Atlantic type refrigerated fishing trawler. Power plant with diesel gear transmission. RTM type "Atlantic"

In 1964, a new stern trawler "Bonn" was delivered to a West German customer in Germany http://www.shipspotting.com/gallery/photo.php?lid=424751 which was the next generation of trawler after English project"Fairtry" which included the Pushkin-type BMRT, also built in Germany.

Having adopted the concept of the "Bonn" trawler, by order of the MRP/MRKH of the USSR and in collaboration with specialists from the Soviet department, the GDR developed a project for a fishing trawler that received the code "Atlantik", which made up for a number of shortcomings of the first generation BMRT, which had been in operation for almost a dozen years, and exactly:

* a combined navigation and fishing cabin was used
* a diesel gear unit with 2 main engines and a power take-off was used, which significantly increased the reliability and survivability of the vessel, and also expanded the possibilities of working in the field. It is worth noting separately that the trawler’s power plant had 3-fold survivability due to the installed electric shafting machine, which after 40 years became practically mandatory for tankers with one main engine.
* the longest fishing deck is provided
* a whole range is applied automated processes control and management that made the trawler one of the most modern automated vessels of that time.

A total of 171 vessels were built in Stralsund (147) and Wismar (24) from 1966 to 1976. The first fifty trawlers belonged to the Atlantic I project.
The subsequent 121 ships, built between 1968 and 1976, belonged to the modernized Atlantic II project.
Also on the basis of this project, in 1971-72, seven Research Vessels (RVs) of the "Eureka" type were built, and in 1973 - seven fishing training vessels (FTS) of the "Kursograph" type.
The bulk of trawlers of this type left the stocks of the Stralsund shipyard, and only 24 units. were built in Wismar.
In addition, 24 ships were built for Bulgaria, 8 for Romania, and 5 for Cuba.

Purpose of the vessel:
- fishing with bottom and mid-depth trawls;
- processing of fish into frozen products;
- processing of inedible bycatch and fish processing waste into feed meal and technical fat;
- storage and transfer of manufactured products to transport refrigerators or transportation to the port.

Overall length, m: 82.20
Overall width, m: 13.62
Side height to upper deck, m: 9.55
Average draft when loaded, m: 5.16
Maximum displacement, t: 3362
Deadweight, t: 1150
Registered tonnage gross/net, reg. t: 2657/1139
Main engines:
Quantity and power, pcs*hp: 2*1160
Brand: 8NVD 48A-2U

Productivity of technological lines:
Frozen fish, t/day: 45
Fishmeal and technical oil, t/day: 35
Refrigerated holds, quantity and total volume, pcs*cub. m: 3*1095
Volume of premises for storing fishmeal, cubic meters. m: 163
Volume of fat tanks, m3: 9
Temperature in the holds, degrees C: -25
Refrigerant: Ammonia
Load booms, quantity and load capacity, pcs*t: 4*3.0 (2*3.0; 2*5.0)

Diesel fuel, t: 602
Heavy fuel, t: 69
Fresh water, t: 133
Speed, knots: 13.8

45 years ago, on February 28, 1967, the Soviet trawler Tukan sank in the North Sea. According to one of the many versions of the disaster, the ship was destroyed by its secret cargo. Columnist for "Power" Evgeny Zhirnov I found the answer to this mystery in the archives of the CPSU Central Committee.

"The ship felt a shaking of the hull"

Much of what happened during the last voyage of the Toucan looked strange and sometimes inexplicable.

This type of RTM (freezer fishing trawler) was designed in the GDR according to Soviet order and was called “Tropic”: the trawlers were intended for fishing in southern latitudes. The ships of this series were built there, in the German socialist state, and received names depending on their future location. Those heading to the Black Sea were named after the Black Sea cities - “Alupka”, “Yalta”, etc. And the trawlers destined for the Baltic were named after the southern constellations. That is why the RTM, built in 1962 at the shipyard in Stralsund for Kaliningrad fishermen, received the name “Tukan”.

About the further work of the Tukan, one of the most famous specialists in the history of the Russian fishing fleet, captain of the Kaliningrad sea fishing port, Vyacheslav Morozov, wrote:

“Since the Kaliningrad trawl fleet was added to the balance sheet in September 1962, the vessel has made five fishing trips (two of them double), and from June 1966 to February 1967 it was under scheduled maintenance.”

The repairs, however, as Captain Morozov wrote, did not go entirely smoothly:

“Due to the lack of necessary spare parts in Tralflot warehouses, the faulty active rudder was removed from the vessel. According to the USSR Register Rules, the absence of an active rudder did not affect the seaworthiness of the vessel, and therefore the trawler crew had no reason to demand its restoration.”

All further history Vyacheslav Morozov restored the “Tucan” and its crew on the basis of an investigation conducted by a commission of the USSR Ministry of Fisheries:

“The RTM Tukan set out on its 6th fishing voyage on February 25, 1967 at 17.30. The voyage through the Baltic and Danish Straits to Cape Skagen took place under normal navigation conditions. The crew recovered from the onshore departure turmoil. During February 25 and 26 The boatswain distributed life-saving bibs to the crew members. A characteristic nuance for ships of the Tropic type: 10 people refused to receive them, citing the lack of space in the cabin for storing life-saving equipment. This practice took place on more than one Tucan, I can confirm this as a person. , who worked in the “tropics” for four years... On February 27, at about 6 p.m., in relatively good weather conditions, we entered the Skagerrak Strait. But at about 11 p.m., one of the mining masters arrived on the bridge and reported that they were on the stern. on the deck, all the hatches and necks were battened down, and the loads were secured “in a storm style”... By 23.30, the wind had noticeably increased, and the pitching became more intense. At 23.50 we received a weather forecast on the radio. A storm of force 10 was expected from the southwest.”

