Potapov concluded on behalf of the brigade. Plans for seminars and practical classes in the discipline: Labor Law. "Altai State University"

13.06.2022

Commander Mikhail Potapov

My acquaintance with the fate of Mikhail Ivanovich Potapov and the history of the 5th Army of the South Western Front started by accident. Several years ago, while digging on the Internet, I noticed a map of the Soviet-German front as of August 25, 1941, apparently borrowed from some English-language resource. By this time, the Germans occupied Novgorod, Smolensk, approached Bryansk, besieged Odessa in the south and reached the Dnieper line from Kremenchug to the mouth.

And only to the south of the Pinsk swamps a powerful wedge literally pierced several hundred kilometers into the thickness of the territory occupied by the Nazis. On the tip of this wedge there was a laconic inscription “5 POTAPOV”. This was the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front under the command of Major General Potapov.

Of course, the front line could not be uniform; in different sections of it, formations of unequal numbers and strength opposed each other, and success or disaster was influenced by many circumstances. In addition, such a wedge could not exist for long, since it easily became encircled. From the south, the Germans came close to Kyiv, and it was necessary to level the front in order to organize a stable defense of the city. A potential threat was also brewing to the right flank of the 5th Army after German troops Army Group Center, bypassing the marshy Pripyat basin, reached the Gomel-Starodub line. On August 19, the 5th Army received an order to retreat beyond the Dnieper to a depth of 140 - 180 kilometers. And yet, the fact that the retreat route of the 5th Army from the western border of the USSR, even if for some time it turned out to be almost three times shorter than that of its neighbors, aroused the desire to learn as much as possible about this formation and its commander.

One should not be surprised at the Fuhrer’s persistence - he saw the same maps of military operations that we see now, and quite adequately perceived the threat posed by the activity of the troops under the command of Potapov.

Finally, on August 21, Hitler issues an order in which he repeats three times (!) the idea of the need to destroy the 5th Army. But the main thing is that for the first time he is ready to allocate “as many divisions as necessary” to carry out this task. Along with the success of the operation to blockade Leningrad, the Fuhrer considers the defeat of Potapov’s army to be a prerequisite for a successful offensive “against Timoshenko’s group of troops,” that is, the Western Front. It turns out that the path to Moscow, according to Hitler, lay through the defeated 5th Army.

I learned all these details later, but when I looked at the map, the name Potapov, alas, did not mean anything to me. Gradually, after getting acquainted with documents and research, conversations with the widow of the army commander Marianna Fedorovna Modorova, an amazing life path this man.

From deacons to generals

Without leaving the volost, Mikhail received a very decent amount for a village boy elementary education. IN rural school his teacher was a “sincere” prince from the Gagarin family; later he studied at a parish school at a church in the neighboring village of Putogino. The trustee of the church and school was the St. Petersburg millionaire book publisher, a native of these places, Ignatius Tuzov, so, for sure, they cared about the level of knowledge of the students here.

First World War and the economic crisis is not in the best possible way affected the Potapov family well-being. As a teenager, Mikhail began helping his father. October Revolution We met the Potapovs in Kharkov, where they worked as bridge workers in a tram depot.

By the spring of 1920, Mikhail returned to his native Mochalovo, and in May he became a Red Army soldier at the military registration and enlistment office in the city of Yukhnov. Formally, Potapov is considered a participant Civil War, however, he did not take direct part in the hostilities.

Potapov, after completing cavalry courses in Minsk in September 1922, was appointed platoon commander of the 43rd cavalry regiment of the Volga Military District. It was not easy for a 20-year-old youth who had never smelled gunpowder to command experienced Cossack riders, many of whom had two wars behind them. Oddly enough, gaining authority among his subordinates was facilitated by a thorough knowledge of church rituals - in Putogino, Mikhail not only studied at the church, but also served for some time as a deacon. From his deaconship, Potapov will have a well-produced, luxurious baritone for the rest of his life. Many years later, already being a general in the Soviet army, the former deacon did not shy away from attending church services in full “parade.”

Two years later, already in the position of assistant squadron commander, Potapov left for Moscow for Military Chemical Courses. The new place of service is the 67th Cavalry Regiment of the North Caucasus Military District. Since 1931, he has been studying again - now as a student at the Military Academy of Motorization and Mechanization of the Red Army. The cavalryman becomes a tanker. After graduating from the academy in 1936, his career developed rapidly, which, however, was typical for many future commanders of the Great Patriotic War. It took Potapov exactly four years to go from regimental chief of staff to army commander.

Undoubtedly, the meeting with Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov played a significant role in his career. It happened in May 1937 in Belarus, where Potapov commanded a regiment and Zhukov commanded a division. By the time they met, the future marshal had already received a new assignment, but since then the fellow countrymen have not let each other out of sight. In the book “Memories and Reflections,” Georgy Konstantinovich writes: “Practically during field exercises and maneuvers and in the 3rd and 6th corps, I had to act with the 21st separate tank brigade (brigade commander M.I. Potapov). This commander was my colleague in the past, and we understood each other in a “combat situation”, perfectly.”

When in June 1939 Zhukov was offered to lead the operation against the Japanese army at Khalkhin Gol, he insisted on appointing Potapov as his deputy.

They flew to the Far East on the same plane. The marshal recalled: “Brigade commander Potapov was my deputy. A lot of work lay on his shoulders in organizing the interaction of formations and branches of the military, and when we launched a general offensive, Mikhail Ivanovich was entrusted with the leadership of the main group on the right wing of the front.”

In June 1940, Zhukov became commander of the troops of the Kyiv Special Military District, and at the same time Potapov was transferred to KOVO to the post of commander of the 4th Mechanized Corps. Six months later, Mikhail Ivanovich becomes army commander. In February 1941, Zhukov, appointed Chief of the General Staff, moved to Moscow. The fellow countrymen had a chance to meet again only in the post-war years.

It remains to be regretted that the remarkable mutual understanding of the two military leaders could not be used for the cause of Victory. I note that these were very dissimilar personalities, in some ways even opposite, but this circumstance only contributed to their mutual attraction.

Blitzkrieg failed

In the event of an enemy attack, Potapov’s army was responsible for “cover area No. 1,” stretching 170 km from Wlodawa to Krystynopol in the north of the Ukrainian section of the Soviet-German border. In the last days of peace, Potapov took a number of measures to increase the combat effectiveness of the army. On the night of June 16-17, units of the 62nd Infantry Division left the camp and, after two night marches, reached positions near the border. On June 18, Potapov ordered the withdrawal of the 45th Infantry Division from the training ground. On the same day, the 135th Infantry Division received an order to advance to the border.

