The first period of unrest. Time of Troubles: brief and clear 3 turmoil causes and consequences

The perception of current political reality as a historical phenomenon makes it possible not only to draw parallels with the past, but also allows us to discover stable, rhythmically repeating patterns of development of Russian life. A careful study of these models, compared with modernity, contributes to a more adequate perception of political reality. "To see your time, said José Ortega y Gasset, you have to look from a distance".

First of all, this method of analysis has prognostic significance. However, in addition to the possibilities of specific forecasts, the creation of models political history It also has independent significance as a form of identifying a cultural and historical phenomenon inherent in Russian history: the productive reflex of the nation. This article is devoted to the topic of overcoming by Russia as a civilization the crises of its own national-state tradition through special shock states - the Time of Troubles. The model of the “Time of Troubles” seems to the author to be more accurate and heuristically valuable than the model of the “revolution”. The transition from the concept of “revolution” to the concepts of “mutation” or “troubled times” allows, in my opinion, to more adequately describe both historical and cultural processes that have already occurred, those currently occurring and those expected in the future.

The historiosophical situation of the 20th century is unique. In Russian social thought over this century, a wealth of experience has been accumulated related to the experience of the tragic clash in Russia between the forces of modernity and traditionalism. However, there was not only a collision, but also an interweaving, and although modernity won a decisive victory, at the same time, its large-scale project (in the form of the USSR), firstly, could not gain a foothold in Russia, and secondly, led to a revision of many essential a feature of the modern paradigm itself, led to a peculiar Russian “fusion” of modernity with tradition.

The practice of constructing historical models involves their heavy abstract-philosophical load and is partly of a playful nature. However, this is not the kind of play that is generated by the postmodern form of consciousness. This interpretation of history gravitates towards folklore consciousness, namely: towards the “epic” perception of the relationship between the personal and the elemental. Folklore consciousness is opposite to modernism in both terminological distinctions of the latter: both in the literary and artistic, stylistic, and in the ideological (modernity as the main direction of thought in the European culture of the New Age). Traditionalism as a spontaneous attitude of the people's consciousness does not exclude a private rejection of tradition, but adds the outstanding, the exceptional to its cultural baggage. For the creators of folklore, a historical milestone or a more deeply individualized personality, more “exfoliated” from the usual course of things, does not contradict the unified historical spirit, but, on the contrary, introduces specific elements into the general model and complements its meaning to true universality. This is how the course of events is perceived in Russian epics, where the personal and spontaneous principles are combined. Folklore characters are not historical in the strict sense, they are characters a large panoramic picture of reality, a kind of folk historiosophy. Bogatyrs, wandering kaliki, the prince of Kiev, robbers, tavern gols, fabulous animals, as well as representatives of “alien worlds” (overseas kings, monsters and snakes, filthy idols, sorcerers, etc.) are personifications of certain historical beginnings, behind each of which there is not just one historical figure, but a whole set of people from different eras and situations, entire trends historical life.

IN traditional culture time and history are interpreted in a special way: thus, in folklore, time is closed, fixed to a certain historical state (to an ideal model), shifted “to the right” if we compare it with literature and historical science. This is explained by the fact that tradition does not so much look for the cause-and-effect source and context of an event, but rather provides a model, a prism for any event as “happening”, as a “variant” of historical diversity. The assimilation of history by the tradition is carried out according to its own laws, more fundamental than in history as a science: the meaning of a historical case is “absorbed” by a higher state, illuminated through the metaphysical dimension. Folklore works represented an ancient form of modeling and forecasting, allowing bearers of traditional consciousness to give clear and correct assessments of current events based on their location not in the current political series, but in the larger semantic space of a living national myth, in a “picture of the world” that ignores particulars and chaos current reality, however, maintaining constant criteria for assessing good and evil, benefit and harm from the point of view of national and cultural identity.

The author is far from seeing in it the same political content throughout many centuries of history or, on the contrary, treating historiosophical models solely as manifestations of naked rhythmic repetitions. The well-known term “Time of Troubles”, enriched with specific facts, was brilliantly formulated in early XVII century, until recently was considered as a subject for journalistic parallels. What are the criteria for defining different eras as versions of a single model of “turmoil”?

Skeptics-Westerners apply the concept of “turmoil” throughout almost the entire space of Russian history. Therefore, elements of this phenomenon and opportunities for parallels are sought by almost everyone in relation to the characteristics of their time or the era of the past under consideration. The tearing of the model into elements and components is caused by a misunderstanding (mixed with rejection) of the systemic, holistic nature of the model itself. These analytical hobbies are associated with some disorientation in a series of troubled and calm eras. In practice Russian history not only does it not represent one big and endless “trouble,” but it is not at all replete with large (simulated) “ troubled times". The Time of Troubles in Russia is always an exceptional phenomenon (albeit a recurring one) and does not last long in comparison with the “untroubled” times: its active course in the open phase usually does not exceed 15 years. Throughout its history, Russia has experienced no more than three similar periods.

It can be stated in advance that “turmoil” is always a period with a particularly high degree of unpredictability in the resolution of a historical crisis. The very name, generated by folk authors, suggests that at the moment of political breakdown, decisiveness, resolution and clarity of outlines are hidden under extremely vague veils, confusing and blurred guises of events and their participants. Therefore, within the Time of Troubles, it is not at all easy for a historian to find grounds for an acceptable classification and periodization, and it is not easy to restore cause-and-effect relationships. Time of Troubles can “confuse” (irrationalize) the thought of both a contemporary and a historian. It always changes the face of History itself, rapidly demythologizing and then remythologizing it.

The triad of “troubled times” in Russia opens with the plurality of power of the beginning of the 17th century (and not earlier; why is a very serious question and not included in the tasks of this work), continues with the “revolutions” of the first decades of the 20th century and closes with modern events. Let us now consider the model of “turmoil” in the variety of its stages and historical manifestations.

Stage one: rejection of tradition (1598–1605, 1905–1912, 1985–1991)

As already mentioned, the periodization of the phenomenon of the Time of Troubles is quite conventional. We are dealing with a fast-moving kaleidoscopic carnival of events, a chain of “revolutionary situations” that are not always realized, rebellions, accidental alliances and false recognitions. Therefore, the three cases of “turmoil” are heterogeneous in their structure, variable in form, determined by the spirit of the time, the specificity of historical circumstances and the nodes of tradition.

Actually, knots of tradition(sometimes Gordian) - untied, cut, tied in a new way - the key metaphor of the proposed model. Thus, the first large stage of the “Troubles” is associated with the rejection of the tradition of political legitimation and occurs in its first 6–7 years. Within this stage, of course, it is possible to distinguish even smaller ones, but this will either be excessive narrative detail, or raising kaleidoscopic reality to a conceptual level.

The rejection of the legitimizing tradition, the bearers of which are always the “tops”, and the absolute “tops” of power, in the conditions of the beginning Time of Troubles, very soon makes the authorities slave delegitimation, which she myopically cherished. However, each time the rejection of tradition turns out to be not only natural, but also prepared by the previous decades.

The events of the beginning of the first “Troubles” (late 16th century) are unique. Then the focus of the process of destruction of old and formation of new key political traditions became the problem of continuity of monarchical succession to the throne. The first Russian “turmoil”, so closely connected with the suppression of the Rurik dynasty, with the mechanism of legitimation destroyed in this way, indicates its only real weight for the then political tradition. It is possible that the new Tsar Boris Godunov, who replaced the old dynasty, was for this very reason persistently considered involved in the murder of the “prince,” the only heir of the Rurikovichs. This hostility towards Godunov (“as if the great king was not worthy of the gift, the seal of heavenly glory”), and the outwardly prosperous beginning of his forced reign is irrational in origin.

Actually, Godunov was a ruler (and a successful ruler) even under Tsar Theodore Ioannovich, an autocrat, as is commonly believed, pious, but incapable of state work. Tradition sanctified the role of Godunov the ruler, but she rejected Godunov the ruler. king(“slave king”, according to Ivan Timofeev’s formulation) despite his formal “chosenness”. Godunov, who was very upset by the actual delegitimation of his power, tried to appease all classes and clans, and was distinguished by his liberalism and love of foreigners.

The crisis of political tradition began almost in the “cleverest head” (as the holy fool Ivashka the Big Kolpak called Boris in the late 80s), when she was still sitting on the shoulders of the ruler of Rus'. For the vain Boris, who, as the king’s brother-in-law, had learned the visible underbelly of palace life, the difference between the concepts of “king by the grace of God” and “good ruler” seemed minimal.

In his mind, it was Godunov who became the first “impostor.” And the phenomenon of “imposture” is equal to the phenomenon of the very first “turmoil”. “The “slave king” (= an impostor, isn’t it?),” indeed, could have been involved in the murder of the prince, whose “holy place” had been empty all the years of “troubles” and, by its very emptiness, produced this “troubles.” The suppression of a dynasty in this case ceases to be an unfortunate accident for historians, but becomes a consequence of a rejection of tradition, carried out not by the monarch himself, but for him.

This is the reason for the uniqueness, and at the same time the basis for the kind of “involuntariness” of the emergence of the first “turmoil.” The other two were born out of a more specific rejection of the existing political tradition. The Manifesto of October 17, 1905 was a continuation of trends that had prevailed under Alexander II. In the same way, Nikita Khrushchev should be recognized as the forerunner of Gorbachev’s innovations. (True, in the case of Godunov, we can talk about the preparedness of a number of elements of “imposture”, “turmoil” and the concept of a tsar-ruler, secular in its tendency, during a certain period of the reign of Ivan IV the Terrible.)

These three persons - Godunov, Sovereign Nicholas II of the first decade of the 20th century and Gorbachev - despite all their dissimilarities, sought to combine both traditions: rejected and barely emerging, they tried (as far as possible) not to notice their incompatibility. At the same time, Nicholas II and Gorbachev not only sought to combine contradictory traditions, they fully personified this contradiction. During the period of “rejection of tradition” of 1905–1912, Tsar Nicholas did a lot to delegitimize the autocracy. His consistent policy of organizing a strong legislative sphere of power can only be considered as preparing society for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. Left political position The tsar borders on the Duma platform of the Cadets (“His Majesty’s opposition”), on the camp of N. Milyukov, while its internal balance is ensured by the political course of the Stolypin government. This “right” component of the position of Nicholas II during the period of “rejection of tradition” manifested itself in tough politics during the events of 1905–1907, during the dissolution of the first two Dumas, and during the “gloomy” reaction of the end of 1908–1912. And only after the murder of Pyotr Stolypin did the tsarist government decisively reject the constitutional idea. We can say that at the first stage of the Troubles, the Tsar outlived a certain political and ideological illusion in himself and those close to him.

Similarly, during the period 1985–1991, Gorbachev delegitimized the power prerogatives of the CPSU, but at the same time managed to remain secretary general until the very end - almost until the time when he ceased to be president. The situation of the “perestroika” stage of the third “Troubles” is complicated by the duality of the geopolitical plan: everyone knows that the complexity of the territorial structure of the USSR and the contradictions between the union republics did a disservice to the supreme power. Apparently, the instigator of the “Troubles” Andrei Sakharov was the first to point out to Yeltsin the advantage of the “Russian” card. Gorbachev, unlike Godunov and Nicholas II, fought not just with centrifugal forces state, but also with the absence of a strong “federal basis” of the empire.

If it were not for this specificity of the latest “turmoil,” it could have continued for a long time under the sign of Gorbachev. After all, Nicholas II remained on the throne until 1917, supporting “drastic measures of reaction.” Then the provincial territorial system of the Russian Empire itself played into the hands of the old order for a long time. In fact, in this version of the Time of Troubles, the putsch of 1991 was not needed - the tsar balanced the situation by suppressing some political impulses and channeling others (in particular, within the framework of the Fourth Duma). At the same time, the result of restraining the development of events in 1908–1913 was their unusually rapid development in 1917, which contained many moments of the Time of Troubles, which in other versions appear somewhat earlier.