The tragic events began two and a half hours later:

“On February 28, at about 02.30, a shaking of the hull was felt on the ship (as some rescued crew members suggest, from a strong wave shock). At about the same time, the engine watch discovered the flow of water into the propeller shaft tunnel... It turned out that it was coming from the fittings room. Through wide slits designed to receive fish, sea water poured into the vessel in a stormy stream."

On the ships of the Tropic series, German workmanship was fully compensated for by design flaws

“Didn’t answer either the radio or the light signal”

“About 3 o’clock,” Vyacheslav Morozov continued the description, “the ship noticed a list on the left side. At 03.20, the captain gave the order to the engine room to pump fuel from the left side tanks to the starboard tanks to reduce the list. But the ship continued to list on the left side. .. At about 4 o'clock, Captain Khramtsov ordered the fuel to be pumped out of tank N23 on the left side. By this time, the wind had reached force 9 from the southwest, the sea state was force 7... Captain Khramtsov went into the cabin of the head of the radio station, Efimov, and woke him up. ...

At 04.10 the sailor on watch reported that he saw an oncoming ship directly ahead. The captain gave the command to disperse on the left sides. After this, Captain Khramtsov, First Mate Safonov and First Mate Mayevsky briefly went into the chart room to discuss the situation.

At 04.20, after diverging from the oncoming vessel (it was the floating base "Vilis Lacis" of the Riga BRF), the captain, senior and first mates again entered the chart room. After a short meeting, the senior officer gave the order over the broadcast: “Everyone get up, put on rescue bibs and go to the upper deck”... To the captain of the Latsis, L. Onuchin, who suspected something was wrong, the Tukan did not respond to either the radio or the light signal. Subsequently, none of the surviving members of the Tucan crew could clearly explain the logic of this action."

Another ten minutes later, when the crew members gathered at the boats, the captain gave the command to turn towards the shore. But the roll increased sharply.

“At 04.35,” Morozov wrote, “senior broadcast assistant Safonov gave the command: “All crew in the left side boat.” Senior engineer Kuzub ordered everyone in the engine room to go to the upper deck. The senior engineer himself remained in the engine room, and with Since then, none of the surviving crew members saw him again. After the command “everyone in the boat,” the head of the radio station, Efimov, stopped the first mate running past the door of the radio room and asked him to give the coordinates of the ship to dial a distress signal, Safonov shouted as he ran that he was in the radio room. the captain will come. Without waiting for Captain Efimov, he started sending the SOS signal, but at that time the captain came in and brought a note with the coordinates of the ship’s location. The SOS signal was broadcast at 04:42-43 minutes... Captain Khramtsov was not on the bridge. left. After that, none of the surviving crew members saw him again."

Many team members also failed to escape:

Unlike other fishing bases (pictured), in Kaliningrad, drinking on vacation was not only not prohibited, but was also encouraged

“An attempt to lower the left side boat,” wrote Captain Morozov, “failed... It was impossible to lower the right side boat due to the large list to the left side. In these moments of general despair, someone suddenly shouted: “Steamboat!” A well-lit ship was approaching. It was impossible to send distress signals with rockets; the cabin, where all the pyrotechnics were stored, was already at the mercy of the waves. They shouted and waved their hands, but to no avail - the ship passed by without stopping. The trawler began to quickly sink, and the bow began to emerge from the water. Many crew members began to jump into the water; those remaining on the deck were washed away by the waves. Electrician Artemyev and several crew members rushed to the upper bridge, where the life rafts were located, but the emergency beams had fallen from their regular places. and almost all the sailors were knocked off their feet by the planks and washed overboard by the waves. Artemyev, holding on to the bridge deck, managed to pull the launch lines of two rafts and threw himself into one of them. Immediately after this, all the rafts were also washed overboard, three of them were in working order, and two did not open. Around this time, the starboard boat was torn off the ship and overturned, and the port boat was broken and also torn off, but was kept afloat in an inverted state. The ship continued to sink into the water with its stern. At approximately 04.50, the bow of the trawler also disappeared under water. The sailors who found themselves in the water were scattered over a large area of ​​water. Those who were close to the life-saving equipment managed to use them with great effort. At first, there were about 20 people on the bottom of the overturned starboard boat, but soon half were washed away by the waves. Eleven people in the water were able to climb into one of the three rafts. No one else was able to use the raft on which Artemyev was. The third raft that opened floated empty."

The Tucan crew was lucky in only one way. The Soviet floating base did not have time to go far.

"At 05.10, after receiving a distress signal and analyzing the situation, the floating base "Vilis Latsis" turned to the area of ​​the accident. At 05.40, flickering lights were discovered on the water. These were the lights on the life rafts and life jackets of the "Tukanovites". At 06.00 they began rescuing people At about 7 o'clock, 10 people were removed from the bottom of the overturned lifeboat. By 8 o'clock, 11 people were lifted aboard the floating base. Last Man was recovered (from the second life raft) at 09.06."

Of the 79 crew members, only 22 were saved.

"Drinking on ships should not be encouraged!"

A commission appointed by the USSR Ministry of Fisheries conducted a detailed investigation into all the circumstances of the tragedy and found out a lot of interesting things. For example, "Information on stability for the captain of ships of the type "Tropic"", which should have been used as a guide when emergency situations, had many unclearly written passages, which was a consequence of its not entirely accurate translation from German language. In addition, the designers ensured that if one sealed compartment was flooded, the ship would remain afloat and would not capsize. But in fact, the design was made in such a way that when water entered the fish workshop, the neighboring compartment was also flooded. So the company's guarantee of unsinkability was worth nothing.

The commission also investigated how water got inside the ship's hull. The version of the hole did not correspond to the description of the disaster compiled after interviewing the surviving crew members. They tried to figure out the route of water entry, as Captain Morozov wrote, by calculation:

"Kaliningrad scientists from the Department of Ship Theory of KTIRPiH (Kaliningrad Technical Institute of Fishery Industry and Economy) examined and calculated six options for water penetration into the hull. The most likely of them were considered to be the following penetration routes: through open hatches in the coamings of the 1st or 4th fisheries bunkers; through loose closures of the hatches of the 2nd or 3rd fish bunkers.

