Akunin history of the Russian state volume 4 in full. Boris Akunin Between Europe and Asia. History of the Russian state. Seventeenth century. Quest. Novel and codes for the novel

11.03.2020

Regularly to books from Akunin’s “History” series Russian state“There are comments in the spirit of “Akunin wrote a Russophobic book!” or “Akunin did not write Russophobic books!” I confess, because of such reviews, I at one time began reading this cycle, each volume of which I provide with my own comments.

What can I say about the Russophobia/Russophilia of citizen Chkhartishvili? But nothing, because if hatred of the Russian people is found in his books, then it should be sought in other works. But what many readers cannot understand is that Akunin’s “History” is not at all a historical or even popular science book. There is too much subjectivity, absurdities and unprofessionalism of the author as a historian in it. And vice versa, there is too little direct lies or scorching “TRUTH” in it to classify this cycle as cryptohistory in the style of Bush’s “Russia that never existed.”

To determine the genre in which this cycle is written, it is necessary to understand that Akunin in his books does not talk about real history Russia, but about the history of Russia that he himself WOULD LIKE TO SEE. If we assume that we are dealing with fantasies on themes of Russian history, then everything will fall into place. Princess Olga - Scarlett O'Hara of the 10th century? Yeah why not! Liberation from the Mongol-Tatar yoke - a national catastrophe? The author sees it that way! Did Ivan III the Great and Ivan IV the Terrible build a totalitarian state (despite the impossibility of it, as even Akunin himself writes about)? Well, for plot intrigue you have to sacrifice historical accuracy!

Thus, we can define Akunin’s “History of the Russian State” as a cycle of fantasy novels in the scenery Ancient Rus', Moscow Principality, Moscow Kingdom and Russian Empire. And the relationship to the historical or popular science literature this “History ...” has no more than, for example, George R. Martin’s cycle “A Song of Ice and Fire” for the Wars of the Roses.

The trouble is that the author himself presents his work as something claiming to be scientific and plausible. If these were free works on historical topics, like the works of Alexandre Dumas, then the biography of the alternative (in every sense) Peter I would be interesting to follow. However, Akunin’s desire to write the CORRECT history of Russia is so great that it pushes him to deceive his readers. At the very beginning of the first book, he accused historians of bias and subjectivity, and what did he do? With his works, he only multiplied myths and misconceptions.

Bottom line: “The History of the Russian State” provides an excellent opportunity to see how Akunin perceives national history. Watching the cockroaches in the head of a liberal writer can sometimes be very funny (that’s why I didn’t stop reading his books), but it can’t bring any practical benefit. If you're interested in Russian history, look elsewhere.

Rating: 4

I am writing only for the historical part of the project. Despite the author’s historical and philological education, he still did not become a professional historian, which is fully evident. In essence, he rewrote the generally accepted version of history, providing a number of facts and events with his own value judgments. How can we admit that Akunin rightly points out in some places that some data are insufficiently thorough, but he immediately offers his own equally groundless ones (for example, when estimating the number of troops in the Battle of Kulikovo). He questions facts he doesn’t like, and repeats those that fit into his picture of the world. official history without bills. You can see, for example, how much he doesn’t like Ivan IV, and he repeats and savors all the trash that has been written about him recent years 150: fornication, madness, and the murder of his son that did not actually take place (the tomb was opened in 1963, no damage to Ivan Ivanovich’s skull that could lead to death was found, attempts to imagine that they allegedly were completely false) . He describes the oprichnina in a marginal version, and does not hesitate to write lies, apparently simply repeating other people’s words, without really understanding it. For example, about the complete incapacity of the oprichnina army, which is supposedly unable to defend the country, which is why they returned back to the zemstvo. Apparently he doesn’t even know the most significant battle of that time (and doesn’t even mention it) - the Battle of Molodi in 1572, when the Oprichnina-Zemstvo army (and the Oprichnina and Zemstvo troops interacted well) defeated a greatly superior enemy. Just like in the battles of the Livonian War (the first part of which proceeded quite successfully) the guardsmen fought both separately and together with the Zemstvo people very well and won. But Akunin’s guardsmen are just vile bastards, capable only of robbing and looting. Well, about the victims of the “Grozny repressions” the author could not resist, and supplemented the false stories based on Kurbsky’s letters with his own fantasies. In general, the historical part of the work is completely weak and in places very deceitful. I encourage those who want to know the history of Russia to read professional historians. The best one professional work on this moment is a five-volume edition for universities by Evgeniy Spitsyn “History of Russia”.