But this could not change the general situation, which with the outbreak of hostilities became extremely unfavorable for our troops. On the Sokal ledge, the Germans achieved a threefold superiority in manpower and equipment. The Soviet divisions stretched along the front could not withstand the blow of the German army corps densely built in the directions of the main attack. The mechanized units of the 5th Army were just moving towards the border from their deployment sites.

Nevertheless, from the very first hours of the war, Potapov’s troops fought stubbornly and skillfully. For every Soviet tank knocked out or burned, von Kleist's 1st Panzer Group units suffered 2.5–3 times more damage. The 5th Army not only defended desperately, but also launched counterattacks against the enemy. “The leadership of the enemy troops located in front of Army Group South is amazingly energetic, its continuous flank and frontal attacks cause us heavy losses,” the commander noted in his notes General Staff ground forces Franz Halder.

On June 26, the counter-offensive of the Southwestern Front began in the Brody-Lutsk-Dubno triangle, where the first counter-offensive in the history of World War II took place tank battle. Four Soviet mechanized corps (two from the 5th Army) failed to build on their initial success. The inconsistent position of the front command also played a role, which, at the height of the fighting in the triangle, ordered a move to the defensive, and then returned to the offensive plan.

I will note this detail: during these days of fierce confrontation, namely June 30, Potapov issued an order in which he indicated the inadmissibility of shooting prisoners of war.

On July 1, against the backdrop of a general withdrawal of front troops, the 5th Army launched a powerful counterattack on the northern flank of the German offensive. In particular, the 20th Tank Division threw back enemy units 10–12 km, destroyed up to 1 thousand enemy soldiers, 10 tanks, 2 batteries.

Army General S.M. Shtemenko wrote: “The 5th Army... became, as they say, a thorn in the side of Hitler’s generals, put up the strongest resistance to the enemy and inflicted significant damage on him.”

The Nazi troops were unable to quickly break through the front here. Potapov's divisions knocked them off the road Lutsk - Rivne - Zhitomir and forced them to abandon an immediate attack on Kyiv.

Shtemenko, in those months one of the leading employees of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, was referring to the successful counter-offensive of the 5th Army launched on July 10. Then Potapov’s tankers, behind the formations of the III Army Corps, intercepted the Novograd-Volynsky-Zhitomir highway at a width of over 10 km. What a headache for the Germans the loss of this most important communication was can be judged by the fact that the commander of Army Group South, Gerd von Runstedt, seriously planned to use aviation to transfer the Hermann Goering infantry regiment to the Zhitomir region.

While Potapov's troops attacked the northern flank of the German offensive, the defenders of Kyiv received a respite. The command of the 6th German Army was forced to declare: “The nature of the threat to our troops from the main forces of the 5th Russian Army is still such that this threat must be eliminated before the attack on Kyiv.” The loss of the Ukrainian capital was postponed by two months.

German military historian Alfred Filippi also points out that the reason for the slowdown in the pace of the advance of Army Group South was the opposition of the 5th Army. “And although this opposition... was not completely unexpected for the German command, it nevertheless brought tactical successes to the Russians from the very beginning of the campaign, and then in the Novograd-Volynsky area, Zhitomir acquired operational significance, much more serious than possible was to be assumed. This had a rather significant paralyzing effect on the will of the 6th Army command to carry out the main operational task, which was access to the Dnieper near Kyiv.”

At the end of July - beginning of August, during the battles for the Korosten fortified area, Potapov’s army again not only sought to hold the Germans with a strong defense, but also with decisive counterattacks and pressure on the flanks forced the attackers to weaken their blow. Here the enemy concentrated 11 divisions against the 5th Army. If we take into account that the staff of the German infantry division was 14 thousand people, then the enemy troops were at least twice as large as the forces at Potapov’s disposal. German military historian Werner Haupt notes that “the 5th Soviet Army, under the command of the talented Major General Potapov, was located on the left flank of the 6th German Army and inflicted very heavy losses on it.” After the war, it will be calculated that on average, for every day of military operations in the 5th Army zone, there were from 8 to 10 strikes by our troops against the enemy.

On August 9, Commander von Runstedt gave the order to suspend the offensive at the Kyiv-Korosten line and temporarily go on the defensive in order to disperse the troops in depth and provide them with the opportunity to rest. In the assessment of the situation presented to the OKH, the command of Army Group South expressed a rather pessimistic opinion regarding the situation on its northern wing. It was even suggested that the Russians intended to “go on the offensive from the Kyiv region and from the Ovruch region in order to defeat the northern wing of the army group.” However, the physical exhaustion and losses that von Runstedt complained about had an equally, if not more, impact on his condition. Soviet troops.

Fatal triumph?

Thus, Hitler’s order of August 21, aimed at destroying Potapov’s troops, seemed completely justified. The idea to allocate the tank forces of Guderian, who were operating in Belarus, to accomplish this task cannot be called spontaneous. A month earlier, in the very first document concerning the 5th Army - Directive No. 33 of July 19, 1941, the Fuhrer already intended to use the southern flank of Army Group Center for an operation north of Kyiv. Perhaps he considered worthy of attention the proposal received the day before from the headquarters of the “southerners”: to strike through Mozyr to Ovruch with the forces of the 35th Corps of Army Group Center. On August 9, von Runstedt again asked to bring his neighbors to his aid.

Consequently, by August 21, Hitler had formed a firm conviction about how the campaign in the East should develop. First: the attack on Moscow can be launched only after the defeat of the 5th Army, which, on the one hand, will ensure the security of the right flank of the troops aimed at the Soviet capital, on the other, will create favorable conditions for von Runstedt’s group to operate in Ukraine. Second: to successfully achieve this goal, it is necessary to attract the forces of Army Group Center. It should not be forgotten that the Fuhrer's priority was the methodical destruction of enemy forces in the territory, regardless of geographical or political goals. Back on July 13, he told the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Walter von Brauchitsch: “It is not so important to quickly advance to the East as to destroy manpower enemy."

Meanwhile, the General Staff was almost unanimously inclined to strengthen Army Group Center and strike directly on a narrow front in the direction of Moscow. The Fuhrer’s order to turn south caused the greatest displeasure among the key figure of the upcoming operation, the commander of the 2nd Panzer Group, Heinz Guderian: “On August 23, I was summoned to the headquarters of Army Group Center for a meeting in which the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces took part. He told us that Hitler had decided to attack first not on Leningrad or Moscow, but on Ukraine and Crimea... We were all deeply confident that Hitler’s planned attack on Kyiv would inevitably lead to a winter campaign with all its difficulties...” .

In fact, in the 20s of August 41, the question was not so categorical: either Moscow or Ukraine. The operation against Potapov's troops was conceived by the Fuhrer as auxiliary precisely within the framework of the decisive Wehrmacht offensive on the capital of the USSR.