It is estimated that in both cases, through any of these holes, within 2-2.5 hours, a sufficient amount of water could have entered to cause the vessel to lose buoyancy. This happens even if the drainage pump of the waste tank is constantly running."

Deputy Prosecutor General of the USSR Mikhail Malyarov (pictured on the podium) did not make public the conclusion that those responsible for the death of the trawler died along with him

The theoretical calculations were confirmed by witness testimony:

“From the testimony of fishmaster Myasishchev, it follows that during the repair, a rubber sealing gasket was not installed on the lid of the 3rd fish bunker, without which a large gap was formed around the perimeter of the lid. The ship's mechanic-adjuster had to install the gasket during the transition to the fishing area.”

Only one thing remained unclear:

“Based on the requirements of normal maritime practice,” wrote Vyacheslav Morozov, “the captain, having received information about the entry of water into the vessel, was obliged first of all to declare a water alarm and make every effort to detect the causes and location of the entry of water, and then take measures to eliminate it But the crew was not prepared to fight for survivability, and the alarm was not announced... The commission did not find an explanation for the reasons why Captain Khramtsov, in violation of the instructions of the Service Charter, did not send a distress signal on time. The captain also did not give orders to prepare all life-saving equipment. immediate use when the ship was actually lost."

The commission suggested that the reason for this behavior of the ship’s command could be alcohol abuse. Moreover, the immediate superiors not only did not prohibit drinking on ships, but, on the contrary, encouraged it in every possible way. For example, sea captain Leonid Tatarin, who sailed for many years on ships of the Kaliningrad trawling fleet base, recalled:

"One of bright examples — former boss Kaliningrad "Tralflot" Vasily Dmitrievich Albanov. No one will argue that he was a wonderful person. The tugboat in the port named after him is a well-deserved memory of him. But everyone was embarrassed to tell him the truth - drinking on ships should not be encouraged! In 1965, the Fisherman's Day holiday was officially introduced in our country. Then I was the third navigator on the RTM "Pallada" in the South-East Atlantic region, just north of Walvisbay. It was on the day when the holiday was celebrated that the head of Tralflot himself arrived at the fishing grounds at the Priboi TR. Our captain was Hero Socialist Labor A. F. Tsygankov. Of course, Albanov decided to celebrate the holiday on board. In the morning, our captain moored aboard the Priboy - beautifully, even elegantly. The boss immediately switched to Pallada. They overloaded us with a line of vodka, then a line of cognac, a line of champagne - to the loud cries of the crew "Hurray!"

But some surviving members of the Tucan crew, instead of alcohol, put forward a completely different version of the death of the ship, which was recorded in their words by Vyacheslav Morozov:

“Mechanic Zolotarev claims that there can be no question of any general drunkenness. If only because the ship had just come out of repair, the crew was hastily recruited from the reserve, and in this “hodgepodge” few people knew each other. But the mechanic has another option for answering questions.

“Shortly before departure, four containers were loaded on board the RTM - as they said, with equipment intended for a secret Soviet facility in Cuba,” recalls Zolotarev. “They were escorted by trawl master K., whom everyone considered to be a “special officer” in disguise.

During a storm in the Skagerrak, one of the containers fell off its fastenings and hit the slipway, which forced it into an open position. Obviously, at this time, the Tucan felt a shaking of the hull, which became fatal for the ship. Another crew member, V. Mezentsev, also recalled the mysterious containers.”

The version that the reason for the sinking of the Tucan was the opening of the slip (a platform for lifting the trawl with the catch onto the deck) had every right to life. Just as the version discussed in Kaliningrad that the cause of the death of the trawler was a Soviet submarine accompanying it and its secret cargo was not without meaning. They said that it was she who hit the Toucan, after which it sank. In support of these mysterious versions, then and much later it was pointed out that the Toucan was never raised, although it sank at a shallow depth: it was more convenient to hide the truth.

However, in 1967, none of the officials began to either confirm or refute these versions. And not only because the party and government only in rare cases reported on disasters with the death of so many people, and even more so on their causes. The silence was also explained by the fact that the USSR Prosecutor General's Office had not completed the investigation.

"The investigation into the case has been terminated"

Acting Prosecutor General of the USSR Mikhail Malyarov reported the results of the investigation into the circumstances of the death of the Tukan to the CPSU Central Committee only in the following year, 1968:

“An investigation into the causes of the death of the fishing trawler Tukan, which occurred on February 28, 1967 when the ship was leaving the Skagerrak Strait into the North Sea, established the following:

February 25, 1967, after completion of scheduled maintenance and receipt of the Register class USSR, the trawler "Tukan" left Kaliningrad to fish in the North-West Atlantic. On February 28, while heading to the North Sea, the Tucan trawler encountered a severe storm and, as a result of water penetrating into the compartments of the ship's hull, sank at a depth of 37 meters. 57 crew members died during the shipwreck."

The expedition that intended to lift the Tucan did not have the necessary skills, healthy divers, and most importantly, as evil tongues claimed, the desire to work

In contrast to the conclusions of the departmental commission, investigators from the Prosecutor General’s Office came to more definite conclusions:

“The death of the trawler “Tukan”, according to the conclusion of experts, occurred due to the flooding of two adjacent compartments - the fish workshop and the fish flour installation (reinforcement department), from where the water quickly spread to other rooms of the ship’s hull. The shipwreck and the death of a significant part of the trawler’s crew were the result of low labor and industrial discipline on the ship, dulling of vigilance and neglect of danger in storm conditions, as well as the result of clearly incorrect actions and gross violations Charter of service on vessels of the fishing industry fleet, Rules of technical operation and provisions regulating the safety of navigation by command staff vessel.