Rating: 2

There’s something I don’t understand, but why on earth was Akunin so vilified for this episode as a Russophobe? I personally have not seen anything like this. The man was simply trying to figure out how it was. I missed something, yes, but I was completely unbiased, and overall the work turned out to be quite thorough and without any ideological distortions. What I previously calculated regarding history coincides completely with what was written. And the conclusions are approximately the same. After reading, I updated many details in my memory, and added many details for myself. And if for anyone the history of Russia is a pure book, it is quite possible to recommend Akunin’s “History” as a self-educational book.

Rating: 10

It’s worth making a reservation right away - this is not historical work. This is a kind of compilation of our old Karamzin, Klyuchevsky, Solovyov, Kostomarov and others, written more modern language. I would call it sci-pop. For a scientific priest - quite good. Despite the really strong subjectivity. However, I don’t understand the barrage of criticism that poured down on Akunin after the writer spoke negatively and allegedly “one-sidedly” about Tsar Ivan 4. There are many arguments for and against Ivan the Terrible, and just as Karamzin once did not like Ivan the Terrible for his cruelty, Akunin also does not like Ivan. I can assume that the legs of such criticism grow from Klim Zhukov and Dmitry Puchkov, and several of their videos where they criticize this work. But, to be honest, while respecting these figures in some way, the criticism of these books is given there very weakly. For example, Klim Zhukov seriously reproaches Akunin for the incorrect use of the word “Monarch” in relation to Ivan III. If this were a purely historical work, it would have a certain meaning, but this is science-pop, with ardent and undeniable subjectivity, and in my opinion, for a more accentuated involvement of the reader, a simpler thought, this term can be used in relation to Ivan the Great. And frankly speaking, oddly enough, the historian Zhukov, criticizing Akunin, himself falls into subjectivity, proving that the personality of Ivan the Terrible played a positive role in Russian history, which, to put it mildly, has always been a debatable issue. And I’ll answer the previous review a little - the murder of Ivan Ivanovich is a very debatable issue. Read about Gerasimov, and about what the bones of Ivan Ivanovich tell us. Ivan Ivanovich’s skull has not been preserved, but for example, some historians note a huge increase in the king’s investments in the Church during the agony and death of his son. Therefore, what’s funny is that those who criticize Akunin for his subjectivity are still subjectivists. Subjectivity is not bad. It’s bad to scold something that doesn’t coincide with your opinion just because it’s subjective. Therefore, I will give Akunin a seven - as a scientist. The illustrations are beautiful, the documents are published, and in general, the outline of Russian history is conveyed correctly. Just as housewives once read Karamzin’s “History of the Russian State” and liked it, nothing has changed now. Therefore, I rather recommend it for review. There is no innovation in these books, but there is nothing bad either. Might be of interest.

Illustrations provided by Shutterstock, Rossiya Segodnya, Diomedia and free sources are used in the design.

Reviewers:

K. A. Kochegarov

(Institute of Slavic Studies RAS)

Yu. M. Eskin

(Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts)

S. Yu. Shokarev

(Historical and Archival Institute of the Russian State University for the Humanities)

Preface

The movement of history is uneven. Incidents memorable for posterity - usually some kind of epoch-making changes or upheavals - alternate with periods about which in ancient chronicles it is briefly reported that “nothing happened” (that is, everything was not bad and there is nothing special to talk about). The pace of events either speeds up or slows down; quick “inhalations” are replaced by long “exhalations”; sometimes the state begins to develop jerkily - as a rule, this happens when a purposeful leader appears who implements a certain program; There are equally rapid crises - for reasons both internal and external.

That is why it is more convenient to talk about different periods in different ways, adapting the presentation method to the characteristics and “importance” of the era. The Russian seventeenth century, to which this volume is devoted, is in this sense difficult to describe. In a relatively small segment of history, both “fatal minutes” are compressed, requiring detailed study, and entire decades of unhurried development, when it is more interesting to talk not about events, but about phenomena and trends.

This explains the asymmetrical structure of the book. Its first part is given detailed story only about a few years, and the next three parts are much more lapidary. However, the same proportion is observed throughout the entire array historical research about the Russian seventeenth century: much more has been written about its dramatic beginning than about subsequent events - right up to the very end of the century, when Russia seemed to wake up or switch from slow walking to fast running.