On August 30, in a conversation between Hitler and Halder, it was noted that the troops of Army Group Center turned to Ukraine not for a “war in the south,” but in order to begin an “operation against Tymoshenko’s troops” as soon as possible. The Fuhrer’s order dated August 21 notes that the defeat of the 5th Army should guarantee Army Group South “the possibility of creating a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Dnieper in its middle reaches, so that the center and left wing can then continue the offensive in the direction of Kharkov, Rostov.” As we can see, the immediate task looks quite modest, and there is no talk at all about the capture of Kyiv, much less the defeat of the Southwestern Front.

The German generals could not then know for sure that Guderian’s turn to the south would lead to a winter campaign, as “fast Heinz” claims in his notes, just as they could not know that the fragile building of the Southwestern Front would collapse and bury it under its rubble plans for a quick and smooth transition to an offensive against Moscow. Because it was no longer Hitler’s directives, but the rapid development of events – which were developing very favorably for the Germans – that dictated the logic of action to the German command.

On September 1, the following report arrives from the headquarters of Army Group South: “If the enemy in Eastern Ukraine is not destroyed, then neither Army Group South nor Army Group Center will be able to conduct an offensive non-stop... Strike at Moskovskoye direction earlier than in Ukraine is impossible due to the fact that the operation already launched by Army Group South and the actions of the southern wing of Army Group Center to support this operation have gone too far (emphasis added - M.Z.) to postpone the main efforts to another area..." The Germans had no other choice but to act according to the situation. Guderian's rapid advance in the north and the occupation of the Derievsky bridgehead near Kremenchug on the southern flank of the Southwestern Front prompted von Rundstedt to order a decisive offensive on September 4, even without coordination with the high command.

According to Werner Haupt, the battle for Kyiv became the most important battle of the entire war: “Because of the events of the next two weeks, the decisive German offensive to Moscow. This probably changed the outcome of the Eastern Campaign." But let us repeat: everything that happened is the result of a paradoxical situation, when the very real prospect of the defeat of an entire front made adjustments to the enemy’s strategy and tactics, and the disaster of the Soviet troops and the triumph of Hitler’s armies in the Kiev cauldron took the Germans a whole month and moved the date of the decisive push on Moscow to the beginning the onset of cold weather.

Chronicle of the disaster

Unfortunately, the Germans' solution to their problems was made easier by the miscalculations of the command of the Southwestern Front. Together with the 5th Army, the 27th Rifle Corps also retreated beyond the Dnieper. Meanwhile, the corps not only did not obey Potapov, but also retreated according to its own schedule. An easily predictable lack of coordination led to the fact that on August 23, the Germans broke through the weak rearguard screen at the junction of the army and the corps, reached the Dnieper north of Kyiv at Okuninovo, captured the bridge and occupied a bridgehead on the eastern bank. Units of the 5th Army and 37th Army under the command of A.A. Vlasov unsuccessfully tried to eliminate the expanding Okuninov group of the enemy.

On August 29, Potapov tried to launch a counteroffensive, this time without success. Not surprising, since the 5th Army has ceased to be the formidable force it was a month ago. Almost a third of it (five divisions) was transferred to the 37th Army; The 135th Infantry Division and the 5th Artillery Anti-Tank Brigade became part of the 40th Army. The 1st Airborne Corps was also withdrawn from the 5th Army and entered into the front reserve. Due to the lack of tanks, the 9th and 19th mechanized corps had to be reorganized into battalions. Rifle divisions due to heavy losses, they had no more than 20-25% of the personnel.

Only the immediate withdrawal of the 5th Army to the Desna River made it possible to avoid the danger of encirclement. Potapov addressed this proposal to the Military Council of the South-Western Front on the morning of August 30, but it did not meet with proper understanding.

On the evening of September 5, Potapov again addressed the front commander Kirponos via HF with a proposal to withdraw troops, but received a categorical refusal. It is noteworthy that it was on this day, according to Halder’s notes, that Hitler first spoke about the Kiev cauldron. Only on September 9, the Headquarters authorized the withdrawal of the 5th Army to the Desna River. By this time, Potapov's main forces were reliably surrounded. Of the entire army of 70 thousand personnel, there were less than 4 thousand soldiers left, as well as about 200 guns and mortars of various systems.

At the end of September 14, Potapov and his headquarters once again made an attempt to stop the withdrawal of the remnants of the army and delay the advance of superior enemy forces. However, it was not possible to gain a foothold on any of the subsequent lines, since the Germans, pressing from the front, simultaneously bypassed both flanks. And on the morning of September 16, at the headquarters of the 5th Army it became known that the day before, in the rear of the front in the Lokhvitsa area (Poltava region), the troops of Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Group, advancing from the north, had united with the troops of Kleist’s 1st Panzer Group, which had broken through from south. Five have already been surrounded Soviet armies. The Kyiv cauldron has become a reality. According to German data, more than 660 thousand soldiers and officers of the Red Army were captured, 884 tanks and more than 3 thousand guns were captured.

On September 21, a combined detachment from the remnants of the front headquarters and the 5th Army gave last battle to the enemy. Potapov was shell-shocked and lost consciousness. In the heat of battle, the general was mistaken for killed and was hastily “buried”, covered with the bodies of the dead.

Potapov’s documents were handed over to Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko, the future marshal and then commander of the 15th Rifle Corps of the 5th Army. “I literally cried when they handed me the documents of our army commander. I didn’t know at all what would happen to us now, since Mikhail Ivanovich died.”

The bitter fate of the commander

Three days later, Potapov was discovered by the Germans. The trial of captivity began. In fascist concentration camps, Mikhail Ivanovich’s paths crossed with generals M. Lukin and I. Muzychenko, senior lieutenant Y. Dzhugashvili, and defense leaders Brest Fortress Major P. Gavrilov and Captain I. Zubachev. In 1992, reports and transcripts of interrogations of Potapov were made public, who, when asked “whether the Russian people are ready to wage war if the army retreats to the Urals,” replied: “Yes, he will remain in a state of moral defense, and the Red Army will continue to resist." German investigators assessed the behavior of the Red Army general as follows: “as a prisoner he behaved with dignity,” “on strategic issues he referred to his ignorance,” “he answered questions concerning his future with restraint.” The Germans also described Potapov as a “Russian nationalist,” although it is difficult to say what exactly they meant by this formulation.

Potapov categorically refused to cooperate with traitors from the ROA. At the same time, Mikhail Ivanovich spoke respectfully about Vlasov himself until the end of his life; he did not believe in the betrayal of his southern “neighbor” in Southwestern Front, believing that the Germans were somehow using the general for their own purposes against his will.