Upon receiving a storm warning on February 27, senior mate Safonov did not take the necessary measures to ensure the hermetically sealed closure of all hatches on the aft deck, and the watch navigator Gutsulyak did not organize monitoring of their condition, as a result of which the flow of water into the production premises of the hull was noticed very late. The captain of the trawler Khramtsov did not declare a water alarm and did not take urgent measures to determine and eliminate the causes of water leakage, and did not inform the Kaliningrad trawl fleet base about the emergency condition of the trawler. Khramtsov and his subordinate commanders Safonov, Gutsulyak, Kuzub did not take appropriate measures to effectively fight for the survivability of the ship and save the crew, who, moreover, through their fault, were not prepared and trained for organized and decisive actions. It was established that on February 26-27, individual members of the ship’s crew, including Khramtsov, Safonov, Kuzub and Eresko, drank alcohol and at the time of the emergency showed obvious inaction and passivity.

Despite the opportunity, Khramtsov did not turn to the Soviet ship Vilis Latsis for help, with which he separated twenty minutes before the shipwreck.

In the presence of a real threat of death of the ship and crew, the distress signal was given very late, and orders to the ship's crew to prepare for rescue were given at the moment when the trawler began to submerge in the water. The command to the crew to “abandon the ship” was not given at all, and no one was in charge of rescuing people during the shipwreck.

The situation that had created by this time was aggravated by the fact that most of the team members did not know how to properly use collective life rafts.”

The conclusions of the Prosecutor General's Office also contained information about the design flaws of the vessel:

“The sinking of the trawler was facilitated by certain design flaws of the vessel (the location below the waterline of two production rooms connected to each other through a drainage system, unreliable fastening of the slip cover and inconvenient closing of the hatch covers in the coamings of the aft deck).”

And about. The Prosecutor General unequivocally pointed to the perpetrators of the tragedy:

"Given that Khramtsov, Safonov, Kuzub, Gutsulyak, through whose fault the shipwreck occurred, died, the investigation into the case was terminated. Officials of the Kaliningrad Trawling Fleet Base and the Kaliningrad Production Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Fisheries, who made official lapses in preparing the trawler "Tukan" for flight, punished in party and disciplinary order."

But it was not only the conclusions that were interesting in the note. It didn't say a word about any secret cargo. It is doubtful that O. The Prosecutor General, if the Tukan was transporting something secret, avoided this circumstance in his report to the Central Committee. Moreover, the document itself was not classified as classified, which clearly indicated that it did not deal with any military or state secrets.

True, the note indicated that “final conclusions about the reasons for the sinking of the trawler could be made only after lifting and a thorough inspection of the sunken vessel.” But, as it turned out, the trawler had not yet been raised. And a new detective story is unfolding around ship-lifting operations.

"Get more currency and dress up"

In February 1968, an anonymous letter was sent to the CPSU Central Committee about how the Tucan was organized and carried out:

“At the beginning of 1967, the Soviet fishing vessel “Tukan” of the Ministry of Fisheries died off the coast of Denmark. The reasons for the death of the vessel were not precisely clarified. According to the agreement, work to lift the vessel was carried out by the forces of the ASPTR (rescue and underwater technical work squad. — "Power") Baltic Shipping Company with a commitment to finish in 1967. However, they worked for about 6 months. Composition: about 160 people. A floating base of 14,000 tons displacement, rescue ships, diving boats, equipment, machinery, etc. But ASPTR failed to achieve anything. They spent more than 1.5 million rubles, more than 28 thousand gold. rub. in currency.

Reasons for failure: illiteracy, lack of any practice in this type of work. Lack of desire to work. The presence of a desire to get more currency and dress up abroad. Essentially, there was no proper selection of the team. In pursuit of currency, those who were able to did so went. We registered 3 diving specialists, and none of them have the right to go underwater. What did they do underwater for 6 months? What did they do there? It is unknown and lies on the conscience of the divers. The Danes offered to officially raise the ship in 1.5 months, but ours? It’s a shame, they disgraced themselves and they also say: they will work in 1968 and spend the same amount of currency, and it will cost at least 4 million rubles. That's what they call it. This is a feeding trough: you can earn extra money, and without any guarantee for the end of the rise in 1968. The indignation of the fishermen is understandable... It’s time to stop all this farming and waste money in vain, because you can build three new vessels.”

Usually they did not pay much attention to anonymous letters. However, this was transferred to the transport department of the CPSU Central Committee with instructions to immediately look into the matter. The department sent inquiries to the Ministry of the Navy of the USSR and the Ministry of Fisheries of the USSR, and, as it turned out from their responses, the facts given in the anonymous letter were fully confirmed.

The Ministry of Marine Fleet, however, tried to make excuses. Deputy Minister Timofey Guzhenko's response to the Central Committee's request, sent on March 12, 1968, stated:

“Due to the limited technical means for such work in the Ministry of the Navy, a number of positions in the material and technical equipment of the lifting expedition were provided with the involvement of other specialized organizations and the owner of the vessel. Such positions include the allocation of the Tungus mother ship, a keel-lift vessel, ship-lifting pontoons, the missing number of cables, cables and hoses, installation of offshore equipment at the work site.

The total duration of work provided for by the vessel lifting project was 109 days. In conditions of unstable weather during the period May-October 1967, which differed sharply from the long-term average, it turned out to be possible to use only 65.5 days, including 12 days in August, 14 days in September and 5 days in October. During the same period, there were strong storms lasting 8-9 days, disrupting not only the rhythm, but also causing serious damage to the work already completed (storms in August and September 1967). The floating base, pick-up and rescue vessels were repeatedly forced to leave the work site for shelter.

Deputy Minister of Fisheries Vladimir Kamentsev presented to the Central Committee a calculation showing that the Tukan is not worth the cost of raising it

Taking into account the difficult weather conditions and the loss of time for repeated rearrangement of watercraft, measures were taken to speed up the work: the number of divers and other specialists was increased, a work schedule was introduced with the use of overtime hours, and the lifting technology was changed. At the beginning of September, the state of work was reviewed by the Ministries of the Navy and Fisheries. At the suggestion of the Ministry of Fisheries, work was continued in the autumn, by joint decision measures have been taken to speed them up. However, continued unfavorable weather prevented the work from moving forward. Involving the Danish company Crower in joint work, due to the actual weather conditions, turned out to be impractical. Due to the onset of the autumn-winter period, on November 14, with the consent of the vessel owner, a decision was made to temporarily stop ship-lifting operations until the spring of 1968.

