Union requested that 200 thousand tons of wheat, 70 thousand tons of sugar and 1.5 thousand tons be sent to its ports monthly cocoa, which implied the full provision of these products to a 10 million-strong army.

In addition to flour and sugar, the first steamships carried high-calorie dehydrated or canned foods. They came in handy for the armies fighting their way out of encirclement near Moscow, but especially for besieged Leningrad and the cities of the Far North. One of these food flows went through Arkhangelsk. Here, during the first war winter, 20 thousand people died from hunger and disease - every tenth resident of the pre-war city. And if it weren’t for those 10 thousand tons of Canadian wheat, which, after much delay, the “father of nations” allowed to be left in Arkhangelsk, it is unknown how many more people would have been killed by hunger. It is equally difficult to calculate how many lives in the liberated areas were saved by those 9 thousand tons of seeds transferred to Russia via the Iranian “air bridge” by the beginning of spring field work in 1942. By July 1942, i.e. By the end of the First Protocol, 392 thousand tons of food worth $90 million were imported into the USSR from the USA and Great Britain.

Tank driver Nikolai Petrovich Vershinin: “At the front they tried to feed better. I won’t say that there was always bad food, although it was not enough, but they brought it. But in the tank corps it became easier, dry rations were given for three days, or even five in case of a breakthrough. It helped a lot, because it’s so far away The field kitchen did not keep up with the tanks everywhere, because where the T-34 passed, the truck would get stuck. I also want to add: in 1942 we were in. tank forces lived on one Lend-Lease dry ration. So American help helped. Lend-Lease became a great help to the front."

But by the summer the situation at the front, and consequently throughout the country, had sharply worsened. German troops launched a grandiose offensive in the South. By the fall of 1942, the most fertile areas of the country were cut off. 40% of USSR farms were ruined. A significant part of the new harvest, as in the first days of the war, went to the occupiers. The loss of food supplies and equipment in the combat zone was aggravated by a further reduction in labor, machinery, fuel and spare parts in the rear. As a result, labor productivity on collective and state farms fell by almost half. In October, Stalin, in a conversation with the envoy of the American President W. Willkie, announced the deterioration of the food situation by winter and the need for prompt assistance from the allies.

The Second (Washington) Protocol, signed retroactively on October 6, recorded not only the previous volumes of requests from the Soviet Union, but also a significant increase in them due to meat, butter and soup concentrates. According to the Soviet application, imported food was to constitute a tenth of the main types of food of the USSR. True, the document stipulated the possibility of reducing the volume of food supplies, which was later done. The agreement with Great Britain, which was extremely dependent on imports, indicated that it would send food to Russia only if there was room for it among the transported tanks and aircraft. A significant part of Britain's supplies was covered by Canada, which signed a loan agreement with the Soviet Union on September 8, 1942 (the so-called “wheat agreement”). By this time, along with the northern supply route, the Trans-Iranian and Pacific routes were fully operational.

Deliveries have not only increased in scale. Their nomenclature has also changed. Margarine, soy flour and cereals, cheese and specially prepared nutritious and light concentrates were added. The soldiers of the Leningrad Front remember how, when going on reconnaissance missions, they received thick bars of dark American chocolate and cans of biscuits. They also remember the taste of chocolate with beef, turkey meat or chicken in chocolate. And the famous “stew”, without which, according to the memoirs of N.S. Khrushchev, it would have been impossible to feed the army, or borscht in bags, Americans began to produce especially for Russia according to Russian recipes. Already in the first quarter of 1943, allied supplies provided 17% of the calories consumed by the Red Army. Subsequently they increased even more. During the year of the Second Protocol, food supplies almost tripled those of the previous protocol period. By July 1943, an additional 885 thousand tons of food arrived in the Soviet Union from the USA and Great Britain. 182 thousand tons of grain were delivered under the “wheat agreement” from Canada. They took up a third of the total volume of goods imported into Russia.

1943 was the most difficult year for USSR agriculture. The Red Army, which went on the offensive, liberated vast territories where millions of people lived. They needed to be fed. Meanwhile, the farms of these lands were completely ruined. The situation was complicated by drought in the regions of Siberia, the Volga region and North Caucasus. An acute food crisis has broken out in the country. In November, the already meager food distribution standards were secretly reduced by almost a third. That is why, in the application to the Third (London) Protocol, food supplies from July 1943 to July 1944 replaced metals and even individual species weapons. Preference was given to products containing large amounts of proteins and fats. For these types of products, the Americans offered even more than the representatives of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade requested. And this was not done out of excess. 25% of all pork produced in the USA was sent to the USSR. Only 14% remained for the American army. In addition, the Soviet Union was the only country among more than forty others receiving Lend-Lease assistance where the United States agreed to import animal oil, which led to a sharp increase in its price on the American market. This oil was intended for Russian soldiers recovering in hospitals. Fruit juices, canned, dry and fresh fruits, vegetables, nuts and many other products not specified in the application were also sent to hospitals. Highly fortified, they became a salvation for many soldiers from scurvy - the “scourge” of the army.

Viktor Alekseev, artillery reconnaissance and radio operator: "When we were in besieged Leningrad, then they fed us very poorly there. The food was terrible! I even remember such an incident. We were sent to break down wooden houses for firewood. Then there was nothing to heat the stoves with! I went into the house where there used to be some kind of club. I walked through the concert hall when suddenly I met a soldier. I also thought: where could he come from here? But it turns out it was a large mirror. I became so thin and thin that I didn’t recognize myself. There was one long skeleton with ribs. In the reserve regiments in Leningrad, people simply died. And at the front, compared to Leningrad, the food was very good. We were mostly given dry rations. Potatoes, canned food, and American stew were also provided. By the way, they started giving us American stew even when we were in Leningrad. It saved us a lot!"