However, their homeland did not greet them kindly. Literally from the plane, Potapov and his comrades were sent to the “facility” in Golitsyno, near Moscow. A special inspection took place for seven months, which left indelible marks in Mikhail Ivanovich’s soul.

Until the end of his life, the invariably balanced and witty Potapov became gloomy and withdrawn at the mention of the name of the former SMERSH chief Abakumov, whom he considered a rare scoundrel.

However, the results of the audit most likely turned out to be objective, since Potapov was restored to the rank of major general and returned to army service. Mikhail Ivanovich wrote an application for reinstatement in the party. And again Zhukov came to the rescue, who gave his longtime comrade-in-arms the following recommendation: “As for leadership qualities, Comrade Potapov was the best army commander, and the units and formations he commanded were always leading. In the border battle, the 5th Army fought with exceptional tenacity and valor. Retreating under the influence of superior enemy forces, she repeatedly counterattacked and defeated the Germans. Comrade Potapov controlled the army brilliantly. I will also say that he was a great-hearted man who was loved by all his subordinates for his kindness and understanding.” It is difficult to read these lines from an official document, coming from the pen of a marshal far from sentimental, without emotion.

Obviously, Zhukov’s opinion was shared by many in the political and military leadership of the USSR. In any case, Mikhail Ivanovich turned out to be probably the only one of the highest Soviet officers, who were captured, who not only returned to the army, but also made, if not an enchanting, but, given the ups and downs of our post-war history, quite a worthy career. He served in Transbaikalia, on Far East, death found Colonel General Potapov in January 1965 in the post of first deputy commander of the Odessa Military District.

The place of Mikhail Ivanovich Potapov in the peculiar hierarchy of military leaders of the Great Patriotic War, built in post-war period, clearly does not correspond to his leadership talent and contribution to the Victory.

But it still cannot be said that the name of the commander of the 5th Army was kept silent. His leadership talent was highly appreciated in post-war memoirs and Soviet marshals THEIR. Bagramyan, I.I. Yakubovsky, and former opponents - Guderian, Keitel, Halder. It should be noted that the 5th Army became a real forge of personnel - such recognized commanders as M.E. came out of it. Katukov, K.S. Moskalenko, K.K. Rokossovsky, I.I. Fedyuninsky. All of them highly appreciated the merits of their former commander. While Potapov was still alive, A. Filippi’s book “The Pripyat Problem” was published in the USSR, where the role of the 5th Army in disrupting the blitzkrieg was examined in detail.
And yet, Potapov’s name has not become known to the general public in the 70 years since the victorious May 45th. So, today the memory of Mikhail Ivanovich is immortalized only in Ukraine, where streets in Kyiv and Zhitomir are named after him. How long? I think it's the anniversary Great Victory- a worthy occasion for Russians to honor the merits of a remarkable commander and patriot of our Motherland.

The article was published as part of a socially significant project carried out with state support funds allocated as a grant in accordance with the order of the President Russian Federation No. 11-rp dated January 17, 2014 and on the basis of a competition held by the All-Russian public organization Society “Knowledge” of Russia.

1. The general meeting of participants in the Vostok production cooperative, taking into account the need to bring the organizational and legal form of the enterprise into compliance with the legislation of the Russian Federation, decided to reorganize it into a limited liability company. When approving the text of the constituent agreement and charter of the company, legal adviser Zadorov pointed out the need to remove from the charter the reasons for dismissal that were not provided for by labor legislation. Objecting to Zadorov, the chairman of the cooperative, Rokotov, referred to the fact that the company’s charter provides grounds for excluding any participant from its membership.

Determine the sectoral nature of labor relations between members of cooperative organizations and employees - participants in non-state enterprises in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation. Describe the features of the content of labor relations of the relevant types.

2. Potapov, on behalf of the brigade, entered into an agreement with the administration of the Avangard stadium in accordance with which the brigade undertakes to put the football field in full order within three months, and the administration - to pay for the work after its completion.

After three months, when making a settlement, the brigade workers demanded that they also be paid compensation for unused vacation in proportion to the time worked.

Is this requirement enforceable? What type of employment contract was concluded?

3. Sergeev refused to sign a contract with a branch of the closed joint-stock company “Berezka”, demanding that not the branch, but the joint-stock company as a whole be indicated as the employer. He believed that only in this case would he acquire the right to receive additional social and living benefits specified in the contract. The head of the branch explained to Sergeev that the separate structural divisions to which the branch belongs have the rights to conclude civil and labor contracts.

Analyze the legal status of a separate structural unit from the point of view of civil and labor legal personality.

4. Do the following situations comply with the labor legislation of the Russian Federation:

a) 14-year-old Akulov started working as a courier during the summer holidays at school. However, at the request of the parents, the employment contract with Akulov was terminated because they did not give their consent to their son’s employment;

b) The mayor of the city made a decision prohibiting the heads of the organization from hiring teenagers who do not have a complete secondary education;

c) The minor Volin entered into an oral agreement with his neighbors to grow seedlings, which he later wanted to sell in bulk;

d) Khalilova was refused a part-time job on the grounds that she was already working as a part-time worker in another organization;

e) Engineer Goberidze was not hired to work at the state unitary enterprise, since the head of the relevant department is Goberidze’s stepfather;

f) Storekeeper Zhuchkin, declared incompetent by the court, was fired from his job for stealing an expensive tool.

5. One of the nightclubs in the city, “Orion,” by agreement with young people, trained croupiers at their own expense to work in their establishment. However, having acquired professional knowledge and skills, and having worked for a short time, the newly minted croupiers left Orion.

What are the rights and responsibilities of the employer and employee in this situation?

6.Determine the grounds for the emergence of the following individual labor relations, if it is known that the employee is:

a) General Director of the JSC;

b) professor at a state university;

c) director of a state unitary enterprise;

d) chairman of the city court;

e) dean of the faculty of ASTU;

f) a member of a professional basketball team.

7. Citizen Kuznetsov came to see a lawyer and asked him to explain to him whether he was considered hired and could demand a work book. Kuznetsov explained that he works at Pirozhok LLC as a loader; an agreement has been concluded with him, called the “Agreement for Contract Work,” according to which he comes to work by eight o’clock every day, except Saturday and Sunday. His working day lasts nine hours, during the day he performs loading and unloading work in the bakery as the need arises, while reporting to the director of the LLC.

As a lawyer, give a reasoned answer to citizen Kuznetsov.

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The district court, considering the case based on the claim of Petrov A.G. to Ivanov P.S. on the collection of debt under the loan agreement, announced a break until later that day in order for the plaintiff to submit to the court an original written receipt from the defendant.