For the entire period from June to October 1967, 70-75% of the total volume of ship-lifting work was completed, for which the customers paid the ASPTR detachment about 900 thousand rubles. All payments for the work performed, including the payment of currency to personnel, were made with the execution of the relevant documents with confirmation from the customer’s representative, who was constantly at the work site.

In December 1967, the Baltic Shipping Company carried out a review of the operation to lift the trawler. It was noted that in addition to unfavorable weather, there were significant shortcomings in the preparation and execution of the expedition. The main shortcomings include: a delay in the start of work at the lifting site for one month due to the late arrival of a keel vessel belonging to the DKBF to equip the roadstead; discrepancy between the actual condition of the soil at the site of the sunken ship and the characteristics presented on the basis of a survey carried out by a third-party organization commissioned by the owner of the trawler (the soil turned out to be much harder, which was not taken into account by the lifting project); insufficient attention to the logistics of the expedition and the organization of ship-lifting operations on site; the lack of diving specialists who, for health reasons, are capable of descending to the sunken ship to depths of up to 40 meters."

Probably, if some super-secret cargo existed and was lifted, the position of the Ministry of Marine Fleet would look much better and Guzhenko would definitely mention it. But the repentant note further said only that the ministry was going to raise the Toucan in the coming 1968.

"The ship broke off and fell to the ground"

However, the USSR Ministry of Fisheries had a completely different opinion on the issue of raising the Tucan. The report of Deputy Minister Vladimir Kamentsev, sent to the Central Committee on April 19, 1968, stated:

“Taking into account that the Ministry of the Navy has a special organization for ship-lifting work, it was decided to lift the vessel by the rescue team of the Baltic Shipping Company and refuse offers from foreign companies that undertook to carry out this work. The Kaliningrad Production Directorate of the Fishing Industry concluded on April 27, 1967 a contract agreement with a detachment for lifting the trawler "Tukan" in 1967 with costs for lifting the ship at approximately 610 thousand rubles...

According to information from the Ministry of the Navy, in 1967, the detachment washed 4 tunnels and installed ship lifting slings in them, sharpened 4 log 400-ton ship-lifting pontoons and 1 suspended 400-ton pontoon, completed preparatory work to raise the stern of the Tucan from the ground in order to install slings for the midship 400-ton pontoons.

After these works, two attempts were made to raise the stern of the vessel, but in both cases, for various reasons, the vessel broke off and fell to the ground.

In the second half of September, the detachment made new attempts to raise the bow end of the Tucan, but in this case, too, the ship-lifting equipment was damaged and the work was unsuccessful.

Taking into account these circumstances and the stormy period that had begun, the Ministry of the Navy raised the question of recalling the detachment and postponing ship-lifting work to 1968.

According to reporting data, in 1967, the Kaliningrad Production Directorate of the Fishing Industry spent 2,146 thousand rubles on ship-lifting work on the Tukan, including 900 thousand rubles (instead of 610 thousand rubles) to pay the rescue team (instead of 610 thousand rubles) and, in addition, 22,086 foreign currency rubles to pay the foreign currency part of the salary to engineering and technical personnel, divers, sailors and other participants in the work.

In the first quarter, the rescue team presented to the Kaliningrad Production Directorate of the Fishing Industry a draft contract for work on lifting the trawler "Tukan" in 1968 within 150 days."

There was not a single word about the secret cargo here either. However, the following calculation was given, the accuracy of which was not disputed by the Central Committee:

“According to calculations made by the detachment, the cost of the work planned for 1968 will be about 850 thousand rubles for the detachment’s work, 750 thousand rubles for the maintenance of the Tungus base, payment for the services of a keel vessel, rental of pontoons, services of a rescue vessel and others, about 400 thousand rubles, and in total about 2 million rubles and 32 thousand rubles in foreign currency. Thus, total costs for lifting the trawler, the amount was determined to be at least 4.2 million rubles.

However, the contract does not provide any guarantees for ensuring the lifting of the vessel and does not provide for liability for expenses in the event of failure to complete the work.

During the long stay of the vessel at the bottom, it received additional damage and wear from exposure to bad weather and from corrosion, and especially from impacts when falling on the ground during unsuccessful attempts to raise the stern in 1967, in connection with this, restoration of the trawler will require high costs, which are determined calculations of 1.3 million rubles.

Consequently, the total cost of lifting and repairing the Tukan trawler will be about 6 million rubles, with a residual value of the vessel of 1.4 million rubles. In connection with the above, and also due to the lack of guarantees about the unconditional provision of the lifting of the Tukan trawler, the USSR Ministry of Fisheries decided not to continue this work in 1968.”

So the mystery of why the ship was not raised turned out to be not military, but financial. The importance of the cargo that was sent with the Tucan to Cuba, apparently, is also significantly exaggerated. And the whole story turned out to be not about secrets, but about the human factor. In all the diversity of its manifestations.

This installation usually consists of two main engines, from which power is transmitted to one propeller through a gearbox.

Gear ratio 1:2; 1:4 allows the use of motors with increased speed. Gearboxes in such installations only reduce the crankshaft speed; reverse is ensured by reversing the engine or using a rotary propeller.

The diesel gearbox diagram is shown in Figure 2.5. The crankshafts of the two main engines 5 are connected through couplings 4 to the primary shafts of the gearbox. The gearbox is a single-stage gear transmission. Gears 3 and 6 rotate a large gear connected to shafting 2 and propeller 1. The shafting thrust bearing is mounted in the gearbox. Thanks to the presence of a gearbox, the propeller shaft rotation speed can be reduced to a value that ensures high propeller efficiency.