However, the reforms of Peter I will be the topic of the fifth volume, while the fourth will end in 1689. The tightest knot of this era is the Troubles - the experience of the collapse of the state. A crisis of comparable scale in Russia would repeat itself only three hundred years later, at the beginning of the 20th century.

The Russian state, destroyed by the Time of Troubles, was second in historical continuity. The first, the Grand Duchy of Kiev, arose in the 9th century, when the Rurik family took control of the trade route “from the Varangians to the Greeks.” Early Russian state persisted until river transit in the 11th–12th centuries lost its former significance. After that central government weakened and the country began to split into separate principalities, which became easy prey for Mongol invasion.

The second centralization was carried out by the Moscow prince Ivan III (1462–1505), who took as a model the structure of Genghis Khan's empire, the greatest state known to the Russian people of that time. The fortress of the Horde was based on a pyramidal hierarchy of power, the only bearer of which was the great khan. The country was governed not by laws common to all, but by the khan’s decrees, which were issued taking into account the specific situation and could change the previous “rules of the game” at any time. Morally and religiously, the principle of such unlimited power was supported by the sacralization of the person of the monarch, the intercessor and mediator for the people before God.

The “second” Russian state was architecturally a very simple structure. Anyhow important decisions were accepted exclusively by the sovereign, who not only was in charge of all directions of policy, but also sought to completely control life in the regions of his rather large country. At the same time, the central government and regional administration were in their infancy. The country was governed as the personal fiefdom of one master.

In the conditions of the Middle Ages, such a structure certainly had its advantages, which included good controllability, accumulation of resources and high mobilization ability. The main rivals of the Moscow autocrats - the Polish-Lithuanian kings - for the war needed to secure the consent of the aristocracy and obtain permission to collect finances, so the western neighbor was always late in starting hostilities, and then often found himself unable to take advantage of the fruits of victories due to lack of money. It was enough for the Russian sovereign to simply order - all the human and material resources of the country were in his complete will.

The main weakness of the “second” state, as usual, was reverse side his strength. Under an active and capable ruler, the country strengthened and grew; with a ruler of average ability, it found itself in a state of stagnation; a bad ruler led the country to decline. And the absence of an autocrat became a complete disaster; it led the state to paralysis.

This is exactly what happened in April 1605, which was described in the previous volume and to which we will return again, looking at the same events from the other side - the side of the Pretender. We will see that his adventure was poorly organized and would undoubtedly have ended in defeat if Tsar Boris had not suddenly died in Moscow. Two fatal factors coincided here. Firstly, Boris's heir was a teenager and could not rule on his own. Secondly, new dynasty, which arose only seven years ago, has not yet had time to acquire an aura of sacredness (a circumstance that preserved the country during the childhood of Ivan the Terrible).

To put it very briefly, main reason The collapse of the “second” Rus' became too strong an autocracy with too weak a state. The combination of the unlimited power of the monarch with the underdevelopment of institutions made political system fragile. As soon as the only rod on which it was supported was broken, the state crumbled.

The history of the Troubles (as well as the events of 1917) demonstrates that a seemingly powerful power can collapse very quickly. This is truly a scary and exciting sight.

Compared to the Troubles, the next part of the book looks lackluster. The high drama disappears, they disappear bright personalities, everything seems to become smaller and discolored. The story about the reign of Mikhail Romanov is less winning - but the story of receiving a wound is always more interesting in terms of plot than the description of its treatment. At the same time, from the point of view of the history of the state, the process of healing and restoration of the country’s strength, the process of creating new system instead of the collapsed one is no less important.

The Muscovite kingdom of the seventeenth century, although externally similar, is very different from the Muscovite kingdom of the sixteenth century. I believe that here we're talking about about a slightly different model, and I will explain in detail why I consider this state to be “third”.

Europe has become the center of the development of world civilization, and Russia, politically, technologically, and culturally, is increasingly drifting in a western direction. In the seventeenth century, it was already closer to Europe than to Asia, but the “Horde foundation” remained the same, and it was difficult to build something fundamentally new on it. In just seventy years there will be a need for a new modification.

The book “Between Europe and Asia” consists of four parts that correspond to the stages of life of almost every state: previous chaos; birth and growth; maturity and stagnation; finally – exhaustion and crisis.