Gorbachev failed to retain the energy of “democracy” within the framework of those institutions that were under his control and inextricably linked with his presidency. And these institutions under his control, as a result of his double game, slipped out of his hands: Lukyanov’s Supreme Council almost managed to identify with the State Emergency Committee during the August putsch. In the first “turmoil,” Godunov also did not have time to create significant guarantors of the flow of his personal power into legitimate autocratic and hereditary power. The sudden death of Godunov in 1605, due to the approach of the troops of False Dmitry I, resolved the outcome of the first stage of the “Troubles” in its own way. Based on his personal power and authority, Boris would certainly have been able to repel the impostor, but the heir to the throne, Theodore Godunov, no longer had such support. His father’s closest associates betrayed him; despite the oath, neither the troops nor the Moscow middle classes supported him. The old principles of dynastic inheritance were destroyed, the new ones did not come into force enough to withstand the tests of the crisis.

The completion of the first stage of unrest (1605, 1912, 1991) is always marked by a powerful reaction to abandon tradition, this is a moment of high intensity of passions. Reactionaries act as representatives of a trampled tradition, discredited sacred authorities. However, the triumph of reaction, even in the best case, can only be measured in years. “The lawless kingdom” of False Dmitry I (mistaken for Tsarevich Dimitri Ioannovich), “autocratic obscurantism” and “Black Hundred frenzy” (standing for Russia of Tsar Nicholas II), “putschists who had lost all shame and conscience” (as it soon became clear, the last defenders USSR) - under such names this reaction remains in the political discourse after the Time of Troubles. At the first stage of unrest, their characteristic feature clearly appears: the inability of the authorities to see real reasons political disharmony, suicidal sawing of the supporting structures of statehood.

Stage two: schizogony of power (1606–1611, 1912–1918, 1991–1997)

The transition from one stage of “turmoil” to another is a point of particularly high alternativeness to an event, when the “subjective factor” of history gives rise to the most incredible political combinations. The death of Godunov made Moscow a hostage of False Dmitry I and the Cossack-Polish troops that came with him for almost a whole year. The events of the August 1991 coup also developed illogically - the inconsistency of actions and the incompetence of the conspirators struck the whole country. Despite the entry of troops into the capital, the putsch was imprinted in the popular consciousness as the phenomenon of a “ridiculous monster.” From the point of view of the carnival aspect of history, the State Emergency Committee and False Dmitry I can be put on the same level. However, many other aspects force comparison with the impostor not only of those who failed, but also of the forces that won in August 1991. At this time, the President of the USSR, who played the role of a figurehead, a fictitious mask of power that deceived the reactionaries, carried a lot of carnivalism in his appearance.

The Godunov-False Dmitry opposition corresponds in its own way not only to the Gorbachev-GKChP opposition, but also to the Gorbachev-Yeltsin opposition. Anyone can choose what they like, especially since there are the most contradictory interpretations of the August events. Like the populist Yeltsin, False Dmitry I relied on popular consciousness and combined an appeal to trampled tradition with radical innovation (religious indifference, abstract nationalism, plans to create a “Senate”, introduce freedom of movement, calling himself an “emperor”). In 1604–1605, people read the impostor’s anonymous pages and even after his fleeting collapse still called him “our bright Sun” (here is the trampled principle of legitimation!).

In False Dmitry there is something from both the State Emergency Committee and Yeltsin. But Yeltsin managed to defeat his opponents and took control of the situation, so the parallel with Vasily Shuisky, the tsar “chosen by the shouts” and the main organizer of the reprisal against the impostor, is more easily assigned to him. In the context of the “Troubles”, Godunov, Shuisky, and Otrepyev are involved to one degree or another in the phenomenon of “imposture.” This cannot be said about Nicholas II, an invariably legitimate guardian-reformer (he combines and at the same time cancels the internal capabilities of Godunov, Shuisky, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin).

At the second stage of the eras under consideration, new oppositions arise, as if “self-regenerating turmoil.” Shuisky - False Dmitry II (Tushinsky thief) and Yeltsin - The White house(forces of Rutsky-Khasbulatov). It is characteristic that Shuisky at one time supported the defrocking of Otrepyev against Feodor Godunov at Lobnoye Mesto. It is no coincidence that Yeltsin, Khasbulatov, Rutskoi are the three main “victors” over the putschists, they are also the three highest officials of the Russian government, the personal centers of its legitimacy.

At this stage, any certainty of power continuity is lost, and the fluid relevance of the political sign is observed. The level of legitimacy of the warring camps at a certain point objectively coincides, and a regime of more or less stable parallel coexistence of authorities arises, a period of mutual offensive manifestations, sieges, blockades, smoking out and expulsions. Smaller groups sprout from a group of former comrades and, having defeated a new common enemy, again organize to fight among themselves. The second stage of the “turmoil” reveals its key phenomenon - the schizogony of power, reaching the complete erosion of legitimacy, when both the lower classes and the respectable classes do not know who to recognize as fully competent. Schizogonizing power splits the entire society. And if for the time being Tsar Nicholas II bound this group dispersion of the public within the framework of the State Duma and covered it with his royal mantle, then starting from February 1917, the Time of Troubles made up for lost time and formalized political life in the form of a bipolar opposition - the so-called dual power.

In 1917, Soviets were created as an alternative to the “Duma” government; in 1993, the very principle of separation of powers helped; there was no need to create new political forms. As a result, the old forms were abolished - October 1993 put an end to those same Soviets. The longest was the open confrontation of the “authorities” in the 17th century - Moscow and Tushino for 3 years were the “two capitals” of Rus', while gangs of their own and foreign thugs scurried around its expanses. The Poles, Cossacks, a significant part of the boyars and the mob found themselves in these circumstances and, probably, could have maintained the existing state of affairs for a long time, if not for the exhaustion of the strength of the distressed people.

In the midst of “turmoil,” the popular consciousness picks up any critical information about the government and inflates it into a myth. This mythology took on especially sharp forms in Russia, burdened by the World War of 1915–1917. Disrespect for the Tsar and bad rumors about Grigory Rasputin also echo the mythopoetic ideas of the first “Troubles.” Shuisky and Otrepiev were said to have a passion for witchcraft and astrology (“stargazing”). The symbol of the witchcraft obsession with Rus' was the “queen” Marinka (nee Mnishek), who cohabited with both False Dmitrys, and in the intervals between them and after them with the “slaves”.

The schizogony of power was not stopped either by Shuisky, who managed to defeat the Tushins, or by Yeltsin, who stormed the House of Soviets and largely subordinated the legislative branch of power. But False Dmitry II again approached Moscow, and Shuisky was overthrown from the throne; In the elections of December 1993 and 1995, Yeltsin was forced to accept the defeat of radical democracy, his ideological support. The composition of the V and VI Dumas turned out to be no more favorable than the composition of the congress; the October “rebels” and August “putschists” were soon amnestied by parliament and took prominent places in the Duma.

Many people perceived the “occupation” of Chechnya by government troops, which began at the end of 1994, as a huge mafia showdown. But the “Dudaev” problem is largely connected with the “Khasbulatov” one, and the “ Chechen War"represents a moment of highest tension and a flashpoint of war self-eating schizogonizing Russian authorities. Schizogony is a difficult-to-treat, and, for the time being, completely insurmountable historical disease.

The schizogonic policy of the Provisional Government, which tried to ignore the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and at the same time did not dare to ban them, ended sadly. "There may be two ways out,- V. Shulgin said in February 1917, - everything will work out - the sovereign will appoint a new government, and we will hand over power to him. But it won’t work out, if we don’t pick up the authorities, then others will.” On exactly the same grounds, after the overthrow of Shuisky, the Semiboyarshchina (the power of the Boyar Duma) was established in Moscow. In this version of the “Troubles,” an alternative to imposture and the power of the mob in 1610 initially seemed to be the conscription of a foreigner, Vladislav, the son of the Polish king Sigismund III, to the kingdom. “It is better to serve the king’s son than to be beaten by his slaves and suffer in eternal labor for them,”- said the boyars. So Miliukov, who in mid-1917 advocated a war to a victorious end and the capture of the Bosphorus, a little later, realizing the Bolshevik threat, already pinned his hopes only on German occupation. The attempt of the right-wing majority of the Provisional Government to curb the radicalization of the unrest by the Kornilov dictatorship was also unsuccessful - the cadets were let down by the socialist A. Kerensky, who unexpectedly announced the general’s treason. The national liberation campaign of Patriarch Hermogenes and the head of the people's militia, Prokopiy Lyapunov, supported by part of the Seven Boyars, ended in failure, just like the “Kornilov rebellion,” - the anarchic revelry of robbers and the destruction of Moscow in 1611 reached an unprecedented scale. This time was popularly called “hard times.” In the 20th century, “hard times” corresponded to the beginning Civil War, bloody 1918.

In December 1610, another accident of the first “Troubles” occurred that solved a lot - False Dmitry II (Tushinsky thief) died. Given his growing popularity by leaps and bounds, one can assume that the hypothetical death of Lenin, say, in mid-1917, would be comparable to this death. It cannot be ruled out that a victor-impostor could have taken the place of Mikhail Romanov and the entire subsequent dynasty of Russian tsars.

After False Dmitry II, the radical forces of the “Troubles” no longer had time to raise a candidate who would have gained significant support. Meanwhile, in 1918, it was Lenin and his disciplined team who had the opportunity to put an end to schizogony central government and move the front of civil intransigence from the capitals to the periphery of the European part of Russia. The one who manages to overcome the schizogony of the Troubles subsequently writes the history of the “Troubles” in the way he likes.

Summing up the results of the second stage of the Time of Troubles, it should be said that in these tragic years for the fate of the country there is no power in the usual sense of the word, political institutions are not something positive, they represent self-eating statehood, and in the last, third “version” of the Russian turning point, the “turmoil” was especially institutionalized, disguised as statehood. The schizogonizing government successfully destroys the remnants of the former political structure, squanders the reserves and funds accumulated by its predecessors, squanders and sells gold and oil reserves, incurs debts to other states; it fights for the state “pie” and subsequently, by redistributing seats and balancing forces, divides this “pie”. This materialized and personified “turmoil” (imagining itself as Power) is such because it is unable or unwilling to secure a strong strategic future for itself as power.

Stage three: overcoming acute turmoil (1611–1613, 1918–1920/21, late 1990s)

The “hard times” of the 17th century directly turned into Swedish and Polish intervention; Sigismund III stopped hiding his aggressive plans, having lost faith in the possibility of installing a “legitimate” protege in Moscow. The year 1918 was also marked by intervention. In both cases, foreign powers sought to prevent Russia from being excluded from the world political system. In the 17th century, this meant the expansion of Catholic influence (the pope was deeply interested in the “turmoil” and influenced the impostors in every possible way, extracting from them various promises, primarily related to church reforms, which would allow Rome to create a powerful bloc against the Reformation in Eastern Europe). The Bolsheviks' break with the Entente and the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Peace meant a course towards increasing the internal self-worth of the state (before Lenin, no one had even thought of deciding on such a radical course). For Russia, inclusion in the world political system always led to either world domination or geopolitical capitulation. It is clear that in the conditions of the Time of Troubles, a weakened Russia could only count on the second option.