Since other cases were also scheduled for consideration on that day, the court, during the announced break, considered the case of reinstatement at work, on which it made a decision.

After this, the court continued the hearing in the first case of debt collection under the loan agreement, since the plaintiff presented a genuine receipt from the defendant.

Did the court violate the principles of civil procedural law?

In this task, the object of civil procedural relations is the announcement by the court of a break for a later time on the same day, and the consideration of another case during this break.

The subjects in this task are: district court, plaintiff - Petrov A. G., defendant - Ivanov P. S.

When solving this problem, you must refer to clause 3 of Art. 157 Code of Civil Procedure of the Russian Federation.

To answer the question of the task - yes, in this case the principle of continuity of trial was violated. The court should have postponed the trial (clause 1 of Article 169 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Russian Federation, for the presentation of additional evidence), only after this it was possible to consider other civil cases. After adjournment, the trial of the case begins again - clause 3 of Art. 169 Code of Civil Procedure.

Potapova V.N. I received a valuable parcel from my sister. After opening it, it turned out that all the things contained in it were damaged due to the fact that the parcel was stored in a damp room. Potapova V.N. turned to a lawyer for legal advice with a request to assist her in protecting the violated right and recovering the cost of the parcel from the telecom operator.

What advice should Potapova’s lawyer give regarding the procedure for protecting her rights?

In this case, the object of civil procedural legal relations is the protection of the violated right and the recovery of the cost of the parcel from the telecom operator.

The subjects in this case are: citizen Potapova V.N., lawyer, telecom operator, and in the future, depending on the type of protection of the right, another subject may appear - the court.

In this situation, it is necessary to refer to clause 2, art. 11 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, it is also necessary to refer to Part 6, Art. 52 Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of April 15, 2005 N 221 Moscow “On approval of the Rules for the provision of postal services”

When giving advice, a lawyer must explain that in this situation, both administrative and judicial procedures for protecting the violated right are possible. Those. Potapova, can file a complaint with the postal operator and wait for a response. If the postal operator refuses to satisfy the claim, if it agrees to satisfy the claim partially, or if the postal operator does not receive a response within the time period established for consideration of the claim, the user of postal services has the right to file a claim in court. But the choice by the victim of an administrative procedure for protecting the violated right does not deprive him of the opportunity to subsequently, and sometimes simultaneously, appeal to the court on the same issue.

Akimov V.I. filed a claim in the interests of a construction team of three against Polet LLC for the recovery of 60 thousand rubles. for construction work performed under a contract. In the power of attorney issued to Akimov V.I. brigade leader S.K. Petrov, indicated the right of the representative to sign the statement of claim, present it to the court and perform other procedural actions on behalf of the team members. The members of the construction team themselves were not involved in the case.

Yakov Petrovich writes that on many SKA there were commanders he knew, since he began his service in the division of these boats. Therefore, he was able to call individual commanders of the patrol boats by name, and Volkov was heard.

A small barge approached the side of the minesweeper. Ya. P. Volkov remembers that those who were on it rowed with their hands, butts and, barely touching the side of the ship, immediately found themselves on the deck of the minesweeper. The barge, caught by the wave and not controlled by anyone, was immediately thrown onto the rocks.

The commander of the 79th Marine Rifle Brigade, A.S. Potapov, was lifted from the water. He had a pistol on his belt and held a tablet in his hands.

In Novorossiysk I had the opportunity to meet Alexey Stepanovich. Shaking his hand, I said from the bottom of my heart:

I'm glad to see you! I saw tears in Potapov’s eyes... Yes, it’s hard to imagine how much this courageous man endured during the war years. I remember one of our first meetings in besieged Odessa, when Commissar S.F. Izus was killed and Major Potapov returned from encirclement. No matter who he met from those who fought with Potapov, everyone spoke of him as a brave commander who knew ground tactics perfectly. Despite his outwardly stern appearance, he was caring, attentive to his subordinates, and most importantly, he skillfully taught them how to fight.

A. S. Potapov was one of the first in the navy to volunteer for the land front near Odessa, and was the commander of the first volunteer detachment of sailors.

The commander of the 1st company of the volunteer detachment, now captain 1st rank in the reserve, V.I. Silyutin, told me:

Everyone in the squad loved Potapov. I saw how he raised and led sailors to attack. During a dash in one of the attacks, I noticed a heavy machine gun on his back and a box of machine gun belts in his hands. How this machine gun helped us out when the enemy began to snap at us! Then Sergeant Major Zakharchenko and all of us always tried to “keep a machine gun at hand” in any attack.

In one of the counterattacks, Potapov was seriously wounded. The Marines carried him off the battlefield.

In the December days of 1941, Alexey Stepanovich was already a colonel, commanding the 79th Naval Rifle Brigade.

When the danger of being captured by the Nazis loomed over the Northern Side, the Potapov brigade was urgently transported to Sevastopol. I remember from the story of A. S. Potapov that in July days When only a few dozen people remained from the brigade, they remained active fighters, did not lose heart, and cared for their wounded comrades.

When the minesweepers and boats arrived, the survivors stuck together and transported the wounded first.

I wouldn't have made it on my own. I was supported by marines, or rather towed, one on the right, one on the left. And when they dragged me onto the deck, they returned for the other wounded. I didn’t meet them in Novorossiysk...

And Alexey Stepanovich was silent for a long time.

In the first volunteer detachment of sailors under the command of Major A. S. Potapov, now reserve midshipman M. M. Trubchannikov began his combat activities - back in besieged Odessa.

During the battles near Odessa, Trubchannikov was wounded. Having recovered, he ended up in the 79th Naval Rifle Brigade, where the commander was also A. S. Potapov, already a colonel.

In the December days of 1941, the 79th brigade was sent to Sevastopol. In one of the forays behind enemy lines, Trubchannikov was again wounded. He returned to the brigade only in June 1942.

Mikhail Mikhailovich recalls how the Marines then repelled the continuous attacks of the Nazis, naked to the waist, when they, shooting on the move, from machine guns, without bending down, approached the positions of Sapun Mountain. There were already few sailors, but they held out until they received the order to retreat.

We retreated to the fork of the Yalta and Balaklava highways, where by the evening of June 29 the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 9th brigade were entrenched Marine Corps. A group of marines from the 79th brigade joined the depleted 1st battalion, where the commander was captain 3rd rank V.V. Nikulshin, and the commissar was battalion commissar E.I. Rylkov. They began to retreat together to the 35th battery.

Several days of joint fighting brought the Marines of the two brigades closer together. On July 1, they took part in a counterattack against the Nazis, who were trying to capture the 35th battery. By evening the Nazis were driven away from the battery.

On the night of July 2, the patrol boats and minesweepers that arrived in the area of the 35th battery and in Cossack Bay could not approach the piers, which were completely destroyed.