Death of the state

Russia entered the seventeenth century, outwardly, as a strong and prosperous power. With fifteen million people, it was one of the most populated countries in Europe, and the first in size. Moscow maintained peace with its neighbors, who respected its power; the treasury was full; trade flourished; cities grew. An experienced ruler, Boris Godunov, sat on the throne, seemingly holding the country with a tight grip: the intimidated aristocracy was afraid to intrigue, the downtrodden peasants did not rebel. It seemed that in Rus', after the difficult trials experienced in the second half of the previous century, calm, peaceful times were established for a long time.

Boris Akunin

Between Europe and Asia. History of the Russian state. Seventeenth century

Illustrations provided by Shutterstock, Rossiya Segodnya, Diomedia and free sources are used in the design.

* * *

Reviewers:

K. A. Kochegarov

(Institute of Slavic Studies RAS)

Yu. M. Eskin

(Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts)

S. Yu. Shokarev

(Historical and Archival Institute of the Russian State University for the Humanities)

Preface

This explains the asymmetrical structure of the book. Its first part is devoted to a detailed account of just a few years, and the next three parts are much more lapidary. However, the same proportion is observed in the entire body of historical research about the Russian seventeenth century: much more has been written about its dramatic beginning than about subsequent events - right up to the very end of the century, when Russia seemed to wake up or switch from slow walking to fast running.

The Russian state, destroyed by the Time of Troubles, was second in historical continuity. The first, the Grand Duchy of Kiev, arose in the 9th century, when the Rurik family took control of the trade route “from the Varangians to the Greeks.” The early Russian state survived until river transit in the 11th–12th centuries lost its former significance. After this, the central government weakened and the country began to split into separate principalities, which became easy prey for the Mongol invasion.

The “second” Russian state was architecturally a very simple structure. All any important decisions were made exclusively by the sovereign, who not only was in charge of all directions of policy, but also sought to completely control life in the regions of his rather large country. At the same time, the central government and regional administration were in their infancy. The country was governed as the personal fiefdom of one master.

The main weakness of the “second” state, as usual, was the reverse side of its strength. Under an active and capable ruler, the country strengthened and grew; with a ruler of average ability, it found itself in a state of stagnation; a bad ruler led the country to decline. And the absence of an autocrat became a complete disaster; it led the state to paralysis.

This is exactly what happened in April 1605, which was described in the previous volume and to which we will return again, looking at the same events from the other side - the side of the Pretender. We will see that his adventure was poorly organized and would undoubtedly have ended in defeat if Tsar Boris had not suddenly died in Moscow. Two fatal factors coincided here. Firstly, Boris's heir was a teenager and could not rule on his own. Secondly, the new dynasty, which arose only seven years ago, had not yet acquired the aura of sacredness (a circumstance that preserved the country during the childhood of Ivan the Terrible).

To put it very briefly, the main reason for the collapse of the “second” Rus' was too strong an autocracy with too weak a state. The combination of the unlimited power of the monarch and the underdevelopment of institutions made the political system fragile. As soon as the only rod on which it was held was broken, the state crumbled.

The history of the Troubles (as well as the events of 1917) demonstrates that a seemingly powerful power can collapse very quickly. This is truly a scary and exciting sight.

Compared to the Troubles, the next part of the book looks lackluster. The high drama disappears, bright personalities disappear, everything seems to become smaller and discolored. The story about the reign of Mikhail Romanov is less winning - but the story of receiving a wound is always more interesting in terms of plot than the description of its treatment. At the same time, from the point of view of the history of the state, the process of healing and restoration of the country’s strength, the process of creating a new system instead of the collapsed one is no less important.

The Muscovite kingdom of the seventeenth century, although externally similar, is very different from the Muscovite kingdom of the sixteenth century. I believe that we are talking about a slightly different model here, and I will explain in detail why I consider this state to be the “third”.

Death of the state

However, this strength was an illusion.

The most important element of the autocracy system founded by Ivan III was the deification royal power- only this, from a religious and rational point of view, could justify the undivided power of one person over a huge country, all the inhabitants of which were considered his “slaves.” If such power is established by God himself, there is nothing to grumble about: in heaven is the Lord and all His servants; on earth - the Sovereign and all his servants.