This significant aspect makes the Bolsheviks who came to power similar to those forces of the “Zemstvo army” that began to take control of the situation by the beginning of 1612. However, there are other aspects as well. Detractors of the Soviet revolution point to the dominance of the Polish-Georgian-Jewish element in the Bolshevik ranks. Admiral A. Kolchak (the successor to the work of L. Kornilov, whom I have already compared with Lyapunov, the forerunner of Minin and Pozharsky) also rightly laid claim to the role of Prince Pozharsky in 1918. Although Kolchak collaborated with the interventionists, in the context of the White Guard worldview this was only a continuation of the alliance with the Entente, which was by no means hostile towards Russia throughout the second “Troubles” ( folk hero XVII century M. Skopin-Shuisky collaborated with Swedish mercenaries and successfully defeated troublemakers). The White Guards as failed saviors of Russia and liberators of Moscow in opposition to Lenin as the Tushinsky thief who defeated them, the leader of the mob (and by the way, a “German spy”) is a completely acceptable option.

But in its own way, another, “avant-garde” version of Minin and Pozharsky as Lenin and Trotsky, who brilliantly organized the Red Army, withstood the front-line blockade of the traitor boyars and repelled the intervention, is also acceptable. However, the argument against this option is the Bolsheviks’ suspicion of participation in an “international conspiracy” against Russia. Pozharsky and Kolchak themselves excluded the possibility of such suspicion.

In contrast to the Seven Boyars (indeed, very reminiscent of the Provisional Government in its heterogeneity and inconsistency), both of the largest impostors of the early 17th century stood out after coming to power for their stubborn nationalism: False Dmitry I in 1605 gave short shrift to the claims of the Pope and the Swedish king, and False Dmitry II still in 1608, sitting in Tushino, he refused to obey his patron Sigismund III, whose “protege” he seemed to be. In the third version of the “troubles,” radical democrats invariably appear as henchmen of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other Bretton Woods institutions. However, the West's support for Yeltsin in both the August (1991) and October (1993) events, as well as the continued Westernization of Russia, indicated a greater likelihood of victory at the next historical stage of opposing trends.

The exit from the Time of Troubles at the end of the 20th century objectively began to occur under Yeltsin (starting with the Primakov government). The late Yeltsin is in many ways a different political figure, a politician with a different value sign, although he managed to maintain a certain “continuity.” This continuity, however, should not be overestimated, since the events of 1991–1993 did not carry a positive, creative content in terms of state building. These years were the height of the Time of Troubles and the beginning of the stage of schizogony of power. In terms of values, Yeltsin was a postmodern ruler, but he managed to go through the stage of “emptiness” of values ​​and lead Russia through it without much bloodshed. He will forever remain a symbol of the Time of Troubles.

Yeltsin did not solve the terrible problems of his era, but he ensured the transfer of power to the one who was called upon to solve these problems. Yeltsin of 1999 is a symbol of the desire to get out of the Time of Troubles; Yeltsin’s departure on December 31 is an act when the “Troubles” itself give way to a new, already fairly defined political course. This course is the harsh suppression of schizogony in all spheres of Russian life, a diplomatic but independent foreign policy, and the revival of traditional Russian statehood on new grounds. A return to tradition, tying a new knot of tradition means a partial return to the Soviet and at the same time pre-revolutionary idea of ​​​​values.

The exit from the Time of Troubles will be completely completed when Putin manages to complete the change in the status of the small “false heroes” of the Time of Troubles - “oligarchs”, presidents of autonomous regions and governors, oppositionists, criminal authorities, subjects mass media. The consequences of the Time of Troubles will affect the social atmosphere of Russia for a long time; the mentality of “troublemakers” will remain noticeable for a long time and determine much in the public environment. In addition, there are risks of both relapses of the acute Troubles and its transition from the acute to the chronic stage, which would mean a sluggish collapse and desoverinization of Russia as a civilization.

If, after the Time of Troubles, one manages to collect one’s constants, albeit in a new and not entirely familiar configuration, this means a decisive victory. Sooner or later, but through the mutation of the new historical stage We, as a community, are coming to develop a national-traditionalist worldview and are developing our civilizational reaction.

The truly profound meaning of the dynamics of the Time of Troubles takes on a broader historiosophical perspective. In addition, when analyzing a specific Time of Troubles, an enormous role is played by the international factor, the influence of which can delay or accelerate the development of the “Troubles”, aggravate its course up to crises that are mortally dangerous for statehood. All three Time of Troubles in Russia were largely provoked by this external, international factor, and each time there was intervention - both military and spiritual. In the third Time of Troubles of 1986–2000, the military component, apart from the Chechen “ulcer” fueled by Western finance, turned out to be unnecessary - the dismemberment of the USSR occurred easily and in an organized manner, the costs and victims of this dismemberment were, at first glance, minimal. However, the huge moral, demographic and economic sacrifices that followed and continue to this day, which were brought by the peoples of the former Union on the altar of local “nationalisms” provoked from outside, are not inferior in significance to the losses of Russia and its subjects in the first “unrest.”

The most difficult question is about the origin of the first Time of Troubles, about the maturation of a situation favorable to this chain reaction events that largely determined subsequent Russian history. The Time of Troubles of the late 16th and early 17th centuries was a very painful initial mutation of the state organism - the consequences of these events should be regarded as the deepest transformation of all aspects of social life, that is, the deepest mutation of the very development of Russia, a mutation of the development program.

The First Time of Troubles befell Russia almost immediately (by historical standards) after its formation as a qualitatively unique state organism. If the origin of the Moscow state dates back to the 14th century, and the regional leadership of Moscow was finally determined in the second half of the same century, then it acquired a national character by the beginning of the 16th century, under John III. The formation of the Moscow state as a fairly mature organism, as an independent power with single center took place under Ivan the Terrible, the first crowned Russian Tsar. The time of his reign should be considered defining and decisive for the entire subsequent historical fate of our people. The era of Ivan the Terrible, in contrast to the era of the first Time of Troubles, is positive determinant. If the Time of Troubles should be considered the root of a painful mutation of the state organism, then the era of Tsar Ivan the Terrible is the completion of the initial growth and structural formation of this organism. The state of the Terrible Tsar of the era of reforms forever became the fundamental image of Russia, despite all subsequent mutations. Among the causes and origins of the Time of Troubles, historians usually point to two main factors - the crisis of the state in the “oprichnina” of the 60s and 70s. XVI century and the intervention of a foreign factor, the aggression of pro-Catholic forces and Western neighbors, concerned about the imperial ambitions of Moscow, manifested in the Livonian War and the war with the Swedes. As for this second source of the Time of Troubles, it is completely impossible to dispute it. As for the first source - the “oprichnina”, usually interpreted as a dangerous breakdown in state building, as inconsistency in terms of the formation of a national-state tradition - its role in the development of the situation of the Time of Troubles is much more difficult to determine.

So, the first Time of Troubles, as well as the two subsequent ones, should be considered as caused by a more complicated format of the struggle of civilizations, a struggle from which the Moscow state in the 17th century emerged with huge losses - both territorial, human, and organizational (regression to the “patrimonial” system land ownership from the already consolidated “local”, the weakening of autocracy, including the weakening of the very legitimacy of power, the slide from a balanced social system to serfdom, fixed not least thanks to the crisis of the Time of Troubles). The main loss of the Time of Troubles was the damage suffered by national and spiritual identity. The era of struggle between impostors and illegitimate “kings”, the era of the “Seven Boyars”, the era of schizogony of power, the era of passions, in which the unity of classes and groups turned out to be ephemeral, was very traumatic. For a short time, the Moscow state again felt like appanage Russia, that is, Russia in a sense, non-existent, “perished,” in the fire of civil strife and under the onslaught of a foreign yoke. The hypocrisy and meanness that many Russian people demonstrated when they swore allegiance to impostors and simply participated in the party struggle of the era of schizogony of power was etched into the consciousness of the people. Time of Troubles is, first of all, a severe moral trauma - a young community that has just grown together, has just passed the stage formation of its national-state organism, victorious in the first wars of conquest, having passed through the fire of the oprichnina that purified and tempered its state core, having just been honored with being crowned by the Moscow Patriarchate (1589), Muscovite Rus' hung over the abyss for more than 10 years, was in question .

The mutation had more dramatic and lightning-fast features during the second Time of Troubles (1905–1920) and after it. Then the exit from the Time of Troubles was led not by “restorers”, but by radical “revolutionaries”. The mutation was total and acute in nature, although one cannot talk about the irreversibility of its course - first, Lenin’s introduction of the NEP, then Stalin’s gradual turn to the symbolic and ideological principles of the “pre-Trouble” time speaks of a peculiar rotation of the same national-state tradition, although the rotation of its with a very large amplitude. The changes in Russia after the first Time of Troubles were no less profound than after the second. The difference was that in the 17th century the development of the mutation was slow and occurred under the cover of the restoration course. But already under Alexei Mikhailovich church schism and then the cardinal reforms under Pyotr Alekseevich revealed the consequences and depth of this historical mutation, the scope of which was very large.

The essence of mutation in the context of the historiosophy of the Troubled Times can be defined as an adjustment of civilizational identity, and the adjustment is not unambiguous, but is often carried out through trial and error. On the one hand, there is a change in the people’s idea of ​​their past and their origin, on the other hand, through this change a new knot of the same historical tradition is tied. On the one hand, the Time of Troubles demonstrates to the Russian people that their identity is somehow flawed, that it is not mature enough and is not fully prepared for historical trials. On the other hand, the Time of Troubles strengthens the core nature of national identity; through the instillation of the very image of the “death” of the civilizational archetype, it forces us to reassemble in a new, unprecedented configuration the same fundamental constants of civilization that are embedded in it and act in it not only as its integral property , but first of all as the personal beginning of civilization itself, its voice inseparable from its source, its unique path, the single channel of the ancestral memory of all its bearers.

The dissertation of I. V. Kondakov sets out views that are very close to my concept of “three troubled times,” which the author defines as “three sociocultural transitions.” In the process of these transitions, culture is recoded, and a new “sociocultural era” opens.

A rather in-depth interpretation of the Time of Troubles using the example of Russian ethnic history was proposed by S. V. Lurie. Changing traditional consciousness - says Lurie, - occurs as a result of a catastrophe, when the previous ethnic picture of the world begins to sharply contradict reality, and the ethnic group has no alternative traditions with greater adaptive properties. In conditions of temporary shortage, an ethnos must create a completely new cultural tradition, since the state of turmoil, although it can last for years and decades, nevertheless threatens to collapse ethnic culture. Then a spontaneous restructuring of the ethnos occurs, which can be called one of the most amazing phenomena in the life of an ethnos, and it is all the more surprising because it occurs quite often. An ethnos that is not capable of spontaneous restructuring dies as a result of historical cataclysms; on the contrary, the mobility of restructuring mechanisms ensures the “survival” of the ethnos. According to Lurie, at such moments an ethnos forms a “completely new” picture of the world not through any traditional continuity, but directly through the “central zone” of its ethnic culture. In my opinion, Lurie does not provide convincing arguments in favor of the fact that such speakers really offer the ethnic group a “completely new” picture of the world and does not clearly describe the signs by which such speakers can be judged. From Lurie’s description and the examples she gives, one can get the impression that we're talking about about representatives of the deep spiritual knowledge of the tradition. In this case, Lurie is right in many respects, but this correctness, if it occurs, is given only in the form of hints, and not definite instructions. A more definite interpretation of what Lurie calls “personal consciousness” can be found in the works of T. B. Shchepanskaya, whose materials Lurie undoubtedly used. Shchepanskaya studied the problem of “chaos dynamics” in folk culture for many years and tried to build a model of Russian self-organization in conditions of a sociocultural crisis. She touches on the theme of the Troubles when she describes the phenomenon of imposture. Shchepanskaya gives numerous examples of “strange leadership” that can be found in such dissimilar phenomena as Pugachevism, Christism, “prophets”, impostors, self-saints, “messengers” from Fr. John of Kronstadt, etc. Shchepanskaya comes to the conclusion that with the appearance of prophets and impostors, national culture responds to crisis phenomena in society, when the level of crisis reaches a national and “ideological” level, the myth of a deliverer who will correct the global violations that have occurred is in demand.