The sailors carried the seriously wounded in chest-deep water, but not all of this group managed to get onto the boats. From Nikulshin’s battalion, together with the infantrymen of the 79th brigade, 20 people remained. Nikulshin suggested dividing into two groups. One went towards Kamysheva Bay. In one group, in addition to Trubchannikov, there were six: Alexey Medvedev, Mikhail Skakunenko, Nikolai Ershov, Ivan Nechipuro and Fedor Nekrasov.

Near the shore they discovered a fishing boat under a rock. It contained two pairs of oars, a bucket and a hook. Without waiting for darkness, we went out to sea, but were immediately discovered; shelling began from the shore of Kamysheva Bay. The shells fell 7–10 meters from the boat. The sailors rowed as hard as they could, trying to get out of the shelling zone. We finally broke away from the aimed fire from the shore, but the joy was short-lived: the Messerschmitts appeared.

Someone shouted:

Everyone in the water, hug the board!

The Nazis hit the boat with a machine gun, one of the sailors was wounded in the neck. The planes flew towards Sevastopol.

We counted our supplies: four packs of pea concentrate, a kilogram of sugar, some crackers soaked in sea water, one pack of shag.

Chief Petty Officer Alexey Medvedev once again reminded everyone that the campaign would be difficult. Unity and confidence in the successful outcome of a difficult voyage can save.

The first days passed calmly. We kept the course according to the compass. The wounded Mikhail Skakunenko was getting worse and asked for a drink.

Thirst tormented everyone, and soon hunger joined it. We were also exhausted from rowing.

On the sixth day the sky began to become overcast with clouds - a thunderstorm was approaching. They hoped that they would be able to collect at least some rainwater. They waited impatiently, licking their cracked lips. But the cloud passed by...

The tenth day has passed. No one lost heart, everyone stood firm. Rowing intermittently, each stroke cost enormous effort, from time to time someone lost consciousness.

On the twelfth day, Medvedev stood up to his full height of almost two meters and shouted:

Shore, lads, shore!.. See?.. There’s a river there!

None of us remembers how the destroyer approached and took the boat in tow,” M. M. Trubchannikov finished the story. - I woke up already in the Batumi hospital. To this day, I still wonder how we could survive without water and food! And I answer to myself: “So, they could. After all, we are Soviet sailors!”

I was interested in the fate of Major V.V. Nikulshin’s group. Having met with a participant in the war on Black Sea Fleet senior reserve lieutenant Ya. A. Solodovsky, I learned that he is familiar with V. V. Nikulshin, corresponds with him and meets when Vyacheslav Vasilyevich is in Moscow.

In October 1971, Solodovsky and Nikulshin visited me.

Nikulshin’s tanned face, covered with radiant furrows of wrinkles, and his generously silvered head showed traces of what he had experienced….

Vyacheslav Vasilyevich spoke about the events of early July 1942 as if everything had happened quite recently. His story did not differ from the data that was known to me from others.

In addition to the story, V.V. Nikulshin sent several letters in which he outlined in detail what interested me.

The war found Vyacheslav Vasilyevich assistant commander of the 35th battery. He was among those who were entrusted with responsibility for activities related to defensive work on the Chersonesos Peninsula.

In October 1941, by order of the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov, in accordance with the State Defense Committee, 12 battalions were formed for two marine brigades. Nikulshin was appointed commander of one of the battalions. Commanding the battalion, Nikulshin took part in the battles near Matveev Kurgan and was seriously wounded during the crossing of the Mius River.

A general whom the enemy rated higher than his command. The contribution to the common Victory of General Potapov and the 5th Army entrusted to him can hardly be overestimated - historians do not rule out that it was its persistent defense that prevented the fall of Moscow in the fall of 1941.

My acquaintance with the fate of Mikhail Ivanovich Potapov and the history of the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front began by accident. Several years ago, while digging on the Internet, I noticed a map of the Soviet-German front as of August 25, 1941, apparently borrowed from some English-language resource. By this time, the Germans occupied Novgorod, Smolensk, approached Bryansk, besieged Odessa in the south and reached the Dnieper line from Kremenchug to the mouth.

Of course, the front line could not be uniform; in different sections of it, formations of unequal numbers and strength opposed each other, and success or disaster was influenced by many circumstances. In addition, such a wedge could not exist for long, since it easily became encircled. From the south, the Germans came close to Kyiv, and it was necessary to level the front in order to organize a stable defense of the city. A potential threat was also brewing to the right flank of the 5th Army, after the German troops of Army Group Center, bypassing the swampy Pripyat basin, reached the Gomel-Starodub line. On August 19, the 5th Army received an order to retreat beyond the Dnieper to a depth of 140 - 180 kilometers. And yet, the fact that the retreat route of the 5th Army from the western border of the USSR, even if for some time it turned out to be almost three times shorter than that of its neighbors, aroused the desire to learn as much as possible about this formation and its commander.

During the first two months of the war, Potapov’s troops loomed menacingly from the north over the German Army Group South, but even after the retreat beyond the Dnieper, the 5th Army exerted a noticeable influence on the decisions of the high command of the Reich armed forces. In his first directive on combat operations on the Eastern Front (Directive No. 33 of July 19, 1941), Hitler states: “The enemy 5th Army must be quickly and decisively defeated.” But it doesn’t work out quickly and decisively, and the next directive No. 34 of July 30, 1941 again orders the German troops to “force the 5th Red Army... to force a battle west of the Dnieper and destroy it.” The Fuhrer did not rule out a breakthrough of Potapov’s troops north through Polesie to the flank of Army Group Center and demanded that measures be taken to prevent this, frankly speaking, unlikely maneuver. Two weeks pass and Hitler again irritably reminds that “the Russian 5th Army must... finally be destroyed.” (Appendix to Directive No. 34 of 08/12/41). However, a few days later, Potapov’s army disappeared behind the wide expanse of the Dnieper.
One should not be surprised at the Fuhrer’s persistence - he saw the same maps of military operations that we see now, and quite adequately perceived the threat posed by the activity of the troops under the command of Potapov. Finally, on August 21, Hitler issues an order in which he repeats three times (!) the idea of the need to destroy the 5th Army. But the main thing is that for the first time he is ready to allocate “as many divisions as necessary” to carry out this task. Along with the success of the operation to blockade Leningrad, the Fuhrer considers the defeat of Potapov’s army to be a prerequisite for a successful offensive “against Timoshenko’s group of troops,” that is, the Western Front. It turns out that the path to Moscow, according to Hitler, lay through the defeated 5th Army.
I learned all these details later, but when I looked at the map, the name Potapov, alas, did not mean anything to me. Gradually, after getting acquainted with documents and research, conversations with the widow of the army commander, Marianna Fedorovna Modorova, the amazing life path of this man was revealed to me.