However, Godunov also came out of the “slaves”, as the whole power knew and remembered. He himself perfectly understood this vulnerability of his and compensated for it with some semblance of a “people’s mandate”, for which, upon his accession to the throne, for the first time in Russian history, he organized something like elections - he did not sit on the throne without permission, but was “asked” by the patriarch and the boyars and “shouted out” by the capital crowd, that is, replaced heavenly sacralization with earthly legitimization.

Boris Akunin

History of the Russian state.

From origins to the Mongol invasion.

Part of Europe

The design uses illustrations provided by the agencies Fotobank, Shutterstock, as well as from the author’s archive and free sources.

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Before you decide whether it makes sense for you to read this essay, I must warn you about its features.

There are three of them.

I write for people who don’t know well Russian history and those who want to understand it. I'm the same way myself. All my life I have been interested in history, received a historical education, wrote several dozen historical novels and yet one day I realized that my knowledge consisted of separate fragments that did not fit well into the overall picture. I did not have a clear idea of how and why Russia turned out the way it did. And I realized: in order to answer such a short question, I would first have to read tens of thousands of pages, and then write several thousand pages.

I'm not building any concept. I have not it. Every historian who creates his own theory cannot cope with the temptation to highlight facts that are convenient for him and remain silent or question everything that does not fit into his logic. I have no such temptation.

In addition, I am a strong opponent of ideologized history. Both self-praising and self-deprecating lines, abundantly presented in the works of Russian historians, are equally uninteresting to me. I want to find out (or calculate) what it really was like. I don't have a preconceived opinion. There are questions and there is a desire to find answers to them.

This is the history not of a country, but of a state, that is, political history: state building, governance mechanisms, relationships between people and government, social evolution. I touch on culture, religion, and economics only to the extent that they are related to politics.

Russia is first and foremost a state. It is not identical to the country, and at certain moments in history it was even hostile to it, but it was the state of the state that invariably determined the vector of evolution (or degradation) of all spheres of Russian life. The state is the cause of both Russian troubles and Russian victories.

An attempt to understand what is right and what is wrong in our thousand-year-old state (and why) is what this work is ultimately intended for.

Preface to the first volume

The origins of any national history, if it lasts many centuries, resemble the pre-dawn twilight. First, some indistinct noises are heard from the darkness, ghostly silhouettes appear, and obscure movements are discerned. And only over time, very slowly, events and human figures gain clarity. The information that has reached descendants is vague, fragmentary and often contradictory or simply implausible.

Because of this, many historians are tempted to add order and logic to the story of ancient times, to “explain” what happened, and give hypotheses and guesses the appearance of an established fact. I had the same temptation, but I tried to overcome it. That is why in this volume there are often phrases “apparently”, “probably”, “presumably” - as a sign that this information is a reconstruction. Essays on the history of Ancient Rus', where the authors confidently operate with dates, facts, figures and names, should be treated with caution.

After studying very few sources and very numerous interpretations of these sources, I became convinced that none of the historians knows exactly when, by whom and under what circumstances the first Russian state was created and built. Textbooks often give dubious dates for events, and the events themselves, upon closer examination, sometimes turn out to be retellings of myths. Numerous absurdities of the “canonical” historiography, which began to take shape in the eighteenth century, prompted some researchers to the other extreme - the denial of traditional chronology and the promotion of various hypotheses that turn the whole history upside down. The more temperamental the author, the more revolutionary his version looks.

The text brought to your attention is completely non-revolutionary and non-temperamental. The main method is the notorious “Occam’s razor”: everything unnecessary (and unreliable) is cut off; only the facts that most historians consider verified or at least the most probable remain. If doubts remain, this must be specified.

The country that we call Ancient Russia was so different from Russia of the post-Mongol era that, through the thickness of the past centuries, it seems to us some kind of lost, legendary Atlantis. Therefore, I considered it appropriate, as a supplement, to add to the presentation political history a purely descriptive chapter “Life in Ancient Rus'”. The chronicles recorded only memorable events, that is, extraordinary events that stood out from the normal course of life. If we limit ourselves to retelling the chronicles, one may get the feeling that all of early history consisted of wars, epidemics, crop failures, changes of rulers and the construction of large churches and fortresses. The inserted part, although it stands out from the general line of the narrative and goes beyond the scope of the title task, will give the reader some idea of how and what the ancient Russian people lived.