Thus, the crisis of tradition leaves the community with two main possible exits: through a sudden “forced” revelation (prophet), changing the configuration of the tradition, or through self-destruction (an impostor, deliberately donning the guise of an alternative power). The exit from the Time of Troubles is associated with the legitimation of one of the two indicated exits, which makes it possible to rebuild the tradition around the newly acquired (restored or reconstructed) “sacred-mythical” core.

If, after the Time of Troubles, one manages to collect one’s constants, albeit in a new and not entirely familiar configuration, this means a decisive victory. Sooner or later, through the mutation of a new historical stage, we as a community come to develop a national-traditionalist worldview and, along with its development, we develop our civilizational reaction in our activities. The element of mutation and the beginning of tradition are in a complex dialectical struggle with each other, so that as a result, tradition is revived and traditionalism overcomes worldviews that oppose it, but this happens in different symbolic, legal, institutional forms than we expect.

Now, in the very beginning of XXI century, Russia faces not a choice of its path, but a kind of historical inevitability. We are again forced to carry within ourselves, in our hearts, the strife of mutations and traditions, we are again in some ways returning to the pre-Troubles (now this means Soviet) time, in some ways to the previous pre-Troubles time (Russia of the St. Petersburg period), and in some ways to the “virgin” Muscovite Rus'. But with all this, we are entering the 21st century with its challenges and threats - and what stands behind us, our national-cultural tradition today is already a much more mature and experienced entity than in the 17th century, richer in historical content and experience “deceptions” and “transformations” than even 20 years ago. It is possible that having gone through a series of Troubled Times, mutations and reactions, we, as a tradition-civilization, have come closer to our own identity in a way that we would never have come closer to by ourselves, in a calm development.

The final exit from the Time of Troubles, overcoming its consequences is carried out through the integration of mutation into the tradition-system, the digestion of mutagenic forces by the forces of the traditional order, the restructuring of civilization in order to adapt to mutagenic agents, turning poison into a vaccine. The answer to the crisis of the Time of Troubles cannot be spied on or copied from neighbors; it can only be gleaned from the hidden treasures of the national tradition itself. Answers to Troubled Times and conclusions from them, as a rule, are always late for everyone. Russia repeatedly experiences this experience of civilizational struggle with its competitor, who is ahead of the curve.

The first stage of the Troubles is characterized by the struggle for the throne of various contenders. After death Ivan the Terrible his son Fedor came to power, but he turned out to be unable to rule and was actually ruled by the brother of the king’s wife - Boris Godunov. Ultimately, his policies caused discontent masses.

The Troubles began with the appearance in Poland of False Dmitry 1 (in reality Grigory Otrepiev), the allegedly miraculously surviving son of Ivan the Terrible. He won over a significant part of the Russian population to his side. In 1605, False Dmitry 1 was supported by the governors, and then by Moscow. And already in June he became the legitimate king. But he acted too independently, which caused discontent among the boyars; he also supported serfdom, which caused protest from the peasants. On May 17, 1606, False Dmitry 1 was killed and V.I. ascended the throne. Shuisky, with the condition of limiting power. Thus, the first stage of the turmoil was marked by the reign False Dmitry I(1605 - 1606)

Second period of troubles

In 1606 there was an uprising, whose leader was I.I. Bolotnikov. The ranks of the militia included people from different walks of life: peasants, serfs, small and medium-sized feudal lords, servicemen, Cossacks and townspeople. They were defeated in the battle of Moscow. As a result, Bolotnikov was executed.

But dissatisfaction with the authorities continued. And soon appears False Dmitry 2. In January 1608, his army headed towards Moscow. By June, False Dmitry 2 entered the village of Tushino near Moscow, where he settled. In Russia, 2 capitals were formed: boyars, merchants, officials worked on 2 fronts, sometimes even receiving salaries from both kings. Shuisky concluded an agreement with Sweden and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth began aggressive military operations. False Dmitry 2 fled to Kaluga.

Shuisky was tonsured a monk and taken to the Chudov Monastery. An interregnum began in Russia - the Seven Boyars (a council of 7 boyars). Boyar Duma made a deal with the Polish interventionists and on August 17, 1610 Moscow swore allegiance to the Polish king Vladislav. At the end of 1610, False Dmitry 2 was killed, but the struggle for the throne did not end there.

So, the second stage was marked by the uprising of I.I. Bolotnikov (1606 - 1607), the reign of Vasily Shuisky (1606 - 1610), the appearance of False Dmitry 2, as well as the Seven Boyars (1610).

Third period of troubles

The third stage of the turmoil is characterized by the fight against foreign invaders. After the death of False Dmitry 2, the Russians united against the Poles. The war acquired a national character. In August 1612 militia of K. Minin and D. Pozharsky reached Moscow. And already on October 26, the Polish garrison surrendered. Moscow was liberated. The time of troubles is over.

Results of the Troubles

The results of the Time of Troubles were depressing: the country was in a terrible situation, the treasury was ruined, trade and crafts were in decline. The consequences of the Troubles for Russia were expressed in its backwardness compared to European countries. It took decades to restore the economy.

11) Creation of the 1st and 2nd militia. Liberation of Moscow

In the spring of 1611, “from different parts of the earth” the first militia was formed, led by P. Lyapunov, D. Trubetskoy and I. Zarutsky, with the goal of liberating Moscow from the Poles. Lyapunov, calling on all military people to take part in the liberation of Moscow, promised “will and salary.” In the spring of 1611 The militia besieged Moscow. In March, an uprising broke out in the capital. Stubborn fighting ensued in the streets. D.M. became an active participant in the uprising. Pozharsky, who was wounded and taken to his Nizhny Novgorod estate. Lacking the strength to cope with the Muscovites, the Poles burned out part of the settlement.

The militia created the highest temporary authority of the country - the Council of the Whole Earth. But he did not act decisively, constrained by internal disagreements and mutual suspicions. To overcome them, on the initiative of Lyapunov, on June 30, 1611, the “Sentence of the Whole Land” was adopted, which provided for the restoration of the previous order.

“The verdict did not satisfy the free Cossacks. News of the massacre of twenty-eight nobles. The Cossacks ran out of patience. July 22, 1611 Lyapunov, summoned to the Cossack circle, was killed. Lyapunov's death led to the collapse of the first militia. The nobles left the camp near Moscow. The Cossacks of Trubetsky and Zarutsky continued the siege, but they were not strong enough to cope with the Polish garrison.

But the zemshchina again showed its ability to revive. In provincial cities, a movement began to organize a second militia. “In the fall of 1611, the head of Nizhny Novgorod Posad, Kuzma Minin, made an appeal to sacrifice everything for the liberation of the Motherland. Under his leadership, the city council raised funds for military people. A post-creative impulse, a readiness for self-sacrifice, swept the masses. A governor was also elected, distinguished by his “strength and honesty - D. M Pozharsky. The latter, together with the “elected person” Kuzma Minin, headed the new Council of the whole earth”14.

The second militia did not immediately advance to Moscow. Having climbed up the Volga, the militias more four months stood in Yaroslavl, forming their government and basic orders. This was necessary in order, firstly, to gather strength and resources, relying on the less devastated northern cities, and, secondly, to come to an agreement with the free Cossacks. Lyapunov's fate was still too memorable to ignore the importance of such an action.

“In August 1612, the second militia came to Moscow. In September, the governors of the two militias agreed to “access” Moscow together “to want the best of everything for the Russian state without any cunning.” A unified government was formed, which henceforth acted on behalf of both governors, princes Trubetsky and Pozharsky"15.

In the twentieth of August, the militia repelled an attempt by Hetman Khotkevich to liberate the besieged Polish garrison. The Poles persisted; they hoped for help from the king. But Sigismund III faced a number of difficulties: the gentry, in particular, fearing the autocratic aspirations of the king, strengthened by the resources of Moscow, limited his strength. Sigismund 3 never appeared. The Polish and Lithuanian people were exhausted. On October 22, Kitay City was taken. Four days later, on October 26, 1612, the Kremlin garrison capitulated. Moscow was liberated.

In January - February 1613, one of the most representative Zemsky Sobors in the history of Russia took place, at which, after lengthy disputes, Mikhail Romanov was elected tsar unanimously by class delegations. An attempt by one of the Polish detachments to capture the 16-year-old Tsar was thwarted as a result of the feat of Ivan Susanin. The “Troubles” in Russia began to gradually fade away. Gangs of “robbers” continued to roam the country, and individual Cossack, peasant and urban uprisings broke out. The most serious of them were the performances of the Cossacks under the leadership of I. Zarutsky in 1612-1614, who tried to place the “warren” - the young son of False Dmitry II - on the Russian throne, and the uprising of Balovny in 1615, who defended the principles of the free Cossacks. After a series of concessions to the Cossacks from the boyar duma and promises not to persecute the Cossacks for their previous deeds, the situation in the country stabilized. In 1617-1618 Relations with Sweden and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were normalized.

12) Overcoming the “great Moscow ruin”, the restoration process after the turmoil took about three decades and was completed by the middle of the century. The general line of Russian history followed the path of further strengthening the serf system and the class system. The main task facing Russia was to restore the country's destroyed economy, internal order and stability. Mikhail Fedorovich (1613-1645) followed the path of assigning peasants to their owners. In 1619, a five-year search was again announced, and in 1637, a nine-year search for fugitives. In 1642, a decree was again issued on a ten-year period for the search for fugitives and a fifteen-year search for peasants who were forcibly taken out.

In 1632, the Zemsky Sobor decided to return Smolensk, lost after the turmoil. The task was made easier by the death of the Polish king Sigismund III and the election of a new monarch. 30 thousandth Russian army with 150 guns, Smolensk was besieged. The siege ended in major failure. True, the new Polish king Wladislav was unable to build on his success.

In 1634, a peace treaty was signed near the city of Vyazma on the Polyanovka River. Poland retained the Smolensk, Chernigov and Novogorod-Seversky lands. Vladislav, who took the Polish throne, renounced the Russian throne, to which he was invited by the Seven Boyars during the Time of Troubles, and recognized Mikhail Fedorovich as tsar.

In 1637, the Don Cossacks, on their own initiative, captured the Turkish fortress of Azov at the mouth of the Don. The Cossacks turned to the king with a request to take Azov under his rule. The Zemsky Sobor of 1642 did not express unity on this matter. It was clear that Russia would have to lead difficult war with Turkey and Crimea, but there is no strength for this. The Cossacks were forced to leave Azov.

Alexey Mikhailovich (1645-1676) received the nickname "The Quietest". The new king was a well-read man, distinguished by good health and a cheerful disposition, piety, was an exemplary family man, loved luxury and rituals. However, he was quick-tempered and “moved to anger,” but quickly moved away.

In 1648-1649 The Zemsky Council was held and ended with the adoption of the “Cathedral Code” of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich. It was the largest Zemsky Sobor in the history of Russia. 340 people took part in it, the majority of whom (70%) belonged to the nobility and the elite of the settlement.

The “Conciliar Code” consisted of 25 chapters and contained about a thousand articles. Printed in an edition of two thousand copies, it was the first Russian legislative monument published in printing, and remained valid until 1832. It was translated into almost all European languages.

Although the power of the Moscow sovereigns was not absolute (not having a sufficiently ramified bureaucratic apparatus, they relied on the top of the service class and were forced to take into account their specific class interests, in particular the local tradition), the weakness of the classes (including the boyar nobility itself, which was in the position of a serving aristocracy) and the serfdom of the bulk of the country's population allowed them to rise significantly above society. This was the main feature of the estate-representative monarchy in Russia, the process of its transition to absolutism. An important milestone in the evolution of Russian statehood was the reign of Boris Godunov, marked by significant changes in the social and political life of the country.