In general, supplies by mid-1944 significantly exceeded even the total food supplies during the period of validity of the First and Second Protocols. 1.8 million tons was the net weight of agricultural goods imported into the USSR under the London Protocol. The supply of weapons, equipment, and materials increased in proportion to food supplies.

Meanwhile, the Soviet government did not seek to advertise where and how imported goods came to the USSR. At one of the press conferences, the American Ambassador to Moscow, William Standley, expressed concern about this. And although the ambassador’s statement was taken into account and a week later it appeared in the central newspapers brief information about the number of deliveries under Lend-Lease.

The Fourth (Ottawa) Protocol (for the period from July 1, 1944 to June 30, 1945), like the previous ones, was officially signed much later than its entry into force - on April 17, 1945. It only formally consolidated the requests of the Soviet Union when they were already largely satisfied. USSR during last year During the war with Germany, it received from the allies over 1.4 million tons of food - slightly less than in the previous period in terms of tonnage, but significantly more in value terms. The cost of supplies has increased mainly due to an increase in the import of more expensive meat products, seeds and vitamins. Along with the increase in food supplies under Lend-Lease, by this time the supply of the army and the population had significantly improved by strengthening its own food base. The gross agricultural output of the USSR in 1944 reached 54% of the pre-war level, and grain procurement doubled the level of 1943. Lend-Lease seeds, tractors and cars contributed to this to a large extent.

With the end of the war with Germany, allied supplies, including food supplies, were unexpectedly suspended on May 12 until the issue of the Soviet Union's entry into the war with Japan was resolved. According to the new President Harry Truman, he signed this order from the words of his advisers, without even bothering to read it. The president's hasty actions caused a storm of indignation on the Soviet side. And although two days later the ships were sent again on established routes, G. Hopkins was urgently forced to fly to Moscow to resolve the incident. Hopkins assured J.V. Stalin that the United States also intended to fulfill its obligations under all applications of the USSR. True, from now on, most of the cargo will be sent to the ports of the Far East under the Milepost program, which replaced the Protocol programs. May 28, V.M. Molotov and the People's Commissar accompanying him foreign trade A.I. Mikoyan presented US Ambassador A. Harriman with a memorandum requesting new supplies for the period from July 1 to December 31, 1945. Along with these cargoes, the United States also had to import in full everything that was not shipped by The Fourth Protocol and the “special program of October 17, 1944.” A significant part of the total cargo volume was still occupied by food. In addition to the 1.4 million tons of food cargo imported by the allies under the Fourth Protocol as of May 12, the United States supplied an additional 270 thousand tons to the USSR under the Mailpost program by September 2. These products were a significant addition to the diet of the Russian soldier who entered the land of Manchuria in August 1945.

Campaign on Far East didn't last long. Already at the beginning of August its outcome was a foregone conclusion. With the surrender of Japan, the bloodiest war in human history ended. And with it, the Lend-Lease law on the Soviet Union ceased.

Taught by experience, G. Truman announced on August 21 the curtailment of Lend-Lease work and the cessation of deliveries from September 2, i.e. from the day the Japanese surrender was signed. All countries were required to conduct an inventory of Lend-Lease cargo received after August 14. To avoid incidents, the president provided additional time until September 20 for the delivery of goods stuck in ports (to “clean the pipeline” - “to empty pipeline”). Lend-Lease food “crumbs” during the “cleaning of the pipe” increased by another 10 thousand tons.

However, the inertia of deliveries under Lend-Lease was so great that the Soviet Union turned to the United States with a request to continue cooperation, albeit on the basis of a long-term loan. On October 15, 1945, such a loan agreement with settlement over 30 years was signed and went down in history as the “pipeline agreement”. It operated until mid-1947, until it was stopped by the outbreak of the Cold War.

In total, the USA, Great Britain and Canada shipped to the USSR from June 22, 1941 to September 20, 1945 4,915,818 net tons of food, the total calorie content of which was about 67,502,474.4 million kcal. If we consider the average ration for a soldier in the active army to be 4,000 kilocalories per day, then it is easy to calculate the number of days during which the Allies could provide food supplies to the Red Army. The food supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease would be enough to feed an army of 10 million people for 1,688 days, i.e. throughout the war. And if we take into account the calorie content of food supplied by individual companies and public organizations, drinking alcohol imported into the USSR, then it can be argued that the calorie content of the food imported by the Allies would be enough not only for full content the Red Army throughout the war, but also as a significant supplement to the diet of part of the civilian population.

From Viktor Volodin’s book “The Unfinished Route”: “Soon after the start of the war, food began to arrive in Kolyma from America, and then we completely switched to American supplies, which arrived in Magadan uninterruptedly and in sufficient quantities to fully meet the needs.

There was only white wheat flour in small bags of 100 English pounds (43.4 kg). Meat products were always represented by canned food: stewed pork or, as they were called on the labels compiled in Russian: pork stew and sausage, perhaps reminiscent of tea sausage, also in cans. Other meat products, particularly bacon and sausages, were rare and never reached us. The same can be said about turkey meat."

During the last war, the Soviet Union lost millions of its citizens from hunger alone. And how many millions would he have lost without Lend-Lease food? Allied assistance in this regard cannot be calculated in any way - it is invaluable.