The peculiarity of the historiography of the Kyiv period is that there are very few sources of information - at least written ones. The fundamental one, in fact, is only one: “The Tale of Bygone Years,” a chronicle that has been preserved not in its original form, but in two different options of a later time. The matching fragments of these two versions are considered a protograph, that is, the original text. But it, apparently, was rewritten and changed under the influence of the political situation. The chronicler describes the events of the ninth and tenth centuries very approximately, and in some places clearly erroneously, inserting legends and stories, obviously drawn from folklore. There are also big gaps. Only from the eleventh century the narrative turns from a collection of legends and pious parables into a historical chronicle proper, and dating becomes confident, often giving not only the year, but also the date. However, when describing recent events, the author is unbiased, setting out the “Kyiv” interpretation of political collisions and clearly flattering Vladimir Monomakh (perhaps the initiator or even the customer of the edition that has come down to us), which forces us to treat many statements and descriptions with a certain skepticism. Alternative chronicles, including regional ones (Novgorod, Galician-Volyn), appear only at the end of the period described and cannot significantly complement the picture.

As a big fan of B. Akunin’s work, I, of course, could not ignore his project “History of the Russian State.” At first there were doubts. You see, Akunin is interesting for his writing, and history requires documentary presentation, dry figures and facts. Besides, there are many other sources - why buy this particular book? But still I decided to try and bought the first volume “Part of Europe. History of the Russian state. From the origins to the Mongol invasion." To say that the result exceeded all my expectations is to say nothing.

Firstly, I was very glad that even in documentary films there is the unique style of Mr. Akunin, for which I love his works so much. Secondly, this is not just a dry summary of history. The text is replete with many facts from various sources, which are compared with each other, analyzed and give the reader a deeper picture. At the same time, the Author as much as possible avoids giving events and facts any kind of assessment. The truth is, as you can see, this is difficult. And not always. At the end of each chapter, the author tries to summarize briefly, which helps to better understand the material. In general, Akunin is at his best as always. His approach to presentation, his original style, his love of history makes this series unique!

I am not a historian, so I can neither support nor condemn the fact that historians have massively branded “History”. But it seems to me that this is simply envy of a person who was able to simply talk about historical events in an accessible, clear, exciting way. I read with pleasure.

History of the Russian state

I read the first two books “Part of Europe” and “Part of Asia”

I am fascinated by the structuring of "History"

I am not a humanist, but I have been interested in the history of our state since childhood. Before Akunin’s books, the initial period of our history fell apart for me into separate plots and details, as in a situation when “you can’t see the forest for the trees.” Now all the previously known “details” easily fit into a single structure, which includes the picture external relations states.

Initially, I was somewhat confused by the fact that the author for “History” used a pseudonym, and not his real surname, as if leaving room for artistic fiction as opposed to scientific accuracy. But at the level of knowledge that I have, there are no fantasies or speculations. On the contrary, there is a fairly clearly structured argumentation with quotations from primary sources, explanations of why one or another interpretation is preferred, and if the author’s “additions” to known materials are given, then this is stated quite clearly.

And at the same time it’s easy to read, the story captivates you like in a detective story...

Thanks to Grigory Shalvovich

I am a regular reader of this author’s books and consider him one of the most erudite and deeply thinking writers of our generation. Now I am enjoying reading the third book about the history of Rus'. What to say first?

Firstly, the period of Ivan III and Ivan the Terrible is perhaps one of the most controversial in the history of our state. Because on the one hand, quite a lot is already known about him and much is known almost reliably, and on the other hand, there are still a lot of conjectures and deep-rooted myths, especially, of course, about Ivan the Terrible. That is why I liked how the author, with honor and without going to ideological extremes, simply gives a clear and understandable analysis to the reader of what was happening in the country at that time, explains, so to speak, where the wind is blowing, who controls the ship and why it is sailing there.

Secondly, I am very impressed that all three books are logically linked to each other - it is clear that the author works in great detail on the concept of presenting the material, on the general ideological idea that involuntarily arises in the mind of a thoughtful reader. One can argue endlessly about the history of the Russian state, but one thing is objective and this is a fact - Mongol yoke forever changed our country and it was this that was both evil and good in the historical period that followed it. Therefore, thanks to the author for writing honestly about this and not hiding many points of view and possible interpretations that were previously camouflaged and not very popular among other historians.

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Akunin history of the Russian state volume 4 in full. Boris Akunin Between Europe and Asia. History of the Russian state. Seventeenth century. Quest. Novel and codes for the novel

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