13) Increasing centralization of the Moscow state demanded a centralized church. It was necessary to unify it - the introduction of the same text of prayer, the same type of worship, the same forms of magical rituals and manipulations that make up the cult. For this purpose, during the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich as patriarch Nikon a reform was carried out that had a significant impact on the further development of Orthodoxy in Russia. The changes were based on the practice of worship in Byzantium.

After the baptism of Rus', some changes occurred in the ritual of the Byzantine church. Having conceived the idea of ​​​​correcting books according to Greek models, Nikon realized that it was impossible to do without a decisive break in many rituals that had taken root in the Russian Church. In order to gain support, he turned to the Patriarch of Constantinople Paisia, who did not recommend that Nikon break established traditions, but Nikon did it his own way. In addition to changes in church books, innovations concerned the order of worship. Thus, the sign of the cross had to be made with three fingers, not two; the religious procession around the church should be carried out not in the direction of the sun (from east to west, salting), but against the sun (from west to east); instead of bows to the ground, bows should be made from the waist; to honor the cross not only with eight and six points, but also with four points; sing hallelujah three times, not two, and some others.

The reform was proclaimed at a solemn service in the Moscow Assumption Cathedral on the so-called Orthodoxy Week 1656 (first Sunday of Lent). Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich supported the reform, and the councils of 1655 and 1656 approved it. However, it aroused protest from a significant part of the boyars and merchants, the lower clergy and peasantry. The protest was based on social contradictions that took a religious form. As a result, a split in the church began. Those who did not agree with the reforms were called schismatics. The schismatics were led by archpriest Habakkuk And Ivan Neronov. The means of power were used against schismatics: prisons and exile, executions and persecution. Avvakum and his companions were stripped of their hair and sent to the Pustozersky prison, where they were burned alive in 1682; others were caught, tortured, beaten, beheaded and burned. The confrontation was especially brutal in the Solovetsky Monastery, which held a siege from the tsarist troops for about eight years.

In Moscow, the archers, under the leadership of Nikita Pustosvyat. They demanded a debate between the Nikonians and the Old Believers. The dispute resulted in a squabble, but the Old Believers felt like winners. Nevertheless, the victory turned out to be illusory: the next day the leaders of the Old Believers were arrested and executed a few days later.

The adherents of the old faith realized that they had no hope of victory in the state plan. The flight to the outskirts of the country intensified. The most extreme form of protest was self-immolation. It is believed that during the existence of the Old Believers, the number of those who burned themselves reached 20 thousand. “Burning” continued throughout most of the 18th century. and stopped only during the reign of Catherine II.

Patriarch Nikon tried to establish the priority of spiritual power over secular power, to place the patriarchate above autocracy. He hoped that the tsar would not be able to do without him, and in 1658 he pointedly renounced the patriarchate. The blackmail was not successful. The local council of 1666 condemned Nikon and deprived him of his dignity. The Council, recognizing the independence of the patriarch in resolving spiritual issues, confirmed the need for subordination to the church royal power. Nikon was exiled to the Belozersko-Ferapontov Monastery.

14) Social movements in the 17th century. The development of the country's economy was accompanied by major social movements. It was no coincidence that the 17th century was called the “rebellious century” by its contemporaries. In the middle of the century, there were two peasant “unrest” and a number of urban uprisings, as well as the Solovetsky riot and two Streltsy uprisings in the last quarter of the century. The history of urban uprisings opens with the Salt Riot of 1648 in Moscow. Various segments of the capital's population took part in it: townspeople, archers, nobles dissatisfied with the pro-boyar policy of the government of B. I. Morozov. The reason for the speech was the dispersal by the archers on June 1 of a delegation of Muscovites who were trying to submit a petition to the Tsar at the arbitrariness of the officials. Pogroms began at the courts of influential dignitaries. The uprising in Moscow received a wide response - a wave of movements in the summer of 1648 swept many cities. The most persistent and lengthy uprisings took place in 1650 in Pskov and Novgorod; they were caused by a sharp increase in bread prices as a result of the government's commitment to supply grain to Sweden. In both cities, power passed into the hands of zemstvo elders. The Novgorod elected authorities showed neither fortitude nor determination and opened the gates to the punitive detachment of Prince I.N. Khovansky. Pskov put up successful armed resistance to government troops during the three-month siege of the city. The Zemskaya Izba, headed by Gabriel Demidov, became the absolute owner of the city, distributing bread and property confiscated from the rich among the townspeople. Resistance ended after all participants in the uprising were forgiven. In 1662, the so-called Copper Riot occurred in Moscow, caused by the protracted Russian-Polish war and the financial crisis. Monetary reform (minting depreciated copper money) led to a sharp drop in the exchange rate of the ruble, which primarily affected the soldiers and archers who received cash salaries, as well as artisans and small traders. On July 25, “thieves’ letters” were scattered around the city with an appeal to the action. The excited crowd moved to seek justice in Kolomenskoye, where the tsar was. In Moscow itself, the rebels destroyed the courtyards of boyars and rich merchants. While the tsar was persuading the crowd, and the boyars were holed up in the distant chambers of the tsar’s palace, regiments loyal to the government of the Streltsy and “foreign order” regiments approached Kolomenskoye. As a result of the brutal massacre, several hundred people died, and 18 were publicly hanged. The culmination of popular uprisings in the 17th century. was an uprising of Cossacks and peasants led by S. T. Razin. This movement originated in the villages of the Don Cossacks. The Don freemen have always attracted fugitives from the southern and central regions Russian state. Here they were protected by an unwritten law - “there is no extradition from the Don.” The government, needing the services of the Cossacks for the defense of the southern borders, paid them a salary and put up with the self-government that existed there. Stepan Timofeevich Razin enjoyed great authority. In 1667, he led a detachment of a thousand people who went on a campaign “for zipuns” to the Volga, and then to the river. Yaik, where the Yaitsky town was occupied with battle. In the summer of 1668, Razin’s army of almost 2 thousand successfully operated in the possessions of Persia (Iran) on the Caspian coast. In the summer of 1669, the Cossacks defeated a fleet at Pig Island, equipped against them by the Persian Shah. This greatly complicated Russian-Iranian relations and aggravated the government’s position towards the Cossacks. In early October, Razin returned to the Don via Astrakhan, where he was greeted with triumph. Inspired by success, he began preparing a new campaign, this time “for the good king” against the “traitor boyars.” The next campaign of the Cossacks along the Volga to the north resulted in peasant unrest. The Cossacks remained the military core, and with the influx of a huge number of fugitive peasants and peoples of the Volga region - Mordovians, Tatars, Chuvashs - into the detachment, the social orientation of the movement changed dramatically. In May 1670, a thousand-strong detachment of S. T. Razin captured the city of Tsaritsyn. Ivan Lopatin led a thousand archers to Tsaritsyn. His last stop was Money Island, which was located on the Volga, north of Tsaritsyn. Lopatin was sure that Razin did not know his location, and therefore did not post sentries. In the midst of the halt, the Razins attacked him. They approached from both banks of the river and began shooting at the Lopatin residents. They boarded the boats in disarray and began to row towards Tsaritsyn. All along the way they were fired upon by Razin’s ambush detachments. Having suffered heavy losses, they sailed to the walls of the city. The Razins started shooting from them. The Sagittarius surrendered. Razin drowned most of the commanders, and made the spared and ordinary archers rower-prisoners.

Battle for Kamyshin.

Several dozen Razin Cossacks dressed as merchants and entered Kamyshin. At the appointed hour, the Razintsi approached the city. Meanwhile, those who entered killed the guards of one of the city gates, opened them, the main forces burst through them into the city and took it. Streltsov, nobles, and the governor were executed. Residents were told to pack everything they needed and leave the city. When the city was empty, the Razintsi plundered it and then burned it.

Trip to Astrakhan.

A military council was held in Tsaritsyn. There they decided to go to Astrakhan. In Astrakhan, the archers were positive towards Razin, this mood was fueled by anger at the authorities, who paid their salaries late. The news that Razin was marching on the city frightened the city authorities. The Astrakhan fleet was sent against the rebels. However, when meeting with the rebels, the archers tied up the fleet commanders and went over to Razin’s side. Then the Cossacks decided the fate of their superiors. Prince Semyon Lvov was spared, and the rest were drowned. Then the Razins approached Astrakhan. At night the Razins attacked the city. At the same time, an uprising of the archers and the poor broke out there. The city fell. Then the rebels carried out their executions, introduced a Cossack regime in the city and went to the Middle Volga region with the goal of reaching Moscow.

March to Moscow.

After this, the population of the Middle Volga region (Saratov, Samara, Penza), as well as the Chuvash, Mari, Tatars, and Mordovians freely went over to Razin’s side. This success was facilitated by the fact that Razin declared everyone who came over to his side a free person. Near Samara, Razin announced that Patriarch Nikon and Tsarevich Alexei Alekseevich were coming with him. This further increased the influx of poor people into his ranks. All along the road, the Razintsi sent letters to various regions of Rus' with calls for uprising. They called such letters charming.

In September 1670, the Razins laid siege to Simbirsk, but were unable to take it. Government troops led by Prince Yu. A. Dolgorukov moved towards Razin. A month after the start of the siege, the tsarist troops defeated the rebels, and the seriously wounded Razin’s associates took him to the Don. Fearing reprisals, the Cossack elite, led by military ataman Kornil Yakovlev, handed Razin over to the authorities. In June 1671 he was quartered in Moscow; brother Frol was presumably executed on the same day.

Despite the execution of their leader, the Razins continued to defend themselves and were able to hold Astrakhan until November 1671.

15) The years of the Great Troubles resulted in the loss of many lands for Rus'. The most important task during the reign of Mikhail Fedorovich was to overcome the consequences of this difficult time for Russia. The renunciation of the rights to the throne of Moscow by the Polish prince Vladislav was of great importance.

Novgorod and Smolensk, lost during the Time of Troubles, were not immediately regained. Russia at that time was seriously weakened and the wars with Poland and Sweden were not successful. Novgorod was returned only in 1617 after the conclusion of the Pillar Peace with Sweden, but the coast of the Gulf of Finland was lost. Only in 1634, according to the Treaty of Polyana, Vladislav finally renounced his claim to the Moscow throne. However, the Seversky lands and Smolensk remained in the power of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich focused his energy on resolving the problems left by the previous reign. At this time, most of Ukraine and Belarus belonged to the Polish Crown. The riots that began against the Poles in 1648 in Ukraine grew into a large-scale war of liberation, which covered all Belarusian lands. At the head of this powerful movement was Bogdan Khmelnitsky. The rebels turned to Moscow for help. However, the decision to unite Russia and Ukraine was made only in 1654. This became the reason for another war with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The result was “Eternal Peace.” Russia was finally able to regain Smolensk, and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was forced to recognize the reunification of Russia and Ukraine. Also, according to the terms of this peace, Kyiv also ceded to Russia.

Russian-Turkish relations also remained difficult. The Crimean campaigns of Prince Golitsin in 1687 and 1689 did not bring success. Russia never managed to gain access to the Black Sea. However, it is worth noting the Azov campaigns of 1695 and 1696. But the capture of Azov was clearly insufficient to ensure safe trade routes to the west. The Black Sea remained completely under the control of the Ottoman Empire.

A striking success of Russian foreign policy in the 17th century was the annexation of lands into the territory of the country Eastern Siberia. Dezhnev and Poyarkov, famous Russian pioneers were able to reach the banks of the Amur and Pacific Ocean. Territory expansion Russian Empire at the expense of the Amur lands could not but cause concern to the rulers of China. However, in 1689 the border along the Amur River (and its tributaries) was fixed by the Treaty of Nerchinsk.