From deacons to generals

Mikhail Ivanovich Potapov was born in October 1902 in the village of Mochalovo, Yukhnovsky district, then Smolensk province, now Kaluga region. Although in the questionnaires the future commander-5 classified his parents as “middle peasants,” they should rather be classified as wealthy artisans: Mikhail’s father was a contractor for paving roads and streets.
Without leaving the volost, Mikhail received a very decent primary education for a village boy. At a rural school, his teacher was a “sincere” prince from the Gagarin family; later he studied at a parish school at a church in the neighboring village of Putogino. The trustee of the church and school was the St. Petersburg millionaire book publisher, a native of these places, Ignatius Tuzov, so, for sure, they cared about the level of knowledge of the students here.

The First World War and the economic crisis did not have the best impact on the Potapovs’ family well-being. As a teenager, Mikhail began helping his father. The Potapovs met the October Revolution in Kharkov, where they worked as bridge workers in a tram depot.

By the spring of 1920, Mikhail returned to his native Mochalovo, and in May he became a Red Army soldier at the military registration and enlistment office in the city of Yukhnov. Formally, Potapov is considered a participant in the Civil War, but he did not take direct part in the hostilities.

Nevertheless, from the very first hours of the war, Potapov’s troops fought stubbornly and skillfully. For every Soviet tank knocked out or burned, von Kleist's 1st Panzer Group units suffered 2.5–3 times more damage. The 5th Army not only defended desperately, but also launched counterattacks against the enemy. “The leadership of the enemy forces in front of Army Group South is amazingly energetic, his continuous flank and frontal attacks cause us heavy losses,” noted the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Franz Halder, in his notes.

On June 26, the counter-offensive of the Southwestern Front began in the Brody-Lutsk-Dubno triangle, where the first oncoming tank battle in the history of World War II took place. Four Soviet mechanized corps (two from the 5th Army) failed to build on their initial success. The inconsistent position of the front command also played a role, which, at the height of the fighting in the triangle, ordered a move to the defensive, and then returned to the offensive plan.

I will note this detail: during these days of fierce confrontation, namely June 30, Potapov issued an order in which he indicated the inadmissibility of shooting prisoners of war.

The Nazi troops were unable to quickly break through the front here. Potapov's divisions knocked them off the road Lutsk - Rivne - Zhitomir and forced them to abandon an immediate attack on Kyiv.
Shtemenko, in those months one of the leading employees of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, was referring to the successful counter-offensive of the 5th Army launched on July 10. Then Potapov’s tankers, behind the formations of the III Army Corps, intercepted the Novograd-Volynsky-Zhitomir highway at a width of over 10 km. What a headache for the Germans the loss of this most important communication was can be judged by the fact that the commander of Army Group South, Gerd von Runstedt, seriously planned to use aviation to transfer the Hermann Goering infantry regiment to the Zhitomir region.
While Potapov's troops attacked the northern flank of the German offensive, the defenders of Kyiv received a respite. The command of the 6th German Army was forced to declare: “The nature of the threat to our troops from the main forces of the 5th Russian Army is still such that this threat must be eliminated before the attack on Kyiv.” The loss of the Ukrainian capital was postponed by two months.

On August 9, Commander von Runstedt gave the order to suspend the offensive at the Kyiv-Korosten line and temporarily go on the defensive in order to disperse the troops in depth and provide them with the opportunity to rest. In the assessment of the situation presented to the OKH, the command of Army Group South expressed a rather pessimistic opinion regarding the situation on its northern wing. It was even suggested that the Russians intended to “go on the offensive from the Kyiv region and from the Ovruch region in order to defeat the northern wing of the army group.” However, the physical exhaustion and losses that von Runstedt complained about affected the condition of the Soviet troops to an equal, if not greater, extent.
Fatal triumph?

Consequently, by August 21, Hitler had formed a firm conviction about how the campaign in the East should develop. First: the attack on Moscow can be launched only after the defeat of the 5th Army, which, on the one hand, will ensure the security of the right flank of the troops aimed at the Soviet capital, on the other, will create favorable conditions for von Runstedt’s group to operate in Ukraine. Second: to successfully achieve this goal, it is necessary to attract the forces of Army Group Center. It should not be forgotten that the Fuhrer's priority was the methodical destruction of enemy forces in the territory, regardless of geographical or political goals. As early as July 13, he told the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Walter von Brauchitsch: “It is not so important to quickly advance to the East as to destroy the enemy’s manpower.”

These lines, written after the war, clearly belong to the genre of the general’s memoirs “How Hitler prevented us from winning.” “It is always easier to extol the virtues of some hypothetical alternative than to justify caution and disappointing reality. And in this case, it also happened that all the people who opposed the offensive in the center had already died. Keitel, Jodl, Kluge, Hitler himself - they did not have time to write exculpatory memoirs,” notes British military historian Alan Clark, not without sarcasm.
In fact, in the 20s of August 41, the question was not so categorical: either Moscow or Ukraine. The operation against Potapov's troops was conceived by the Fuhrer as auxiliary precisely within the framework of the decisive Wehrmacht offensive on the capital of the USSR.

According to Werner Haupt, the battle for Kyiv became the most important battle of the entire war: “Because of the events of the next two weeks, the decisive German offensive on Moscow was ignored. This probably changed the outcome of the Eastern Campaign." But let us repeat: everything that happened is the result of a paradoxical situation, when the very real prospect of the defeat of an entire front made adjustments to the enemy’s strategy and tactics, and the disaster of the Soviet troops and the triumph of Hitler’s armies in the Kiev cauldron took the Germans a whole month and moved the date of the decisive push on Moscow to the beginning the onset of cold weather.

Chronicle of the disaster

On August 29, Potapov tried to launch a counteroffensive, this time without success. Not surprising, since the 5th Army has ceased to be the formidable force it was a month ago. Almost a third of it (five divisions) was transferred to the 37th Army; The 135th Infantry Division and the 5th Artillery Anti-Tank Brigade became part of the 40th Army. The 1st Airborne Corps was also withdrawn from the 5th Army and entered into the front reserve. Due to the lack of tanks, the 9th and 19th mechanized corps had to be reorganized into battalions. Due to heavy losses, rifle divisions had no more than 20-25% of their personnel.