Figure 2.5 - Diesel gear transmission diagram

Induction or hydraulic couplings that allow sliding are used as couplings, which ensures quick disconnection of the shaft line from the crankshafts, shutdown of one of the engines in case of malfunctions, and also protects the gearbox gears from sudden impacts when the gear is engaged.

Diesel gear transmission is currently widely used in installations with two medium-speed main engines of the French company Semt-Pilstik. These engines are four-stroke, trunk, V-shaped, gas turbine supercharged, with a number of cylinders from 12 to 16. All engines of this type (PC-2V-400) have the same cylinder dimensions and piston stroke. Their cylinder power is 342 kW (465 hp) at a rotation speed of 500 rpm.

Figure 2.4 - Location of mechanisms in the engine room of the Rembrandt PPR

1 - fresh and sea water pumps for the main engine; 2 - evaporators; 3 - distillate pumps; 4 - desalination plant; 5 - pumps for ship systems; 5 - diesel generator; 7 - warm box; 8 - boiler feed pumps; 9,10 - outboard hydrophores and fresh water; 11 - steam boiler; 12 - desk; 13 - oil and fuel separators; 14 - pumps serving the main engine; 15 - compressed air cylinders; 16 - fresh and sea water pumps of the main engine; 17 - bilge water separator; 18 - cooling water pumps of the refrigeration unit; 19 - fresh water coolers for auxiliary engines; 20 - diesel generators; 21 - oil coolers of the main engine; 22 - fresh water refrigerators of the main engine; 23 - main engine

Gearboxes with such engines are installed on transport refrigerators of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, Amur Bay, and Russky Island types.

Installations of a similar type are used on RTM “Tropic” and “Atlantic”. They consist of two main single-row NVD SKL engines for RTM Tropic, 490 kW (670 hp), for RTM Atlantic, 850 kW (1160 hp), connected to the gearbox using induction couplings.

A special feature of these installations is the use of reversible electric shaft generators (shown in Fig. b with a dashed line), which allow either taking power from the main engines to supply electricity to ship consumers, or using the power of a ship power plant to move the ship. The shaft generators are driven from the driven gear of the gearbox through a transmission that increases the rotation speed. Such installations allow, when performing fishing operations (lowering, raising fishing gear), the power reserve of the main engines to power the fishing mechanisms through a shaft generator.

During transitions, the shaft generator can be used as a shaft motor to increase the speed of the vessel.

RTM type "Atlantic"

Fishing freezer trawlers of the Atlantic type were built by the Volkswerf national enterprise in Stralsund (GDR) to order Soviet Union. The trawler is designed to operate in the Middle and South Atlantic regions, equipped with a device for stern trawling, an installation for freezing the catch and storing fish products in refrigerated holds.

The vessel is single-screw, double-deck, with excess freeboard and the power plant is located in the middle part. The main deck houses a three-tier superstructure. The stem is inclined, the stern is transom with a flat transom sloping towards the bow. Main characteristics of the Atlantic type vessel:

Trawlers of the Atlantic type are built to the USSR Register class

The propulsion unit is diesel-geared, two-machine, with a rotating propeller and power take-off to shaft generators.

Two main engines type 8NVD-48. 2AU transmit power to the rotary propeller through induction couplings and a gearbox. Part of the power through the same gearbox can be selected by a three-phase alternating current shaft generator operating on the ship's network, and by a generator direct current, working on fishing mechanisms. Ship power plant alternating current consists of four diesel generators with a capacity of 320 kVA each, an emergency diesel generator with a capacity of 50 kVA, switchgear, equipment and electricity sewer networks.

The basis of the auxiliary boiler installation is a water-tube boiler of the Wagner-Hochdruck system with a steam capacity of 2.5 t/h at a pressure of 785 kPa (8 kgf/cm2).

Vacuum evaporation unit, direct evaporation. All auxiliary mechanisms servicing the power plant are electrically driven.

The layout of the trawler's engine room is shown in Figure 2.6.

Propulsion installation. The main engines on the Atlantic-type RTM are SKL engines produced by the plant named after. K. Liebknecht (GDR). Four-stroke engines of single action, trunk-type, reversible, with gas turbine supercharging. The main characteristics of the engines are given below.

Engine type 8NVD-482AU

Number of cylinders z 8

Cylinder diameter Du, mm 320

Piston stroke Sp, mm 480

Cylinder volume Vc, dm3 38.6

Compression ratio 13.25

Rotation speed n, rpm 375

Continuous power Ne, kW (e. hp)... 852(1160)

Starting speed n START, rpm. 80

Minimum stable frequency

rotation n min, rpm 200

Forbidden speed zone n cr,

rpm 250-300

average speed piston with t, m/s 6.0

Compression end pressure MPa (kgf/cm2).. 4, 12-4.1 (44-43)

Maximum cycle pressure p G, MPa

(kgf/cm2) 6.67-7.705 (68-72)

Average effective pressure p e, kPa

(kgf/cm*) 883 (9)

The pressure increase ratio in the turbocharger is 1.27-1.33

Maximum exhaust back pressure

R V.G. , kPa (mm water column) 1.962 (200)

Exhaust gas outlet temperature

from cylinders t Ts VG, °C 375-425

Exhaust gas temperature before turbo

supercharger t* Г,°C 435-85

Specific fuel consumption g E g/kWh

(g/e.l. with h) 218+ 5%(160+5%)

Figure 2.6 - General arrangement of mechanisms in the RTM type engine room

"Atlantic"