16) Most of all, Peter I was occupied by the thought of the fleet and the possibility of trade relations with Europe. To put his ideas into practice, he equipped the Grand Embassy and visited a number of European countries, where I saw how Russia was behind in its development.

This event in the life of the young king marked the beginning of his transformative activities. The first reforms of Peter I were aimed at changing the external signs of Russian life: he ordered beards to be shaved and ordered to dress in European clothes, introduced music, tobacco, balls and other innovations into the life of Moscow society, which shocked him.

By decree of December 20, 1699, Peter I approved the calendar from the Nativity of Christ and the celebration of the New Year on January 1.

1. The third stage of the Troubles occurred in 1610 - 1613. It was characterized by:

1. foreign occupation;
2. attempts by a number of boyars to give the occupation a lasting and legal character;
3. the activities of two people's militias - the first led by Prokopiy Lyapunov in 1611 and the second led by Kozma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky in 1612;
4. liberation of Rus' from foreign occupation by the people's militia;
5. election of the Romanovs as a new royal dynasty;
6. conclusion of peace treaties with Sweden and Poland, gradual stabilization of life.

2. After the destruction of two centers of power in 1610 - the overthrow of Tsar Vasily Shuisky and the murder of False Dmitry II, as well as the defeat of Russian troops from the Poles and Swedes, traditional authorities in Rus' were destroyed - there was no tsar, Zemsky Sobors were not convened, in fact there was no army.

In September 1610, after the capitulation of the boyar government, the Polish army led by Hetman Chodkiewicz entered Moscow. The formation of Polish authorities began, military commandant's offices were created. Preparations were underway for the election of the Polish prince Vladislav as king.

For the first time in history since the time of Rurik, a foreigner and a Catholic claimed the Russian throne. The delay in Vladislav's accession to the throne was due to the religion of the applicant - a number of boyars insisted on Vladislav's conversion to Orthodoxy, while the Poles and Vladislav himself wanted him to remain a Catholic. In this case, Vladislav could become king of Rus' and Poland at the same time and make Rus', along with Lithuania and Ukraine, part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth - the great Polish empire. The threat of loss of independence and inclusion in another state - Poland, as well as political, economic, religious and cultural enslavement loomed over Russia.

3. During this period, people's militias began to operate in Rus', not under the control of the central government (the government of the seven boyars, and the Poles).

The first militia was created by the nobleman Prokopiy Lyapunov (an ally of the murdered False Dmitry II) and began to act against the Poles in the Moscow region. A people's war against the Polish invaders began. In 1611, the first militia was defeated, and Prokopiy Lyapunov was killed.

In 1612 Nizhny Novgorod, on the Volga, the zemstvo elder Kozma Minin began to form a second militia. Representatives from all walks of life signed up for the militia - townspeople, peasants, nobles, and patriotic boyars. Prince Dmitry Pozharsky was appointed commander of the militia.

The second militia acted with great success. It met with popular support and grew rapidly. Within a few months, the militia liberated vast areas near Moscow from the Poles. In September 1612, the people's army of Minin and Pozharsky defeated the Polish army and liberated Moscow. The threat of Polish enslavement was averted.

4. In February 1613, the Zemsky Sobor was convened for the purpose of electing a new king. The new Tsar of Rus' was 16-year-old Mikhail Romanov, the son of the key oppositionist to Boris Godunov, Fyodor (Filaret) Romanov, who in 1619 would be elected Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus'. A new dynasty reigned in Rus' - the Romanovs, which ruled for 304 years - until 1917. The election of the Romanovs as a new royal dynasty was predetermined by the following factors:

• The Romanovs were the closest relatives of the last Rurik tsar, Fyodor Ivanovich;
• The Romanovs were experienced intriguers and “politicians” who, without particularly participating in the national liberation struggle, eventually outplayed the rest of their competitors;
• it is possible that there was a banal bribery of participants in the Zemsky Sobor (this was a common practice, for example, at conclaves for the election of the Pope, elections of the Holy Roman Emperor, elections of the King of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, etc.). Recently, the version that the Romanovs and their allies “bought Mishka a kingdom” has become increasingly widespread; A.S. Pushkin indirectly indicates that D. Pozharsky was also not averse to becoming a tsar, but the 20 thousand rubles distributed to the delegates were not enough, while the “investments” of the Romanovs, who had been aiming for the throne for 20 years, were the largest. If we reject the version of bribery, then it is difficult to explain for what merits the sickly 16-year-old boyar son Misha Romanov, who did not participate in the national liberation struggle and served the Poles, was suddenly awarded the honor of receiving power from the rebellious people;
• Perhaps there was a grandiose farce during the Romanov elections. During the 10 years of unrest, the entire elite became “dirty” - the highest boyars and nobles betrayed left and right, swore allegiance to the “thieves” (False Dmitry), received titles and estates from the “thieves,” and collaborated with the occupiers. In 10 years, there was practically no old elite left, and the new elite was mostly “thieves” (the word “thief” at that time had a broader meaning than today, and, among other things, meant those who illegally seize power). We can say that the militia of Minin and Pozharsky, having liberated Russia, “squandered” power - instead of taking it as a winner, they gave it to the Zemsky Sobor, which was immediately “taken over” by yesterday’s “jurists” and collaborators. “Having lost”, pushing aside Minin and Pozharsky, they elected their own kind as king - the faded Misha Romanov. Subsequently, the Romanovs (yesterday’s peasants and seedy petty nobles, who until recently bore the surname Koshkins (who, shortly before the troubles, “for respectability”, came up with the surname Romanovs for themselves), and by chance, on the people’s grief, became the rulers of Russia) the story of their “election to the kingdom” was glorified and mythologized. For 300 years, myths were created about the “national call” of the Romanovs to the throne in the wake of the people’s liberation struggle, etc., although all this was quite far from reality.

5. After the election of Mikhail Romanov as Tsar and the coming to power of the “new” (in many ways, “thieves” (self-proclaimed) - including from yesterday’s Cossacks and peasants) boyars and nobility, the Troubles in Rus' began to subside. In order to urgently stop external aggression and stabilize domestic life, Russia signed two humiliating peace treaties:

• , through which Russia lost access to the Baltic Sea and northwestern lands;
• Deulino truce of 1618 with Poland, according to which Russia lost Smolensk and a number of territories in the west.

Also, for several years, the revived government army suppressed uncontrolled groups of rebels who did not recognize the new government.

The final political, economic and spiritual stabilization after the Time of Troubles came in the 20s. XVII century As a result of the Great Troubles:

• outdated government bodies were destroyed by revolutionary means;
• the estate-representative monarchy was renewed - a new royal dynasty was elected, the nobility was strengthened, a compromise was found between the boyars and nobles and their groups;
• Russia suffered major territorial losses - access to the Baltic and the original Russian Smolensk were lost;
• the enslavement of the peasants continued (otherwise the country, completely ruined by “thieves” and interventionists, simply would not have “risen”). The Time of Troubles is considered the end of the medieval period in the history of Rus'. After the Time of Troubles, the country increasingly began to be called in a new way - Russia (in 100 years this name would become official).

The Time of Troubles in Russia is one of the key pages of our history. In essence, this was an introduction to the 17th century, which went down in history under the name “Rebellious”. And the Time of Troubles, no matter how much we were told about its short historical period, was not suppressed and it “emerged” from Russia throughout the 17th century. It was actually completed only after the creation of the regime of Peter 1. It was he who finally strangled the process that was rotting the entire 17th century.

The Time of Troubles is an era of social, political, economic, dynastic and spiritual crisis. It was accompanied by popular uprisings, class and inter-class struggle, impostors, Polish and Swedish intervention and the almost complete ruin of the country.

Historical reference book

Concepts of the Troubles

In Russian historiography there were 2 schemes of the Troubles: Klyuchevsky and Platonov. This is what Klyuchevsky wrote: “In the Troubles, all classes of Russian society consistently appear and they appear in the very order in which they lay in the then composition of Russian society, as they were placed on the social ladder. At the top of this ladder stood the boyars, and they began the unrest. Therefore, the first phase is boyar, then noble and then national.”

By the way, the Troubles of the early 20th century, which led to the fall of the Empire, developed absolutely according to the same pattern. The Time of Troubles also began, the first phase of which was Perestroika. That is, the first phase of all three Russian Troubles is the boyar phase, when the elite begins to share power.

The second scheme of the Time of Troubles in Russia belongs to the historian Platonov, who distinguished three periods in the history of the Troubles: dynastic, noble and socio-religious. But in essence, this is the same as Klyuchevsky’s:

1. Dynastic. Boyars and nobles fight for power.
2. Noble. Less rich and influential people are joining in these squabbles.
3. National-religious. The people are included in the Troubles

The main reasons for the Time of Troubles in Russia can be expressed as follows:

• Economic reasons. As a result of weather conditions, a famine occurred in 1601-1603. The population was dying en masse. Trust in the current government was falling.
• Dynastic crisis. After the deaths of Tsarevich Dmitry in Uglich and Fyodor Ivanovich in Moscow, the Rurik dynasty was interrupted.
• Social crisis. Almost all segments of the Russian population of the late 16th and early 17th centuries were dissatisfied with their situation.
• Political crisis. In Russia there was an active struggle for power between boyar groups.
• Poland and Sweden grew stronger and actively showed their claims to Russian lands and the throne.

More detailed causes of the Troubles are given in the following diagram:

The beginning of the Troubles in Rus'

The Time of Troubles in Russia actually began with the death of Ivan the Terrible. In 1598, Fyodor died and events took place that can be called the “Latent Stage of the Troubles.” The fact is that Fyodor did not leave a will, and formally Irina should have sat on the throne. But at this time she clears the way for her brother Boris Godunov and voluntarily goes to the monastery. As a result, the Boyar Duma splits. The Romanovs attacked Boris, and as a result he stopped going to the Duma.

Ultimately, the Zemsky Sobor elected Godunov to reign, but the Boyar Duma opposed this. There was a split. This is a classic feature of the Time of Troubles in Russia - dual power. Zemsky Sobor against the Boyar Duma. Dual power would arise later after the February coup of 1917. It will be the “Provisional Government” against the “Petrosoviet” or the “Reds” against the “Whites”. The dual power at the end of the 20th century will be as follows - first Gorbachev against Yeltsin. Then Yeltsin is against Supreme Council. That is, Troubles always splits power into 2 opposing camps.

Ultimately, Boris Godunov outmaneuvered the Boyar Duma and became king. Read more about how this happened.

Driving elements of the Time of Troubles

You need to understand that the Troubles is a mass phenomenon in which almost all segments of the population and social groups took part. Nevertheless, there were three major classes that played an exceptional role in those events, and which need to be discussed separately. These are the following groups:

1. Sagittarius.
2. Cossacks.
3. "Combat slaves."

Let's take a closer look at each of these groups.

Battle serfs

The problem in Russia after the famine of 1601-1603 was that the growth in the number of service people outpaced the growth land fund. The country (it’s even strange to say this about Russia) did not have the resources to provide all the children of the nobility with land. As a result, a layer of “Combat Slaves” began to emerge in Rus'.

These were those nobles who did not have land, but who had weapons (little is said about this, but Ivan Bolotnikov was one of the Battle Slaves), and who went into service as a military service to some boyar or rich nobleman. The percentage of fighting slaves in Rus' at the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th century was +/-10%. Now think about this... Events of the 90s (collapse of the USSR). Then those who serve in various private and security companies, in the army, and all armed people in the country are exactly that same 10%. That is, it is social dynamite that can explode at any moment.

What were fighting serfs at the beginning of the 16th century? For every 25 thousand nobles in the militia, there were up to 5 thousand fighting slaves.