On the same day, the 21st Army of the Bryansk Front unexpectedly withdrew from its positions, and Wehrmacht units immediately rushed into a breakthrough on the outskirts of Chernigov. On September 1, the Germans occupied a bridgehead on the banks of the Desna in the near rear of the 5th Army. The units sent to eliminate the breakthrough failed to achieve success. The countdown to the inevitable disaster has begun.
On the evening of September 5, Potapov again addressed the front commander Kirponos via HF with a proposal to withdraw troops, but received a categorical refusal. It is noteworthy that it was on this day, according to Halder’s notes, that Hitler first spoke about the Kiev cauldron. Only on September 9, the Headquarters authorized the withdrawal of the 5th Army to the Desna River. By this time, Potapov's main forces were reliably surrounded. Of the entire army of 70 thousand personnel, there were less than 4 thousand soldiers left, as well as about 200 guns and mortars of various systems.

At the end of September 14, Potapov and his headquarters once again made an attempt to stop the withdrawal of the remnants of the army and delay the advance of superior enemy forces. However, it was not possible to gain a foothold on any of the subsequent lines, since the Germans, pressing from the front, simultaneously bypassed both flanks. And on the morning of September 16, at the headquarters of the 5th Army it became known that the day before, in the rear of the front in the Lokhvitsa area (Poltava region), the troops of Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Group, advancing from the north, had united with the troops of Kleist’s 1st Panzer Group, which had broken through from south. Five Soviet armies were already surrounded. The Kyiv cauldron has become a reality. According to German data, more than 660 thousand soldiers and officers of the Red Army were captured, 884 tanks and more than 3 thousand guns were captured.

On September 21, a combined detachment from the remnants of the front headquarters and the 5th Army gave the last battle to the enemy. Potapov was shell-shocked and lost consciousness. In the heat of battle, the general was mistaken for killed and was hastily “buried”, covered with the bodies of the dead. Potapov’s documents were handed over to Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko, the future marshal and then commander of the 15th Rifle Corps of the 5th Army. “I literally cried when they handed me the documents of our army commander. I didn’t know at all what would happen to us now, since Mikhail Ivanovich died.”
The bitter fate of the commander

Three days later, Potapov was discovered by the Germans. The trial of captivity began. In the fascist concentration camps, Mikhail Ivanovich’s paths crossed with generals M. Lukin and I. Muzychenko, senior lieutenant Y. Dzhugashvili, and the leaders of the defense of the Brest Fortress, Major P. Gavrilov and Captain I. Zubachev. In 1992, reports and transcripts of interrogations of Potapov were made public, who, when asked “whether the Russian people are ready to wage war if the army retreats to the Urals,” replied: “Yes, he will remain in a state of moral defense, and the Red Army will continue to resist." German investigators assessed the behavior of the Red Army general as follows: “as a prisoner he behaved with dignity,” “on strategic issues he referred to his ignorance,” “he answered questions concerning his future with restraint.” The Germans also described Potapov as a “Russian nationalist,” although it is difficult to say what exactly they meant by this formulation.

Potapov categorically refused to cooperate with traitors from the ROA. At the same time, Mikhail Ivanovich spoke respectfully about Vlasov himself until the end of his life; he did not believe in the betrayal of his southern “neighbor” on the Southwestern Front, believing that the Germans somehow used the general for their own purposes against his will.

Mikhail Ivanovich met the victorious spring of 1945 in the “general” camp of Hammelburg. On April 22, American troops came close to them. The camp commandant went with a white flag to Patton's army. The Americans arrived at the camp and transported all the prisoners to their place, then transported them to the French, and the recent prisoners of war returned home from Paris.
However, their homeland did not greet them kindly. Literally from the plane, Potapov and his comrades were sent to the “facility” in Golitsyno, near Moscow. A special inspection took place for seven months, which left indelible marks in Mikhail Ivanovich’s soul.

Until the end of his life, the invariably balanced and witty Potapov became gloomy and withdrawn at the mention of the name of the former SMERSH chief Abakumov, whom he considered a rare scoundrel.

However, the results of the audit most likely turned out to be objective, since Potapov was restored to the rank of major general and returned to army service. Mikhail Ivanovich wrote an application for reinstatement in the party. And again Zhukov came to the rescue, who gave his longtime comrade-in-arms the following recommendation: “As for leadership qualities, Comrade Potapov was the best army commander, and the units and formations he commanded were always leading. In the border battle, the 5th Army fought with exceptional tenacity and valor. Retreating under the influence of superior enemy forces, she repeatedly counterattacked and defeated the Germans. Comrade Potapov controlled the army brilliantly. I will also say that he was a great-hearted man who was loved by all his subordinates for his kindness and understanding.” It is difficult to read these lines from an official document without emotion, coming from the pen of a marshal who is far from sentimental.

Obviously, Zhukov’s opinion was shared by many in the political and military leadership of the USSR. In any case, Mikhail Ivanovich turned out to be probably the only senior Soviet officer who was captured, who not only returned to the army, but also made, if not an enchanting, but, given the vicissitudes of our post-war history, quite a worthy career. He served in Transbaikalia, in the Far East; death found Colonel General Potapov in January 1965 as first deputy commander of the Odessa Military District.

The place of Mikhail Ivanovich Potapov in the unique hierarchy of military leaders of the Great Patriotic War, built in the post-war period, clearly does not correspond to his military leadership talent and contribution to the Victory.

But it still cannot be said that the name of the commander of the 5th Army was kept silent. His leadership talent was highly appreciated in post-war memoirs by Soviet marshals I.Kh. Bagramyan, I.I. Yakubovsky, and former opponents - Guderian, Keitel, Halder. It should be noted that the 5th Army became a real forge of personnel - such recognized commanders as M.E. came out of it. Katukov, K.S. Moskalenko, K.K. Rokossovsky, I.I. Fedyuninsky. All of them highly appreciated the merits of their former commander. While Potapov was still alive, A. Filippi’s book “The Pripyat Problem” was published in the USSR, where the role of the 5th Army in disrupting the blitzkrieg was examined in detail.

In 1954, he again became the commander of the 5th Army, albeit without him, but which, in 1945, reached the enemy’s lair. His biggest grievance against Fate was this: “The villainess didn’t let me get to Berlin!” And his wife, Marianna Fedorovna, answered: “Thank God that you are alive!” "Do not understand!" – the stern general was angry.
He passed away on January 26, 1965 from a heart attack - with the rank of Colonel General, as 1st Deputy Commander of the Odessa Military District. Streets in Kyiv, Lutsk, and Vladimir-Volynsky were named after him.

The article was published as part of a socially significant project carried out with state support funds allocated as a grant in accordance with the order of the President of the Russian Federation No. 11-rp dated January 17, 2014 and on the basis of a competition held by the All-Russian public organization Knowledge Society of Russia.

Maxim Zarezin

Potapov concluded on behalf of the brigade. Plans for seminars and practical classes in the discipline: Labor Law. "Altai State University"

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