1 - main engines 8NVD-48A2U; 2 - induction couplings; 3 - gearbox; 4 - AC shaft machine; 5 - DC shaft machine; 6 - boiler installation condenser; 7 - auxiliary steam boiler; 8 - fuel oil pump; 9 - lubricating oil pump; 10 - feed water pump; 11 - drainage pumps; 12 - bilge water separator; 13 - bilge pump; 14 - seawater pump for diesel generators; 15 - main engines seawater pump; 16 - auxiliary diesel generators; 17 - diesel generator starting cylinder; 18 - fuel pumps; 19 - reserve oil pump of the main engines; 20 - air cylinder of the control system; 21 - starting cylinders of the main engine; 22 - fuel separator; 23 - electric compressor; 24 - fresh cooling water pump for diesel generators; 25 - reserve fresh cooling water pump for main engines; 26 - vacuum pump of the evaporation unit; 27- condenser of a desalination plant; 28 - evaporator condenser cooling pump; 29 - fire pump; 30 - evaporator brine pump, 31 - oil separator; 32 - cooling water pump for oil coolers of the gearbox; 33 - oil heater; 34 - gear oil cooler; 35 - gearbox oil pump

The engine design is similar to the design of the 8NVD-48AU diesel engine installed on the Mayak type SRTM. The increase in power was achieved by increasing the rotation speed to 375 rpm and increasing the degree of boost.

Power is transferred from the main engines to the gearbox through two induction couplings. The couplings have the following main characteristics:

Type 1K2000-16/3

Rated torque, MN m (kgf m) 218(2220)

» excitation current, A 85

Rated excitation voltage, V 120

Forced excitation:

voltage, V 170

Limit torque at rated excitation

MN-m (kgf-m) 245(2500)

Limit torque at forced

excitation MN m (kgf m) 275(2800)

Nominal slip, % 2.5

The excitation voltage of the induction couplings is supplied from two converters consisting of three-phase current transformers and silicon rectifiers. The clutches are turned on from the CPU. The clutch activation system has a blocking device that is activated in the following cases:

If the main motor shafts rotate in different directions;

if the oil pressure in the gearbox and cooling water in the stern tube are below the minimum permissible;

When the turning device is turned on;

When shifting the rudder blade to an angle exceeding 40°.

The gearbox is designed to transmit the power of the main engines to one propeller shaft and the power take-off shaft, as well as to change the rotation speed. Gearbox characteristics:

Input shaft rotation speed, rpm 375

» » propeller shaft, rpm 175

» » power take-off shaft, rpm. 1000

Power transmitted to the propeller shaft, kW (e.p.) 1705 (2320)

» » » take-off shaft, kW 556

Maximum transmitted power, kW (e.p.) 1935(2633)

The gears of the gearbox are cylindrical, helical. All gearbox shafts, except the power take-off shaft, are placed in plain bearings filled with babbitt. The power take-off shaft rotates in rolling bearings. A shaft turning device is mounted at the free end of the power take-off shaft. The gearbox has a built-in segmental thrust bearing designed for a maximum thrust of 265 kN (27 tf).

As a propulsion device, the trawler is equipped with an adjustable pitch propeller manufactured by the plant named after. K. Gottwald (GDR). Characteristics of the rotary propeller:

Screw diameter, mm. 3400

» hubs, mm 1000

Constructive pitch ratio 0.852

Rotation speed, rpm 175

Maximum blade rotation angle forward/backward, ° 25/20

The hydraulic pitch change mechanism is located outside the hub.

The propulsion unit is controlled from the control center in the engine room, and the propeller pitch is controlled from control posts located in the wheelhouse and in the control center. The installation control system has load indicators on the main engines, providing control over its distribution between diesel engines.

The rotation speed of the engines and propellers is not adjustable.

Let's consider the operating characteristics of a propulsion unit.

Due to the fact that power is taken from the main engines to an alternating current shaft generator, the engines operate at a constant speed. Changing the speed of the vessel is carried out by changing the pitch of the propeller.

As tests have shown, the maximum freewheel speed when driving the propeller of one engine at nominal mode is 10.4 knots. The rotation angle of the rotary propeller blades is 16°.

When an AC shaft machine operates in the shaft motor mode together with two main engines, the free running speed increases by 0.2 knots, which is practically insignificant.

Tests of the Aviator RTM were carried out while the vessel was operating with 31-meter bottom and 25-meter mid-depth trawls.

The wind and waves during the testing period did not exceed points three.

Tests of the propulsion unit on trawling showed that at towing speeds of a bottom trawl of 4.5 knots and a mid-water trawl of 4.7 knots, the power consumed from the main engines is 0.65-0.67 of the nominal at a blade rotation angle of 15°.

The maximum trawling speed in calm weather when the two main engines are operating at a mode close to the nominal one and the blade rotation angles are within 16-16.5° is about 5 knots.

When one main engine operates with a load of 80-4-85% of the nominal (a=11.5-f-12°), the trawling speed is 3.5-3.9 knots.

Trawling against the wind in waves up to 6 points is possible at a speed of up to 4 knots without overloading the main engines. During the transition to the fishing site, the vessel's progress is ensured by the operation of two main engines. The rotation angle of the propeller propeller blades is set within 19-21° depending on weather conditions.

When moving from the field to the port, due to an increase in the vessel's load, the rotation angle of the propeller propeller blades decreases to 17-20°. The average daily fuel consumption for the main engines during transitions is 8.7 tons/day, and in the field - 5.1 tons/day.

A diesel-geared installation with power take-off through alternating and direct current shaft machines is called a “father and son” installation.

A diesel-geared unit similar to the SEU RTM "Atlantika" with power take-off is installed on the UPS "Khersones", as well as on ships of the RTM-K-S "Moozund" type.

Power plants with diesel-electric transmission. Such installations are used mainly on ships with powerful fish processing equipment on board (production refrigerators, canning trawlers), where flexible redistribution of the energy generated by the power plant is required: on transitions - maximum use of the generated energy for the needs of the movement of the vessel, and in the fishery - ensuring work fishing and fish processing mechanisms. This possibility is provided by a power plant with electrical transmission. The electrical transmission diagram is shown in Figure 2.7.