For example, after the shelling of Ivangorod in 1590, the governors led 350 archers, 400 Cossacks and 2,382 fighting serfs to storm. That is, there were a lot of combat slaves, and their proportion in the army changed its structure for the use of these people. And these people were extremely dissatisfied with their situation.

It was from the fighting serfs that the leader of the largest uprising of the lower classes in 1602-1603, Khlopko Kasolap, came from. In 1603, he approached Moscow, and a regular army had to be sent to defeat him.

Sagittarius

The Streltsy, as a military unit, was created in the mid-16th century. The undoubted advantage of its creation was that it was thanks to the Streltsy army that Kazan was taken. In Moscow there were 10 thousand archers (that is, a fairly large social stratum). In others major cities up to 1 thousand people. The salary of archers ranged from 7 rubles in Moscow to 0.5 rubles in the outskirts. They also received a grain salary.

The problem was that they only received full money during hostilities. In addition, the archers received money with a long delay, since those who distributed money, according to Russian tradition, stole. Therefore, the archers who lived in the settlements kept vegetable gardens, were engaged in trade, and some even engaged in banditry. Therefore, they felt a social kinship with the townspeople, because their lifestyle and priorities were identical.

Cossacks during the Time of Troubles

Another band that played exceptionally important role in the Time of Troubles in Russia, and which was also dissatisfied with the authorities - the Cossacks. The total number of Cossacks at the end of the 16th century from the Dnieper to the Yaik River (the modern Ural River) is estimated at 11-14 thousand people. The Cossack organization was as follows: In Russia it was a village, in Ukraine it was a hundred. The free villages were not part of the government troops, but actually served as border guards.

After impoverishment, military slaves fled to the Don, the government demanded that they be taken out, but there was a rule - “There is no extradition from the Don!” Hence the anti-Cossack measures of Godunov, who tried to return the fighting slaves, since the rich nobility put pressure on him. Naturally, this caused discontent among the Cossacks. As a result, Godunov found himself in a situation where whatever he did did not solve the problem, but only aggravated it.

The Cossacks were associated with the southern counties, in which social contradictions were already acute, because those who were offended by the authorities fled to the southern counties. That is, the Cossacks are such a separate layer that has always considered itself superior to the rest.

The beginning of the open stage of the Troubles

Thus, we can say that at the turn of the 16th-17th centuries an explosive situation developed in Russia:

1. Almost all possible contradictions between and within classes intensified.
2. Confrontations within the country intensified - “South” against “Center”.

A lot of “social dynamite” had been produced and all that remained was for interested parties to light the fuse. And it was lit simultaneously in Russia and Poland. At the beginning of the 17th century, a situation arose in Russia that contributed to the transition of the Time of Troubles from a latent (hidden) state to an open state.

First stage of the Troubles

A man appeared in Poland who called himself Tsarevich Dmitry, a survivor of Uglich. Of course, he declared his rights to the throne and began to gather an army in Poland to go and take back “his” throne by force. I will not now dwell in detail on this man and the elements of his attempt (and a successful one) to seize power. We have a whole article on our website where all the events of this stage are discussed in detail. You can read it using this link.

I will only say that at this stage Poland did not support False Dmitry. He recruited an army of mercenaries there, but the Polish king Sigismund III distanced himself from this campaign. Moreover, he even warned Godunov that a man was coming “for his soul.”

At this stage:

1. There was a dynastic struggle for power.
2. False Dmitry 1 appeared.
3. The scale of the Time of Troubles was still small. In fact, only the elite were involved in them so far.
4. Murder of False Dmitry 1.

Second stage of the Troubles

After the overthrow of False Dmitry, Vasily Shuisky became king. By the way, the future king himself played not the least role in the murder of the impostor. Most historians agree that it was his plot, which he brilliantly implemented. The accession of Shuisky, as the historian Platonov believed, was the beginning of the entry of the Time of Troubles into the second period (noble), marked not only by a dynastic struggle for power, but also by deep social conflicts. Although Shuisky’s reign began very well, with the suppression of Bolotnikov’s uprising. In general, the Bolotnik uprising is an extremely important thing for understanding the essence of the Troubles in Russia. Again, we will not consider this issue in detail in this topic, since this topic has already been discussed by us. Here is a link for reference.

It is important to understand that Bolotnikov’s uprising is not a peasant war, as they often try to present it to us, but a struggle for power in the conditions of the Troubles. Bolotnikov was a man of False Dmitry 1, always acted on his behalf and pursued a specific goal - power.

The Time of Troubles in Russia was characterized by the following phenomenon. Free Cossacks, especially in final stage The Time of Troubles claimed to replace the nobility in its function of military defense of the country. That is, the Time of Troubles had many dimensions, but a very important dimension was the struggle between the nobility and the Cossacks over who would become the main military class of the country. The Cossacks did not fight for freedom. It is they who will fight for freedom later, under Razin, 50 years after the end of the Time of Troubles. Here they fought to take the place of the nobility. This became possible due to the fact that the Oprichnina, having shaken up the situation in the country, left some voids.

Tushins and their role in the Time of Troubles

Dual power remained in Russia for a long time. On the one hand there was the legitimate Tsar Vasily Shuisky in Moscow, and on the other hand there was False Dmitry 2 with the Tushino camp. In fact, this camp became a hotbed of banditry and all kinds of wickedness that plundered the country. It is no coincidence that people later called this man “Tushino thief.” But such a situation was possible only as long as the forces were equal. As soon as Shuisky received Swedish troops for help, and the Polish king Sigismund 3 began a campaign against Smolensk, the Tushino camp automatically disintegrated. The intervention of the Polish king and the collapse of the Tushino camp became an important stage in the development of all the events of the Time of Troubles.

At this stage what happened:

• Victory of the tsarist troops over Bolotnikov.
• The appearance of False Dmitry 2.
• Troubles are becoming widespread. All larger number people become involved in events.
• Formation of the Tushino camp as an alternative to the current government.
• Lack of intervention elements.

The third stage of the Time of Troubles in Russia

The death of the Tushino thief and the beginning of the Poles' rule in Moscow became the beginning of the 3rd phase of the Time of Troubles in Russia - national-religious or general social. The situation has been simplified as much as possible. If before 1610 the situation was very difficult, because some Russian forces called foreigners to their side, other Russians called other foreigners, i.e. such a mixed situation. Now the situation has become very simple: the Poles are Catholics, but the Russians are Orthodox. That is, the struggle became national-religious. And the striking force of this national struggle was the Zemstvo militia.

The final heroes of these events were Minin and Pozharsky, who drove the Poles out of the country. But again, we should not idealize the images of these people, since we know little reliably about them. It is only known that Pozharsky was a descendant of Vsevolod the Big Nest, and his campaign against Moscow was the family coat of arms, which directly indicates his attempt to seize power. But that is another story. You can read in this article about the events of those years.

At this stage:

• Polish and Swedish intervention in Russia began.
• Murder of False Dmitry 2.
• The beginning of the Zemstvo militias.
• Capture of Moscow by Minin and Pozharsky. Liberation of the city from Polish invaders.
• The convening of the Zemsky Sobor in 1613 and the accession of a new ruling dynasty - the Romanovs.

The end of the Time of Troubles

Formally, the Time of Troubles in Russia ended in 1613-1614, with the beginning of the reign of Mikhail Romanov. But in fact, at that moment, only the following was done - the Poles were thrown out of Moscow and... And that’s all! The Polish question was finally resolved only in 1618. After all, Sigismund and Vladislav actively laid claim to the Russian throne, realizing that the local government there was extremely weak. But in the end, the Deulin Truce was signed, according to which Russia recognized all the gains of Poland during the Time of Troubles, and peace was established between the countries for 14.5 years.

But there was also Sweden, which Shuisky called upon. Few people talk about it, but Sweden owned almost all the northern lands, including Novgorod. In 1617, Russia and Sweden signed the Treaty of Stolbovo, according to which the Swedes returned Novgorod, but retained the entire Baltic coast.

Consequences of the Time of Troubles for Russia

Time of Troubles is always a difficult phase, which hits the country very hard, and from which it then takes a very long time to get out. This was the case in Russia as well. The Troubles formally ended with the accession of the Romanovs, but in fact this was not the case. For many years, the Russian tsars actively fought against the passive, but still elements of the Troubles, in the country.

If we talk about the consequences of the Time of Troubles in Russia, we can highlight the following main consequences:

1. Russia retained its independence and the right to be a state.
2. Creation of a new ruling dynasty of the Romanovs.
3. Terrible economic ruin and exhaustion of the country. Simple people fled en masse to the outskirts.
4. The decline of the authority of the church. People could not understand how the church could allow such passivity in the fight against the interventionists.
5. There was a complete enslavement of the peasants, which had not happened before.
6. Russia lost part of its territory (Smolensk, the Baltic (access to which Peter 1 would later so persistently strive for) and the Northern regions of the country).
7. The country's military potential was virtually destroyed.

These are the main consequences that were extremely important for the country, but most importantly, Russia retained its statehood and continued to develop. Attempts by Poland and Sweden to seize power in Russia ended in nothing.

The difficulty of interpreting the Troubles

The Time of Troubles was very inconvenient for Soviet historians. Pre-revolutionary historiography did not create a strict concept of the Troubles. There are schemes by Klyuchevsky and Platonov (we will talk about them later) - they empirically reflect reality very well, but they do not provide the concept of the Troubles. Because in order to develop the concept of the Time of Troubles in Russia, you must first develop the concept of Russian history and the concept of autocracy. But this was not the case. Soviet historians were doing very poorly with the concept of the Time of Troubles. Actually, Soviet historians did not study any Troubles. Example of Professor Andrey Fursov:

when I took Russian history, or rather the history of the USSR, the questions “Time of Troubles” were not on the tickets. The tickets contained two completely different questions: “Uprising under the leadership of Ivan Bolotnikov” and “Foreign intervention in the early 17th century.”

Andrey Fursov, historian

That is, the Troubles were dispelled as if it had never happened. And it’s clear why. The fact is that in the Time of Troubles, literally everything came into conflict for Soviet historians. From a class point of view, the Soviet historian had to side with Ivan Bolotnikov because he fought against the exploiters. But the fact is that Ivan Bolotnikov was a man of False Dmitry 1 (we will talk about this below), and False Dmitry was connected with the Poles and Swedes. And it turns out that Bolotnikov’s uprising is an element of False Dmitry’s activities to betray the country. That is, this is what hits the Russian government system. From a patriotic point of view, there was no way a Soviet historian could be on Bolotnikov’s side. So we decided to make it very simple. The Time of Troubles was integrally dissected: Bolotnikov’s uprising is one thing, and intervention is another. False Dmitry is generally the third. But it was a complete fake. Everything was much more complicated. And all this was very closely connected, and there would be no Bolotnikov without False Dmitry and the Time of Troubles.

What actually was the Time of Troubles in the history of Russia

The Troubles were certainly a revolutionary event. How is a revolution fundamentally different from an uprising? Who knows, by the way, when the term “revolution” appeared as a political one? Hint - is there any connection between the word "revolution" and "revolver"? Besides the fact that revolvers are used in revolutions... Is there any connection between the names “revolution” and “revolver”? The point is that the drum “spins”. The revolution first appeared in 1688 during the so-called “Glorious Revolution” in England, when everything seemed to return to normal. That is, initially a revolution was called a 360-degree turn. We made a turn and returned to our places with some changes. But since the French Revolution of 1789-1799, revolutions began to be called a turn not by 360 degrees, but by 180. That is, they turned, but did not return to the previous point.

Any popular movement can be divided into 3 categories:

1. palace coups. This is a showdown between the elite.
2. uprisings and riots. The population takes an active part.
3. revolution. When revolutions occur, what happens is that part of the elite enters into an alliance with part of the population, and throws it against another part of the elite. So at some point, the very top begins to express the interests of society, and not just their own. Therefore, for a short moment of revolution, unity occurs. Then, in most cases, the elite deceives society.

And in the Time of Troubles of the early 17th century, some revolutionary features are certainly visible, especially since after the Time of Troubles the autocratic serfdom system, which had not existed in Rus' before, finally rose to its feet.

Chronology

• 1605 - 1606 Reign of False Dmitry I.
• 1606 - 1607 Uprising led by I.I. Bolotnikov.
• 1606 - 1610 The reign of Vasily Shuisky.
• 1610 “Seven Boyars”.
• 1612 Liberation of Moscow from invaders.
• 1613 Election of Mikhail Romanov to the throne by the Zemsky Sobor.

Time of Troubles in Russia

The Troubles in Russia at the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th centuries became a shock that shook the very foundations of the state system. Three periods can be distinguished in the development of the Troubles. The first period is dynastic. This was the time of struggle for the Moscow throne between various contenders, which lasted up to and including Tsar Vasily Shuisky. The second period is social. It is characterized by the internecine struggle of social classes and the intervention of foreign governments in this struggle. The third period is national. It covers the time of the struggle of the Russian people against foreign invaders until the election of Mikhail Romanov as Tsar.

After death in 1584 g. , his son succeeded him Fedor, incapable of governing affairs. “The dynasty was dying out in his person,” noted the English Ambassador Fletcher. “What kind of king I am, it’s not difficult to confuse me or deceive me in any matter,” is a sacramental phrase put into the mouth of Fyodor Ioannovich A.K. Tolstoy. The actual ruler of the state was the tsar's brother-in-law, boyar Boris Godunov, who endured a fierce struggle with the largest boyars for influence on state affairs. After death in 1598 g. Fyodor, the Zemsky Sobor elected Godunov as tsar.

Boris Godunov was energetic and smart statesman. In conditions of economic devastation and difficult international situation he solemnly promised on the day of his crowning, “that there will not be a poor person in his state, and he is ready to share his last shirt with everyone.” But chosen king did not have the authority and advantage of a hereditary monarch, and this could call into question the legitimacy of his presence on the throne.

Godunov's government reduced taxes, exempted merchants from paying duties for two years, and landowners from paying taxes for a year. The tsar started a large construction project and took care of educating the country. The patriarchate was established, which increased the rank and prestige of the Russian church. He also pursued a successful foreign policy—further advances into Siberia took place, the southern regions of the country were developed, and Russian positions in the Caucasus were strengthened.

At the same time, the internal situation of the country under Boris Godunov remained very difficult. In conditions of unprecedented crop failure and famine in 1601-1603. the economy collapsed, hundreds of thousands of people died of hunger, the price of bread rose 100 times. The government took the path of further enslavement of the peasantry. this caused a protest from the broad masses, who directly linked the deterioration of their situation with the name of Boris Godunov.

The aggravation of the internal political situation led, in turn, to a sharp decline in Godunov’s prestige not only among the masses, but also among the boyars.

The biggest threat to B. Godunov’s power was the appearance in Poland of an impostor who declared himself the son of Ivan the Terrible. The fact is that in 1591, under unclear circumstances, the last of the direct heirs to the throne died in Uglich, allegedly running into a knife in a fit of epilepsy. Tsarevich Dmitry. Godunov’s political opponents accused him of organizing the murder of the prince in order to seize power; popular rumor picked up these accusations. However, historians do not have convincing documents that would prove Godunov’s guilt.

It was under such conditions that he appeared in Rus' False Dmitry. This young man named Grigory Otrepiev introduced himself as Dmitry, using rumors that Tsarevich Dmitry was alive, “miraculously saved” in Uglich. The impostor's agents vigorously disseminated in Russia the version of his miraculous salvation from the hands of assassins sent by Godunov, and proved the legality of his right to the throne. Polish magnates provided some assistance in organizing the adventure. As a result, by the autumn of 1604, a powerful army for a trip to Moscow.

The beginning of the Troubles

Taking advantage of the current situation in Rus', its disunity and instability, False Dmitry with a small detachment crossed the Dnieper near Chernigov.

He managed to attract to his side a huge mass of the Russian population, who believed that he was the son of Ivan the Terrible. False Dmitry's forces grew rapidly, cities opened their gates to him, peasants and townspeople joined his troops. False Dmitry moved on the wave of the outbreak of the peasant war. After the death of Boris Godunov in 1605 g. The governors also began to go over to the side of False Dmitry, and at the beginning of June Moscow also took his side.

According to V.O. Klyuchevsky, the impostor “was baked in a Polish oven, but hatched among the boyars.” Without the support of the boyars, he had no chance of winning the Russian throne. On June 1, on Red Square, the impostor’s letters were announced, in which he called Godunov a traitor, and promised “honor and promotion” to the boyars, “mercy” to the nobles and clerks, benefits to merchants, “silence” to the people. The critical moment came when people asked boyar Vasily Shuisky whether the prince was buried in Uglich (it was Shuisky who headed the state commission to investigate the death of Tsarevich Dmitry in 1591 and then confirmed his death from epilepsy). Now Shuisky claimed that the prince had escaped. After these words, the crowd broke into the Kremlin and destroyed the houses of the Godunovs and their relatives. On June 20, False Dmitry solemnly entered Moscow.

It turned out to be easier to sit on the throne than to stay on it. To strengthen his position, False Dmitry confirmed the serfdom legislation, which caused discontent among the peasants.

But, first of all, the tsar did not live up to the expectations of the boyars because he acted too independently. May 17, 1606. The boyars led the people to the Kremlin shouting “The Poles are beating the boyars and the sovereign,” and in the end False Dmitry was killed. Vasily Ivanovich ascended the throne Shuisky. The condition for his accession to the Russian throne was the limitation of power. He vowed “not to do anything without the Council,” and this was the first experience of building public order based on formal restrictions on supreme power. But the situation in the country did not normalize.

The second stage of the turmoil

Begins second stage of the turmoil- social, when the nobility, metropolitan and provincial, clerks, clerks, and Cossacks enter the struggle. However, first of all, this period is characterized by a wide wave of peasant uprisings.

In the summer of 1606, the masses had a leader - Ivan Isaevich Bolotnikov. The forces gathered under the banner of Bolotnikov were a complex conglomerate, consisting of different layers. There were Cossacks, peasants, serfs, townspeople, many service people, small and medium-sized feudal lords. In July 1606, Bolotnikov's troops set out on a campaign against Moscow. In the battle of Moscow, Bolotnikov's troops were defeated and were forced to retreat to Tula. On July 30, the siege of the city began, and after three months the Bolotnikovites capitulated, and he himself was soon executed. The suppression of this uprising did not mean the end of the peasant war, but it began to decline.

The government of Vasily Shuisky sought to stabilize the situation in the country. But both service people and peasants were still dissatisfied with the government. The reasons for this were different. The nobles felt Shuisky’s inability to stop the peasant war, but the peasants did not accept serfdom. Meanwhile, in Starodub (in the Bryansk region) a new impostor appeared, declaring himself the escaped “Tsar Dmitry”. According to many historians, False Dmitry II was a protege of the Polish king Sigismund III, although many do not support this version. The bulk of the armed forces of False Dmitry II were Polish nobles and Cossacks.

In January 1608 g. he moved towards Moscow.

Having defeated Shuisky's troops in several battles, by the beginning of June False Dmitry II reached the village of Tushino near Moscow, where he settled in camp. Pskov, Yaroslavl, Kostroma, Vologda, Astrakhan swore allegiance to the impostor. The Tushins occupied Rostov, Vladimir, Suzdal, and Murom. In Russia, two capitals were actually formed. Boyars, merchants, and officials swore allegiance either to False Dmitry or to Shuisky, sometimes receiving salaries from both.

In February 1609, the Shuisky government entered into an agreement with Sweden, counting on assistance in the war with the “Tushino thief” and his Polish troops. Under this agreement, Russia gave Sweden the Karelian volost in the North, which was a serious political mistake. This gave Sigismund III a reason to switch to open intervention. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth began military operations against Russia with the aim of conquering its territory. Polish troops left Tushino. False Dmitry II, who was there, fled to Kaluga and ultimately ended his voyage ingloriously.

Sigismund sent letters to Smolensk and Moscow, where he claimed that, as a relative of the Russian tsars and at the request of the Russian people, he was going to save the dying Muscovite state and its Orthodox faith.

The Moscow boyars decided to accept help. An agreement was concluded on the recognition of the prince Vladislav Russian Tsar, and until his arrival obey Sigismund. On February 4, 1610, a treaty was concluded, which included a plan government system under Vladislav: the inviolability of the Orthodox faith, restriction of freedom from the arbitrariness of the authorities. The sovereign had to share his power with the Zemsky Sobor and the Boyar Duma.

On August 17, 1610, Moscow swore allegiance to Vladislav. And a month before this, Vasily Shuisky was forcibly tonsured a monk by the nobles and taken to the Chudov Monastery. To govern the country, the Boyar Duma created a commission of seven boyars, called “ seven-boyars" On September 20, the Poles entered Moscow.

Sweden also launched aggressive actions. Swedish troops occupied a large part of northern Russia and were preparing to capture Novgorod. Russia faced a direct threat of losing its independence. The aggressive plans of the aggressors caused general indignation. December 1610 g. False Dmitry II was killed, but the struggle for the Russian throne did not end there.

The third stage of the turmoil

The death of the impostor immediately changed the situation in the country. The pretext for the presence of Polish troops on Russian territory disappeared: Sigismund explained his actions by the need to “fight the Tushino thief.” Polish Army turned into an occupation, the Seven Boyars - into a government of traitors. The Russian people united to resist the intervention. The war acquired a national character.

The third period of unrest begins. From the northern cities, at the call of the patriarch, detachments of Cossacks led by I. Zarutsky and Prince Dm begin to converge on Moscow. Trubetskoy. This is how the first militia was formed. In April - May 1611, Russian troops stormed the capital, but did not achieve success, as internal contradictions and rivalry among the leaders took their toll. In the autumn of 1611, the desire for liberation from foreign oppression was clearly expressed by one of the leaders of the Nizhny Novgorod settlement Kuzma Minin, who called for the creation of a militia to liberate Moscow. The prince was elected leader of the militia Dmitry Pozharsky.

In August 1612, the militia of Minin and Pozharsky reached Moscow, and on October 26 the Polish garrison capitulated. Moscow was liberated. The Time of Troubles or “Great Devastation,” which lasted about ten years, is over.

Under these conditions, the country needed a government of a kind of social reconciliation, a government that would be able to ensure not only the cooperation of people from different political camps, but also class compromise. The candidacy of a representative of the Romanov family suited different layers and classes of society.

After the liberation of Moscow, letters were scattered throughout the country convening a Zemsky Sobor to elect a new tsar. The council, held in January 1613, was the most representative in the history of medieval Russia, reflecting at the same time the balance of forces that arose during liberation war. A struggle broke out around the future tsar, and they ultimately agreed on the candidacy of 16-year-old Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov, a relative of Ivan the Terrible’s first wife. This circumstance created the appearance of a continuation of the previous dynasty of Russian princes. February 21 1613 Zemsky Sobor elected Mikhail Romanov Tsar of Russia.

From this time, the reign of the Romanov dynasty in Russia began, which lasted a little over three hundred years - until February 1917.

So, concluding this section related to the history of the “time of troubles”, it should be noted: acute internal crises and long wars were generated largely by the incompleteness of the process of state centralization, the lack necessary conditions for the normal development of the country. At the same time, this was an important stage in the struggle for the establishment of a Russian centralized state.