Figure 2.7 - Electrical transmission diagram

In the engine rooms of ships with diesel-electric transmission, units consisting of diesel engines 5 and generators driven by them 4 are installed electric current. The propeller 1 in this gear is driven by an electric motor 2, which receives energy through the distribution board 3. The mechanical work of the main engines 4 in this gear turns into electrical energy, which is then converted to mechanical work in the propeller motor 2 to drive the propeller. This double conversion of energy naturally reduces transmission efficiency.

Electric transmission has become widespread on a number of industrial refrigerators and canning trawlers due to the following advantages:

Possibility of maneuvering the number of working diesel operators, which allows them to be used in whole or in part depending on energy needs;

Easy implementation of reverse using electric switches or CV propellers, which allows you to control the propulsion unit from the bridge;

Possibility of placing the power plant independently of the propeller shafts (absence of intermediate shafts and their tunnels);

Possibility of using main generators to generate current that powers auxiliary mechanisms.

The disadvantages of the electric drive include low efficiency, complexity of the equipment and the need to increase the number of maintenance personnel (in addition to mechanics, electromechanics are also needed); high initial cost.

The installation shown in Figure 2.7 is an installation with a single electrical power system. Diesel generators in this case are not divided into main and auxiliary. The energy they generate, depending on the operating mode of the vessel, is distributed through a distribution board between the propulsion electrical installation and other consumers. The power plants of the “Sever” type trawlers, the “Altai” type fishing and production refrigerators, and the “Natalia Kovshova” type canning fishing trawlers operate according to this scheme.

There are diesel-electric ships that have main and auxiliary diesel generators, i.e. the propulsion electric installation and the ship's auxiliary power plant are in this case autonomous.

Depending on the type of current, power plants with diesel-electric transmission can be of direct current (field refrigerator of the Druzhba type) and alternating current (field refrigerator of the Altai and Zelenodolsk types). The increased use of alternating current in modern diesel-electric installations is due to the compactness, ease of design and maintenance of alternating current generators, electric motors and other equipment compared to direct current equipment.

Power plants with reverse gear transmission to the propeller from a non-reversible engine.

This type of installation is used on small-tonnage fishing vessels: medium and small seiners, small trawlers and reception and transport vessels with a main engine power of 60-140 kW (80 - 200 hp). A diagram of the engine room with such a power plant for a medium-sized Black Sea seiner is shown in Figure 2.8

Figure 2.8 - Schematic plan of the engine room of an offshore fishing vessel

The main engine 8 (110 kW diesel) rotates the propeller 1. Power is transmitted from the engine to the propeller by a shaft line. It consists of separate shafts: intermediate 24 and stern tube, or propeller, 26, interconnected by flanges 3. The intermediate shaft is located in support bearings 4, and the stern shaft is located in stern tube bearings 2, which are installed in the stern tube 25. At the end of the stern shaft propeller 1 is fixed. The engine crankshaft is connected to the shaft line through a reverse gearbox 21, with the help of which the direction of rotation of the shaft line and propeller changes. A thrust bearing is located in the reverse gear housing. It absorbs the pressure created by the propeller.

To provide energy for the ship's auxiliary and field mechanisms - pumps, winches, net-lifting machines - an auxiliary engine 17 (14 kW diesel) is located in the engine room on the starboard side, which drives an electric generator. A fire pump 9 driven by an electric motor is installed on the left side. In the bow there is a bilge pump 12, which pumps water out of the hold and is driven directly from the main engine. The main engine is started by an electric starter.

To power the electric starter and for lighting the premises, batteries are provided, located in cabinet 22 on the starboard side. If the electric starter fails, the main engine can be started with compressed air, which is stored in cylinders 20. Compressed air is also used for other needs. Its supply can be replenished by compressor 19. At the aft bulkhead there is a distribution board 23 of the ship's electrical equipment, a water heating boiler 6 and a coal bunker 5. On the sides there are tanks: the main fuel supply 7 and 18, oil 14 and consumable fuel 16. At the bow bulkhead there is a consumable oil tank 11. Hand pumps are located next to the tanks: 10 - for water, 13 - for oil, 15 - for fuel.

To carry out maneuvers and reverse the main engine, the small-sized vessels are manufactured together with reverse gearboxes, with the help of which it is possible to change the direction of rotation of the propeller shaft and reduce its rotation speed. The design of the reverse gearbox also includes a disconnecting device.

Shafts 13 and 9 have disks 3 and 15. A third disk 4 is placed between them, which rotates together with the housing 2, connected by flange 1 to the engine crankshaft.

Figure 2.10 shows a longitudinal section of the reverse gearbox of the 2ChSP 10.5/13 engine, operating according to the above scheme with a gear ratio of 1:1.35 in reverse and 1:1.25 in forward. The position numbers in Figure 2.9 are the same as in Figure 2.10.

Figure 2.9 - Diagram of a double-disc reverse gearbox

When moving to the right, disk 4 engages with disk 15 and causes it to rotate, and with it through gear 12 and shaft 11 (forward). When moving to the left, disk 4 engages with disk 3 and together with it causes shaft 9 to rotate. The rotation of shaft 9 is transmitted to driven shaft 11 through gears 8 and 10. The direction of rotation will be the same as that of shaft 9, i.e. opposite to the direction of rotation of gear 12 (reverse). The “stop” position corresponds to the middle position of disk 4. In the “stop” position, the engine crankshaft continues to rotate and the propeller shaft will be stopped. The movement of the pressure plate 4 is carried out by the shift lever 5 using the shift clutch 6 of the lever mechanism 14. The advantage of the reverse gearboxes of this design is the possibility of their long-term operation in reverse.

The disadvantages include the limited amount of transmitted torque, as well as the need for very precise installation of the disks in the housing. The slightest misalignment of the disks can lead to overheating and jamming.

To transmit large torques, reverse gearboxes with hydraulic or pneumatic control are used. Maneuvering of such installations can be carried out from remote automated consoles.

Figure 2.10 - Longitudinal section of a double-disc reverse gearbox